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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three chapters which examine family-friendly reforms, child 
planning or children’s early-age outcomes. The following are the titles of the chapters of the 
present dissertation: 
 CHAPTER 1: Are Parents and Grandparents Substitutes or Complements? The 
Effect of Parental and Grandparental Supervision Time Investment on 
Children’s Early-Age Development. 
 CHAPTER 2: The Effect of Family Welfare Support on the Likelihood of Having 
Another Child and Parents’ Labor Supply. 
 CHAPTER 3: The Effect of Maternity Leave Expansions on Fertility Intentions: 
Evidence from Switzerland. (With Dr. Barbos) 
Chapter 1 uses evidence from Scotland to examine the effect of grandparents’ childcare 
provision relative to the effect of parents’ time input on children’s cognitive, social and 
behavioral development at an early age. We construct a model of skills and knowledge 
accumulation, taking into account the time investment in the child since birth, and empirically 
test the hypothesis that both grandparents’ and parents’ supervision time influence different 
aspects of early-age child development. The findings provide evidence of complementarity 
between parental and grandparental involvement in the child-rearing process. Specifically, while 
parents’ supervision time has a larger impact on children’s social and behavioral development 
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than an additional hour spent with grandparents, the grandparents’ effect on children’s 
vocabulary enhancement is larger than that of the parents. These results are consistent with the 
findings of the psychology literature that not only parents but also other relatives and people 
children socialize with determine children’s development at an early age. Our findings imply a 
beneficial role of grandparents, and provide a strong argument in favor of policy considerations 
aimed to promote grandparental involvement in the child-rearing process in the first few years of 
life. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the impact of family allowances on the likelihood of having 
another child, and the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. Due to a measurement 
error in the key explanatory variable, we adopt an instrumental variable approach as a major 
estimation technique. More specifically, as instruments for the support reported by individuals, 
we use the eligibility amount of benefits, as well as indicator variables reflecting a change in the 
allowances after the introduction of the Federal Family Allowance Act (FamZG) which imposed 
a federal floor on child benefits, common to all 26 cantons in Switzerland. In addition to 
examining the effect of child allowances on fertility and labor market outcomes, we also study a 
second, closely related but distinct matter. Specifically, we identify the causal impact of the 
introduction of a universal floor on child benefits on the previously-mentioned outcomes. 
The findings indicate that benefits play a large role in family decision-making. First, using 
an instrumental variable approach, we find that an increase in the family support improves the 
likelihood of having another child, but does not affect labor market outcomes. Second, a 
difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of the introduction of a minimum amount of child 
allowances all cantons are obliged to pay indicates that a floor on benefits led to a significant 
increase in the likelihood of having a child in affected cantons relative to unaffected ones while 
ix 
 
there was no significant difference between the differential effect of the policy on labor supply in 
affected and unaffected cantons. From a policy perspective, the results imply that providing 
financial support to families for raising children at a lower cost is likely to positively affect 
fertility without having an adverse effect on the labor market in countries where federal decision-
makers aim to improve fertility rates. 
Finally, Chapter 3 utilizes data from the European Social Survey to study the effect of the 
expansion of the mandatory paid maternity leave implemented in Switzerland in 2005, on 
individuals’ fertility intentions. Several earlier papers examined the effect on fertility outcomes or 
fertility intentions of changes in the duration of the paid parental leave of a relatively large 
magnitude of one year. The maternity benefit expansion implemented in Switzerland in 2005 was 
of a relatively small magnitude, from 8 unpaid weeks to 14 mandatory paid weeks, and thus its 
effect on fertility choices is less evident ex ante. Nevertheless, the findings from our estimations 
provide evidence of a differential change in fertility intentions between the two waves in the 
treatment group relative to the control group, suggestive of a positive effect of the 
implementation of the maternity benefit expansion on fertility intentions. We further evaluate 
three channels though which this positive effect may affect individuals’ child planning. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
ARE PARENTS AND GRANDPARENTS SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? THE 
EFFECT OF PARENTAL AND GRANDPARENTAL SUPERVISION TIME INVESTMENT ON 
CHILDREN’S EARLY-AGE DEVELOPMENT1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the impact of grandparents’ supervision time input relative to the effect 
of parents’ childcare provision on children’s cognitive, social and behavioral development at an 
early age. We identify the effects of interest through panel data estimation methods and Zellner’s 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The findings provide evidence of complementarity 
between parental and grandparental involvement in the child-rearing process. Specifically, 
grandparental care has a stronger effect than parental intervention on the vocabulary skills of the 
child. However, parents’ time input in the child has a larger impact than does the supervision 
time investment of grandparents on the socio-behavioral development and the picture similarities 
measure of cognitive ability of children between 3 and 6 years old. 
Keywords: Cognitive, Behavioral, Development, Grandchildren, Grandparent, Early age 
  
                                                          
1 I thank helpful comments from Andrei Barbos, Padmaja Ayyagari and Joshua Wilde. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive, social and behavioral development at an early age has an effect on later 
educational attainment, health, behavioral and socio-economic outcomes of children. These 
different aspects of the maturity process can be influenced by all caregivers who supervise the 
child. Therefore it is interesting to explore the relative importance of grandparents, other 
childcare providers and parents in the enhancement of early childhood outcomes for the 
following reasons. Grandparents can influence the early development of children through 
intergenerational transfer of experience, wisdom, knowledge and skills. They can help parents in 
the child-rearing process and might have more time, vigor and willingness to spend quality in 
addition to supervision time with the child. Grandparents can also directly affect early 
educational attainment of the child through helping him/ her learn letters and numbers, do 
homework, and develop practical skills which the child is likely to use later in life. However, this 
does not necessarily imply that grandparental care is sufficient for adequate child development. 
This paper addresses the question of whether grandparents and parents can be thought of as 
substitutes or complements in the development process of children, and quantifies the relative 
effect of parental and grandparental supervision time on child outcomes. 
Previous literature focused on either the impact of grandparental provision of child care on 
grandparents, or the effect of grandparental resources, mainly material and financial, on the 
educational outcome of the grandchild. However, existing articles on the effect of downward 
transfers (i.e. transfers from grandparents to children) on child behavior and educational 
achievement are limited and inconclusive. We contribute to the existing literature by exploring 
the importance of raising grandchildren on their early-age development. We extend a previously 
developed model of skills and knowledge accumulation to take into account the supervision time 
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investment in the child not only by parents but also by grandparents. We employ Scottish data in 
FE panel data regression analysis and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in order to identify 
the effect of the number of hours of childcare provision by grandparents relative to that of parents 
on three measures of child development at an early age. 
Our findings are indicative of a significant difference between the effect of grandparental 
childcare provision and parental time investment in the child on the social and behavioral 
outcomes of children under 6, as well as on their cognitive attainment. While parents’ supervision 
time has a larger impact on children’s social and behavioral development than an additional hour 
spent with grandparents, the grandparents’ effect on children’s vocabulary enhancement is larger 
than that of the parents. Transferring 10 hours a week from the parents to the grandparents 
improves children’s cognitive ability by 2.2%. These results are consistent with the findings of 
the psychology literature that not only parents but also other relatives and people children 
socialize with determine children’s development at an early age (Harriss 2009). 
Our findings imply a beneficial role of grandparents, and provide a strong argument in 
favor of policy considerations aimed to promote grandparental involvement in the child-rearing 
process in the first few years of life. Such policies include national insurance credit grants, 
financial allowances and paid leave, such as the ones recently implemented in the UK, Germany, 
Portugal and other European countries. In the context of Scotland and other countries in which 
childcare is not sufficient in some areas or cost-prohibitive country-wide, parents have to be 
aware of the consequences of employing a grandparent as a substitute for childcare or 
themselves. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing 
literature. Section 3 presents the empirical models, explicates the identification strategies, and 
discusses some threats to the validity of the findings. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
4 
 
empirical analysis of the paper. Section 5 presents the findings of this study. Finally, Section 6 
discusses the policy implications, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section summarizes the existing literature related to grandparenthood and the effect of 
investing in children on their outcomes. 
2.1. LITERATURE ON THE EFFECT OF GRANDPARENTHOOD 
A number of articles, such as Jendrek (1993) and Arpino et al. (2014), considered how 
providing care to grandchildren affects the elder generation. Specifically, they examined the 
effect of grandparenting on the cognitive score of grandmothers. They found that providing care 
to a grandchild had a positive impact on the verbal fluency of the grandparent but did not have a 
significant impact on three other measures of cognitive development: numeracy, immediate 
recalls, and delayed recalls. Jendrek (1993) utilized the results from an interview of grandparents 
who have taken care of their grandchildren every day in order to investigate whether taking care 
of a grandchild changes grandparent’s lifestyle, friendships, relationship with the family and with 
the spouse. The article was purely descriptive, and the effect on children was not included in the 
analysis. Another study, conducted by Bowers et al. (1999) contributed to the literature by 
showing a correlation between caregiving and grandmothers’ life satisfaction, stress and feeling 
of a burden. The results showed that behavioral problems of the grandchild made a grandmother 
feel a larger burden, and decreased her satisfaction from taking care of a grandchild. 
Vendell et al. (2003) studied the factors, such as mother’s age, ethnicity, employment status 
and others, which influence the likelihood of observing four types of grandparental childcare: 
extended full-time, extended part-time, sporadic and no routine care. The results indicated that all 
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types of care were more likely when the grandparent lives in the household. The probability of 
sporadic care was higher when the mother was younger and worked non-standard hours, while 
the chance of full-time care relative to extended part-time care was higher for mothers who 
worked full-time. 
Our study is different from the above-mentioned ones in that we are interested in the 
comparison of the importance of grandparental involvement relative to that of parents for the 
development outcomes of the child. 
2.2. LITERATURE ON THE EFFECT OF INVESTING IN CHILDREN ON THEIR OUTCOMES 
Prior literature also considered the effect of grandparents’ financial resources, human 
capital, social status and acquaintances, rather than time investment, on grandchildren. Some of 
these papers confirmed the existence of an effect on child outcomes (e.g., Zeng and Xie 2014) 
while others did not (e.g., Bol et al. 2016; Erola et al. 2007). For example, Bol et al. (2016) 
studied the effect of grandparents’ education, occupational status and culture on the educational 
outcome of the grandchild. Pedersen et al. (2015) investigated the effect of grandparents’ 
economic, cultural, and social capital resources on grandchildren’s choice of secondary education 
(academic, vocational, or none). They showed that cultural capital possessed by grandparents had 
a positive effect on the probability that the grandchild would choose academic education, but 
economic and social resources of the grandparents did not influence educational choice (Pedersen 
et al. 2015). Further, evidence from the Netherlands was indicative of the lack of a significant 
impact of grandparent’s resources on the educational success of grandchildren. 
In contrast, this article investigates the effect of time investment in the child by the parents 
and grandparents rather than the impact of financial support or social status. We also test the 
hypothesis that there is a difference in the effect of time input in child development, provided by 
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grandparents relative to parents. The differential effect has been extracted from a model similar to 
the ones developed by Blau et al. (1992), Duncan et al. (2003), Bernal (2008) and Bernal and 
Keane (2010, 2011). However, while they investigated the effect of child care and the time 
parents supervise their children on child development, we also incorporate grandparents' 
supervision time in this article. 
Specifically, Blau et al. (1992) studied the effect of maternal employment on child’s 
cognitive development. Their findings indicated that maternal employment of 100% a week was 
associated with a decline in the standardized cognitive ability score of the child by 5.8 points in 
the first year, but had a positive effect of 4.2 points in the following three years. These results 
imply absence of a net effect on child’s development in the first few years of life.2 
Duncan et al. (2003) examined the effect of childcare quality on academic and cognitive 
skills of children and found a positive impact. Bernal (2008) developed a structural model of the 
decision of married mothers about whether to use child care or not and whether to work part-
time, full-time, or not work, and then, examined the effect of the combination of the two 
decisions on the cognitive outcome of the child. He evaluated the effect of maternal employment, 
day care child inputs and household income on the reading and mathematical skills of children 
between 3 and 6. His empirical findings suggested that an increase in full-time employment of 
the mother by 1 year lowers the scores of the child by 1%, and utilization of child care for a year 
more reduces the child cognition test score by 0.8%. Thus, if a mother is employed full-time and 
uses child care for an extra year, the ability test score of her child decreases by 1.8%. 
                                                          
2 The authors provide 2 possible explanations of the impact after the first year: mother’s employment is associated 
first, with higher household income, and second, with more contacts of the child with children and adults as a result 
of non-maternal care, which may affect the cognitive development of the child. 
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Bernal and Keane (2010) extended Bernal’s work (2008) to single mothers, and obtained 
similar results, with the latter effect of interest being 2.7% instead of 1.8%. They investigated the 
effect of maternal time, alternative childcare and goods inputs on child cognitive achievement at 
ages 4-6 in the case of single mothers, and created a model of the employment and child care 
decisions of a mother in order to deal with potential selection bias. 
Finally, Bernal and Keane (2011) estimated the effect of single-mother time input on child 
cognitive development. Using welfare reforms, including TANF, the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), subsidies provided by the Childcare Development Fund, and Child support enforcement 
for single mothers, as instruments for childcare use, they found that an additional year of child 
care lowered test scores of children by 2.1%. 
2.3. CONTRIBUTION 
As shown in the previous subsections, evidence from previous literature is mixed. 
Furthermore, none of the prior papers emphasized the effect of grandparental caregiving. 
This article delves more deeply in both the predictors of success and the outcomes of the 
child. It contributes to the literature in several ways. First, instead of looking at the effect of 
material and connection support provided by grandparents, as it has been done in most previous 
papers, we explain the impact of the amount of supervision time grandparents devote to 
grandchildren, in addition to the effect of parental supervision time investment and non-family-
based child care. In other words, the focus is on non-material support influencing child outcomes 
through transmission of experience, multi-generational and potentially multi-cultural exposure to 
ideas, assistance in daily tasks and attention. 
Second, unlike previous papers which restrict attention to either educational or cognitive 
attainment, we verify whether grandparental intervention can explain some of the variability in 
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both cognitive achievement, and social and behavioral development of the child relative to the 
effect of parents. This is different from most of the papers whose dependent variable captures 
cognition or life satisfaction of grandparents. 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous paper whose analysis has been 
based on Scottish data. Focusing on this particular country is important due to the high childcare 
costs there, as well as the unavailability of formal care in some areas. 
Finally, most studies, with the exception of Black et al. (2005), were based on data obtained 
from interviews with few observational subjects. In addition, most studies except for Bernal 
(2008) and Keane and Bernal (2010, 2011), used cross-sectional data which did not allow making 
a distinction between past and present effects. We address this shortcoming by using a 
longitudinal dataset, following more than 5000 children for 6 years. This allows us to distinguish 
between time investment into the child in the current moment and time inputs in previous periods 
because skills and abilities are continuously acquired over time, and parental and grandparental 
involvement may have both an immediate and a delayed effect on the cognitive, social and 
behavioral formation of the child. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND IDENTIFICATION 
This section explains the identification strategies employed in our study. Subsection 3.1 
presents the methodology selected to identify the effects of interest. Subsection 3.2 discusses the 
reasoning behind the use of seemingly unrelated regressions in addition to the major 
specification. Subsection 3.3 describes the potential validity threats and the methods we use to 
check the legitimacy of our analysis. 
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3.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The goal of our analysis is to explore the determinants of a full set of child development 
outcomes, including measures of early-age cognitive, social and behavioral development. To 
identify the causal effect of childcare provided by grandparents, we consider a model similar to 
the one developed by Bernal and Keane (2011). Our model is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜶𝑯𝑭𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                 (1) 
In this equation, 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a measure of child development. 𝑯𝑭 is a vector of covariates 
controlling for observed child’s health, family and household characteristics at time period 𝑡. 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
captures child’s acquisition of ability and skills through the process described in the following 
paragraph. 𝛼𝑖  are child-specific fixed effects, or unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity whose 
purpose is to control for unobserved skill endowment of the child. 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed effects, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an unobserved, idiosyncratic error component capturing errors and transitory shocks. 
Subscripts  𝑖 indicate that the variable is defined at children level, and subscripts 𝑡 denote years. 
Following Bernal and Keane (2011), the development of child’s abilities is assumed to be a 
function of his inherent, initial endowment 𝐸𝑖0 with which child 𝑖 was born, and a set of inputs 
(parental and grandparental supervision time spent with the child, child care provided by non-
parental and non-grandparental sources, and goods inputs), enhancing the innate 𝐸𝑖0 over time. 
Intrinsic 𝐸𝑖0 is correlated with a set of observable characteristics of the parents and observable 
characteristics of the child at birth, 𝑿𝑖𝑜, including educational attainment of the parents and 
gender of the child, as well as a component 𝜔𝑖0, capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the 
inherited endowment of the child, partly explained by unobserved ability endowment of the 
parents, and partly due to unexplained endowment of the child itself: 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖0 = 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝜔𝑖0             (2) 
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Then, similarly to Bernal and Keane (2011) and Leibowitz (1974), we assume that a 
production function of child development or acquisition of human capital is given by: 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝜏, 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏, 𝐼𝑖𝜏, 𝐸𝑖0|𝜏: 0 < 𝜏 ≤ 𝑡)           (3) 
In (3), 𝑃𝑖𝜏, 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏, 𝐼𝑖𝜏 are inputs in the development of child 𝑖. Specifically, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a 
measure of parental supervision time inputs. 𝐼𝑖𝑡 are goods inputs used in the production of child 
development. 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏  is grandparental supervision time input into the child, and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is child care 
supervision time input (excluding parental and grandparental time) 𝑡 years after the birth of the 
child. 
As noted by previous authors, it is not easy, if possible at all, to estimate (3) if the inputs 
and 𝜔𝑖0 have a different effect on 𝐸𝑖𝑡 at different ages (Bernal and Keane 2011). Therefore, we 
make three assumptions, standard in the literature. First, we assume that cumulative rather than 
per period time inputs are pertinent to the framework of human capital production. The second 
assumption is that the ability component 𝜔𝑖0 is invariant over time. Finally, we assume a linear 
relationship between 𝐸𝑖𝑡 and the inputs. 
Given (2) and the simplifying assumptions, the behavioral and cognitive ability 
(development) production function in (3) can be expressed as: 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖0 + 𝜋1
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋2
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋3
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                  (4) 
Here, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). In the construction of this equation, 
by including cumulative terms capturing cumulative parental, grandparental, and external 
childcare over time we take into account the possibility that current possession of skills can be 
influenced by both past and present inputs in the development of the child. This is an important 
distinction and improvement of other papers which ignore historical attainment of skills because 
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specifications which incorporate only present inputs impose the strong assumption that present 
outcomes are independent of past investments in the child. 
We use annual household income as a proxy for the unobserved 𝐼𝑖𝑡. Data on caregivers' 
inputs, including grandparents, are available. We assume that parents are residual caregivers, and 
express parental supervision time 𝑃𝑖𝑡 as follows: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇 − 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡        (5) 
In this equation, 𝑇 is total time in a period, which is a week (168 hours) in our specification. 
The expression 𝑇 −  𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 can be interpreted as the number of hours in a week which a 
child certainly does not spend with either a grandparent, or an alternative child care provider.3 
Under the assumptions that there should always be an adult supervising children at an early age 
and that parents are the only residual caregivers, can we rewrite (4) as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝜔𝑖0 + 𝜋1
∑ (𝑇 −  𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡)
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋2
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋3
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
= 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝜔𝑖0 + 𝜋1𝑇 + (𝜋2 − 𝜋1)
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ (𝜋3 − 𝜋1)
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝛽2
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝛽3
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                  (6)4 
                                                          
3 We assume that parents supervision time is given by the difference between the total number of hours in a week 
and grandparents’ and other care providers’ supervision time spent with a child. However, it is likely that a parent 
and a grandparent sometimes supervise a child simultaneously. In that case, the assumption that parents are residual 
caregivers may lead to underestimation of the time parents spend with a child because the amount of time of 
simultaneous care-giving has already been counted as time under grandparents’ supervision. Therefore, the effect of 
grandparents on child outcomes will be over-estimated while the impact of parents’ supervision on development of 
the child will be under-estimated. 
4 Alternatively, one may not take the average number of hours spent with the child (i.e. may not divide by the 
number of periods t) because in a production function, one might want to take into account the total amount of inputs 
(here, number of hours invested in the child). As the child grows older (i.e. as t increases), the number of hours 
would increase. However, if one chooses this alternative specification of the model, he/ she has to necessarily 
include a time trend to control for the unavoidable increase in the total number of hours spent with a child as t 
increases. 
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It is important that 𝛽2 ≡ 𝜋2 − 𝜋1 in (6) captures the effect of time the child spends with 
grandparents relative to the effect of parental supervision time investment in the child on child 
development, and similarly, 𝛽3 ≡ 𝜋3 − 𝜋1 shows the effect of time in external childcare relative 
to the effect of parental supervision time with the child on child development outcomes. 
Given equations (1) and (6), we specify the final regression model of interest in the 
following form: 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝛽2
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝛽3
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
𝑡
+ 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜶𝑯𝑭𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (7) 
We estimate different specifications of this model taking into account only individual FE, 
individual and time FE, and individual, time and regional effects. Appendix A2 contains all 
variables used in the analysis and their descriptions. 
As an alternative specification of the model, since acquisition of skills and ability is a 
continuing process and time investment into the child adds up over time, we distinguish between 
the effect of time investment in the past and in the present in order to examine the immediate 
effect of time investment distinctly from the one which affects child outcomes with a lag. We do 
so by separating previous periods from the current period, and rewrite (7) as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑿𝑖0
′ 𝝑 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡
∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝜏
𝑡−1
𝜏=1
𝑡 − 1
+ 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝜏
𝑡−1
𝜏=1
𝑡 − 1
+ 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋4𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜶𝑯𝑭𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (8) 
The interpretation of the coefficients 𝛽2𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡, 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝛽3𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡, and 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 in (8) is similar 
to that of 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 in (6), described earlier. 
It is also worth mentioning that differentiating between past and present effects would  
make sense given that prior and current involvement into child’s development are not highly 
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correlated. In the context of Scotland, data suggest that the correlation coefficient between the 
sum of hours of all prior-period grandparental childcare provision and current number of hours of 
child care provided by the grandparents is 0.5257, while the correlation coefficient between the 
same variables but for external child care is even smaller, or 0.3832. Both correlation coefficients 
are suggestive of a reasonable motive to tease out past and current time input into the child skill 
development production function. 
Finally, while we identify the effect of time spent under parents' or grandparents' 
supervision which is available in the dataset, we fail to capture the impact of “quality time” spent 
with the child which is unobserved. Thus we are able to quantify only the impact of supervision 
time investment on child scores. Because supervision time always has to add up to 168 hours per 
week, an additional hour under the supervision of one provider, e.g. a grandparent, is implicitly 
associated with a subtraction of one hour from the time another provider would otherwise spend 
with the child. Thus one cannot estimate the effect of the marginal hour holding everything else 
fixed. 
3.2. SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS 
While using the panel feature of the dataset and applying fixed effects estimations enables 
us to establish causal relationships between the variables of interest and the outcome, examining 
each outcome, one at a time, independently of the others, may not be sufficient in the context of 
child development. The reason is that a given outcome or ability can be a major predictor of 
another capability in the same or subsequent years. In other words, two measures of cognition for 
a given child are likely to be related although the outcomes of one child are not related to those of 
another. If different measures of cognitive development and/ or their values at different ages are 
correlated, and a formal Breusch-Pagan independence test provides evidence of such correlation, 
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then the effects of interest should be explored through a system of equations, related 
stochastically through the correlation between the error terms. This requires the usage of 
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model (Zellner 1962). We construct a SUR 
model with 4 equations of the following form: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑘𝑖 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝛽𝐻𝑟𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑝𝑘𝑖 + 𝜸𝒌𝑿𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (9) 
Here, 𝑘 = 1, … 4 denotes 4 cognitive development outcomes: scores based on children’s 
ability to identify picture similarities and to name items given pictures, both observed at ages 3 
and 5. The parameters in each of the 4 equations in the system are identified simultaneously using 
generalized least squares (GLS). 
Obtaining Aitken’s GLS estimates has two advantages over running a set of multiple OLS 
regressions. First, despite the fact that OLS estimation for each equation separately would yield 
consistent estimation of the parameters even if the disturbances were correlated, GLS estimation 
would improve efficiency. Second, it allows the outcomes to be correlated for a given child while 
still being uncorrelated across children. A formal justification showing the correlation between 
the disturbances in our application using a Breusch-Pagan test is provided in the results section of 
this article. 
3.3. VALIDITY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
3.3.1. ASSUMPTIONS MADE FOR IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
To employ FE panel data method to identify the parameters in each of the regressions 
presented in subsection 3.1, we assume cross-sectional heterogeneity, i.e. children differ in terms 
of their unobserved, time-invariant characteristics, and we also allow the latent effect or the 
unobserved, time-constant heterogeneity to be correlated with the covariates. We conduct a 
formal Hausman test to detect whether a FE model is the optimal estimation method. 
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3.3.2. SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS ASSUMPTIONS 
A major identification assumption of the SUR model is that for a given child, the stochastic 
error terms are correlated across the 4 equations in the system, while the error terms across 
children are independent and homoscedastic. If the error terms are not correlated across 
equations, the OLS equation-by-equation estimates will be identical to the ones obtained using 
GLS estimation and the SUR model. 
In order to justify using SUR, we conduct a Breusch-Pagan chi-square test for independence 
of the errors. A rejection of the null hypothesis would confirm that GLS would improve 
efficiency, and is thus preferred. 
4. DATA 
4.1. VARIABLES 
All data for this study are extracted from Growing Up in Scotland (GUS) – Birth Cohort 1, 
a panel dataset following 5217 children from birth to early childhood, or the age of 10. This 
dataset contains variables which describe the composition of each participating household. Given 
the relationship of each family member to the child, we find the number of hours of care provided 
by grandparents. Growing Up in Scotland also provides a set of variables controlling for 
household, family, child, and parents characteristics, variables measuring child development and 
early childhood outcomes, as well as different sources and length of childcare provision, 
necessary for our analysis. 
Social, cognitive, and behavioral development, ability, mental and physical health, 
behavior, educational and health well-being of children included in Birth Cohort 1 have been 
tracked for all years of the Growing Up in Scotland study. Families have been first interviewed in 
2004/2005 when the study child in the family was 10 ½ months old (wave 1). Interviews have 
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been conducted face-to-face every year with the respondent being either the mother (in 95% of 
the cases), or the main child-care provider. The respondent has been the same for each family in 
all waves, whenever possible. 
The dependent variables selected for this study include officially reported measures of 
cognitive, social and behavioral development in the survey. More specifically, picture similarity 
(PS) and naming vocabulary (NV) raw scores measure the cognitive development of the child at 
the ages of 34 months (wave 3, year 2007) and 58 months (wave 5, year 2009), while the total 
difficulties (TD) score is a predictor of the behavioral and social development of the child at the 
ages of 46 months (wave 4, year 2008), 58 months (wave 5, year 2009) and 70 months (wave 6, 
year 2010). In what follows, we describe the method in which these three development scores 
have been obtained in the Growing Up in Scotland study. 
First, PS and NV raw scores are extracted from two subtests of the BAS II test, designed to 
estimate the cognitive ability of children at the age of 2 years and 6 months, and 17 years and 11 
months. BAS is individually administered and considered to be appropriate for “administration in 
a non-clinical setting” (Bromley, 2009). In the first experiment, children were given four cards 
with pictures. Then, they were provided a fifth card identical to one of the first four cards, and 
were asked to match the two identical pictures. Based on this experiment, the interviewer 
assigned a PS score, measuring the problem solving capacity of each child. An NV score as a 
predictor of the language skills was obtained by asking children to name items which they were 
observing on pictures provided by the experimenters. 
Second, the TD score was derived based on the computer-based report completed by one of 
the parents of each child (usually the mother). The report contained the answers to a 25-question 
Goodman’s behavioral screening Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), specifically 
designed for children between 3 and 16 and aimed to take into account peer relationship 
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problems, emotional symptoms, inattention or hyperactivity, and conduct issues. The total score 
is calculated as the sum of four scores, assigned to each of the upper-mentioned scales. In the 
original dataset, a lower score indicates a lower level of difficulties, and is thus preferable. In 
order to facilitate interpretation of the results and be consistent with the other development 
measures in this study (for which a higher score is preferred), we rescale the TD score. In 
particular, a score of 35 in the original dataset corresponds to a TD score of 1 in our analysis, the 
original 34 is transformed to 2, and so on. Thus a higher (transformed) TD score is preferable in 
this article. 
Data on each household member and his/ her relationship to the study child are also 
available in the original dataset. We use this information to derive a variable for the presence of a 
mother and a father in the household. Given the legal marital status of each person in the 
household, we derive whether the parents are legally married. The health status of the study child 
is also taken into account by generating a dummy variable for the child not being in good health 
condition, which is equal to one in the instances where the respondent has reported that child’s 
health is in fair, bad or very bad condition. Further, the respondents were asked to release 
information about each childcare provider and the number of hours of paid or unpaid care 
provided each week. This allows us to construct a variable denoting the number of hours of 
childcare provision by a grandparent. We also use the number of hours of care given by all other 
providers, where the weekly hours of care by external providers are calculated as the sum of the 
number of hours of child care by all providers, different from the child’s grandparents. Thus we 
are able to evaluate the effects of those hours on child outcomes with greater precision. This 
gives us a slight advantage over previous papers (e.g., Bernal and Keane 2010) which due to data 
limitations, had to make imputations about whether alternative sources of child care provided 
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full-time or part-time care, based only on the information whether alternative child care was 
provided for at least 10 hours per week. 
It is important to mention that although the number of siblings the study child has may not 
be a direct input into the production of skills and ability of the child of interest, it is useful to 
include it as a control because it may indirectly affect child development because the amount of 
resources allocated to each child may be different depending on the number of children the 
family has. Appendix A2 contains the complete set of all variables utilized in this article, as well 
as their descriptions. 
4.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics respectively, of the continuous and binary 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Evidence suggests that children perform slightly better 
on the NV test of cognitive ability when they are 3 years old, as compared to their score two 
years later, and the result is reversed when comparing PS raw scores although the standards 
remain unchanged. Despite these differences, the mean values of both measures of cognition vary 
between 14.318 and 16.887 (out of a total of 31) in both years. Further, the average TD scores 
measured at ages 4, 5 and 6, seem very close to each other, i.e. we do not observe significant 
differences in this score at different ages, although there is a small upward trend and rising 
dispersion of the scores as the child grows older. The latter observation is suggestive of children 
having fewer social and behavioral difficulties as they grow up. The average transformed TD 
score is 27.53, where the total is 35. 
The statistics related to the time different providers supervise children indicate that the 
average number of hours of childcare provision by grandparents is about 5 hours per week, with 
also being 168 in some exceptional cases, which we exclude in one specification to conduct a 
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robustness check. The average number of hours of childcare provided by grandparents does not 
vary much across the first few years of life of the children. The mean of the number of hours 
given by other sources of childcare changes over time: it increases up until the age of 3, and 
decreases slightly at later age. This is expected because external childcare providers take in 
children only of a certain minimum age. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the number of supervision hours provided by 
grandparents and external care givers. The distribution of hours grandparents supervise 
grandchildren is highly skewed to the right with the majority of grandparents providing care 
fewer than 10 hours per week. The shape of the distribution of supervision hours provided by 
external providers is very similar, with a minor number of external providers supervising a child 
more than 50 hours a week. 
The average number of family members is between 3 and 4, and the average number of 
siblings is about 1. There is a mother in more than 99% of the households, while a father is 
present in about a little more than 82% of the families. Both parents are present in the household 
for 81.83% of the children in the study. 43.83% of the parents of a 1-year-old child living in the 
household are married, but the percentage declines slightly as the child grows older, which may 
be an indication of family destruction. 
The percentage of people being employed ranges from 59 to 79% for both genders in all 
years of the study. Fathers are slightly more likely to be employed than mothers. Mothers are 
more likely to have higher education than fathers. The majority of study children have attended 
pre-school and primary school during the survey period. More specifically, 96.42% of all 
children have already attended pre-school at the age of 6, and more than 98% of the 6-year-old 
children have already started primary school. 
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5. RESULTS 
This section presents the main findings of the article, some secondary results, as well as the 
diagnostic checks we perform in order to verify the validity of our empirical strategies. 
5.1. MAIN RESULTS 
The results from the FE estimations under various specifications are summarized in Tables 
3 to 5. In what follows, we present these results, organized by an area of development. 
First, we look at the TD measure of social and behavioral development. Evidence from the 
FE regression analysis in Table 3 suggests that an increase in the average number of hours per 
week a child has been supervised by the parents at the expense of an additional hour spent with a 
grandparent leads to an increase in the social and behavioral development of the child by 0.1%, 
or a 1% increase for 10 extra hours of parental care per week (Column 1). The significance and 
the magnitudes of the differences between the effects of an additional hour of care provided by 
grandparents relative to that provided by parents in the current period remain the same if we 
separate current period from past periods (Column 5), or if we add one (Column 6) or two 
(Column 7) lags of the hours each care provider supervises the child. All effects are highly 
significant, and imply that spending more time with parents rather than with grandparents is 
beneficial for the improvement of the social and behavioral components of child development. In 
contrast, substituting supervision time with parents for time with external care providers does not 
have a significant impact on children’s TD score. 
Second, analyzing the results for the NV (Table 4) and PS (Table 5) scores of cognitive 
development, we find that grandparents have a larger influence than parents on the vocabulary 
enhancement of children. An additional hour of care per week provided by the grandparents in 
the current period on child’s NV score is 0.22% higher than the effect of an extra hour of parental 
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care, holding all other factors constant. Put differently, transferring 10 hours of supervision per 
week from parents to grandparents enhances child’s vocabulary skills by 2.2% (Column 1). 
Contrary to the effect on the TD score, the effect of alternative child care on the NV measure of 
cognitive ability is also 0.28% higher than the effect of the marginal hour of care provided by 
parents, and the difference is statistically significant. The same estimates on the PS measure of 
cognitive development provide evidence that an additional hour of parental care has a larger 
marginal effect on the PS score relative to the effect of an extra hour of care provided either by a 
grandparent or an external caregiver. More specifically, an increase in the time input into the 
child by the parents by one hour per week at the expense of one hour of grandparental care or 
alternative childcare time leads to an increase in child’s PS score by 0.22% and 0.26%, 
respectively. Similarly to our finding for the TD score, when we distinguish between present and 
average past effect of care, we find that the significance and the magnitude of the estimates 
remain the same (Column 5). The initial results are also consistent with the estimates obtained 
when we add lags of the number of hours different providers spend with children (Columns 6 and 
7). 
For comparison and illustration of the robustness of all findings, we provide the pooled 
OLS and the RE estimates in Columns (2) and (3) of Tables 3, 4 and 5. As expected, the results 
are similar to the ones yielded by the FE regression model. Including time and residential effects 
does not change the significance, direction or magnitude of the effects of interest as well. These 
modifications of the regression are presented in Columns (8) and (9) of Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
The set of the presented FE estimations provides strong evidence of the grandparental and 
parental effect on the cognitive, social and behavioral outcomes of children, but fails to capture 
the potential relationship between these different measures of child development. A formal 
Breusch-Pagan independence test for verification of the existence of a correlation between the 
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error terms of the equations in the system of equations used in the SUR model produces high chi-
square statistic of 1698.943, and a p-value of 0.000, as indicated in Table 6. This result suggests a 
high, statistically significant correlation between the disturbances across the equations, and thus 
justifies the usage of seemingly unrelated regressions. 
Under the assumption that all three outcomes are correlated for a given individual but 
uncorrelated across children, SUR estimation yields the estimates presented in Table 6. A 
simultaneous consideration of different cognitive development measures and the measures at 
different ages indicates that grandparental involvement has a positive impact on the NV score of 
children at age 5, and a negative such impact on the PS score at that age, but no significant 
influence on either of the two scores at the age of 3. More specifically, an additional hour of child 
care provided by a grandparent is associated with an increase in the NV subsection of the BAS II 
test score by 0.66%, but contributes to a reduction in the PS score by 0.08%. Both of these results 
are consistent with the findings from the FE estimation. 
Overall, our findings from both the major FE and the SUR estimations provide evidence 
that on average the grandparental effect exceeds parental involvement on children's vocabulary 
skills, but parents are more important for the PS aspect of the cognitive development of children, 
as well as their behavioral and social skills. These results are suggestive of complementarity 
between parents and grandparents in the child development process. 
Our findings are consistent with the development psychology literature. First, although 
some research in the field showed that children who are more emotionally connected to their 
grandparents are subject to fewer social and emotional problems, have fewer symptoms of 
anxiety and depression, and demonstrate more pro-social behavioral (e.g., Ruiz et al. 2007; 
Kenny et al. 2006), other studies found evidence that as people age, they become more accepting 
and tolerant, lower their expectations, and become more willing to forgive misbehavior of their 
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grandchildren (Seltzer 2016). As a result, although children can obtain specific knowledge and 
skills from their grandparents which they are less likely to be taught by parents, grandchildren are 
less likely to be punished for misconduct by their grandparents than by their parents. Therefore a 
child benefits in the long run if his parents impose rules aimed at disciplining the child and 
enhancing his behavioral development. This is in accordance with our finding that parents have a 
larger effect on the social and behavioral aspects of child development than grandparents do. The 
result is also consistent with the finding of Md-Yunus (2017) that about 13% of children being 
raised by grandparents exhibit a large degree of behavioral problems between the age of 6 and 17 
(Md-Yunus 2017). 
Second, the results of this article confirm Dr. Harris’s theory (2009) related to child 
development. He disproved the so called “nurture assumption” commonly made in the 
development psychology literature. According to this assumption, children’s development and 
personality depend only on the way they are raised by their parents. The parents are responsible 
for what children become. Harris challenged this assumption by stating that this was not 
necessarily true. The environment in which they are raised also plays a role. There is a difference 
between “nature,” or genes, which are highly dependent on the parents, and “nurture,” which 
refers to the way or the environment in which children are raised. Who children socialize with 
and who they spend time with determine different aspects of their development, such as social, 
cognitive, behavioral and mental enhancement. This implies that it is likely that some measures 
of child development can be affected by grandparental involvement more than they are 
influenced by parental time investment. Our results are suggestive of this theory. 
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5.2. SECONDARY RESULTS 
The FE estimation provides additional evidence that poor health has an adverse effect on 
the behavioral development of children between 4 and 6. In addition, higher birth order has a 
significant beneficial effect on the TD and the NV scores of the child (2.63% and 11.82%, 
correspondingly, or 2.84% and 12.48% when past and present involvement of grandparents have 
been separated). The latter finding is expected because older children in the family are likely to 
help their younger siblings to learn, and thus have a beneficial impact on their cognitive, social 
and behavioral development although this does not exclude the presence of other channels 
affecting child growth. 
We also use OLS to test the hypothesis that development scores at specific ages are 
determined by the hours of supervision provided by different providers at each year of childhood 
from birth until the age at which the specific score has been recorded. The findings indicate that 
grandparental involvement has a negative impact on the behavioral development of children at 
the period when the TD score has been measured, but past supervision is insignificant. However, 
the time different care providers supervise children at any specific age does not significantly 
affect their cognitive development. Thus we conclude that, as previously found, only the average 
number of hours of supervision throughout the years and current involvement, rather than the 
time at any given age, are significant determinants of child development at an early age. 
In addition, we perform the major fixed effects estimations using data only on the 
subsample of children supervised by grandparents fewer than a certain number of hours per week, 
and separately, only on a subsample of children who are under grandparents' supervision more 
than a given threshold of hours per week. The former experiment is performed as a robustness 
check the purpose of which is to verify whether the main estimates from the whole sample are 
driven by outliers, where we define outliers as children whose grandparents are their main care 
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providers, i.e. supervise the child more than a given number of hours per week. The selected 
thresholds are 20 and 30 hours per week. The results are presented in Table 7, and are discussed 
in more detail in Section 5.4. They are robust to the choice of an upper bound on the hours of 
grandparental supervision time, regardless of the development score. 
The second experiment involves imposing a lower bound on the number of hours a 
grandparent supervises a child. It allows us to test the hypothesis that grandparents have a 
different from the previously found effect on various aspects of child development provided that 
the child spends a sufficient amount of time under the supervision of a grandparent. The results 
are located in Table 7. Our previous findings of the impact of grandparents on the behavioral 
development of grandchildren have been confirmed and are robust to the imposition of a lower or 
no bound on the amount of supervision time provided by grandparents. However, an interesting 
finding is that if a grandparent supervises a grandchild for more than 13 hours per week, an 
additional hour of grandparental supervision has a significant, positive effect on the PS score of 
cognition of the grandchild. This effect becomes larger with an increase in the lower bound on 
grandparental supervision time. The latter result suggests that even though on average parents 
have a larger impact on the cognitive development of children as measured by their PS score, if a 
sufficiently large number of hours of supervision has been transferred from parents to 
grandparents making the grandparent a main supervisor of the child, grandparents can have a 
significant, positive effect on the cognitive enhancement of children at an early age. This 
observation indicates that grandparents might accept the role of parents in the cognitive 
development of children given that they supervise the child more than 13 hours per week. 
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5.3. DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND VALIDATION OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The results from the diagnostic tests are located in Table 8 and lead to the following 
conclusions. Formal Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis of the existence of non-systematic 
differences in the coefficients estimated using FE and RE, and thus support employing FE over 
RE in all regressions, independent of whether the dependent variable is a measure of social and 
behavioral, or cognitive development. Simultaneously with this finding, using a Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier for RE, we find that in all instances in this article, a FE regression 
model is preferred to pooled OLS. The combination of the latter two results implies that FE 
estimation would be preferred over RE and pooled OLS, and is thus our choice for estimating the 
parameters in all panel data models in this paper. Further, a modified test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticty in a FE model rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedastic error terms in all 
three equations. In order to be certain of the robustness of the standard errors and to correct for 
heteroskedasticity, we use robust Huber/ White standard errors in all regressions in this article. 
5.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We verify whether the results we obtain are robust to various specifications.  
First, as mentioned earlier, identification of the parameters in the FE regressions is not 
influenced by the inclusion of individual, time and regional effects. 
Second, we run the two major FE models (only with current supervision time investment in 
the child, and separated past and present involvement) only for children in good or very good 
health, children whose parents are married, children whose parents are not married, children 
whose parents both live in the same household, and children living in a single-mother household. 
All results are identical to the ones reported in the previous subsection, and are available upon 
request. 
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Finally, we keep only observations for which the hours of grandparental supervision are 
fewer than 30 (and separately, 20) hours per week, and estimate the main model of interest. Such 
an exclusion of outliers does not change the significance of the estimates, and does not yield large 
changes in their magnitudes. In particular, as shown in Table 7, transferring one hour of care 
from the parents to the grandparents increases the NV score of the child by 0.29% (or 0.32% 
when the threshold is 20), and the effect of an extra hour per week of parental involvement 
increases child’s TD and PS scores, respectively, by 0.11% (regardless of the threshold) and 
0.47% (or 0.50% when the threshold is 20) more than does an additional hour of care provided by 
the grandparents. Thus the effects of care of various providers on children’s development remain 
unchanged when we exclude outliers. 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF THE EFFECT OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS ON 
CHILD OUTCOMES 
In this section, we discuss several mechanisms through which intergenerational time 
transfers can influence child outcomes. 
There are ways in which both parents and grandparents can affect child development, but it 
is possible that some of these effects can be intensified if a grandparent is involved in the child-
rearing process. This effect is expected to be larger especially if a non-working or retired 
grandparent supervises the child because such a grandparent is likely to have not only more time, 
but also more vigor and willingness to spend quality time in addition to supervision time with the 
child. Some factors which might determine the impact of supervision time on child development 
and his/ her later outcomes include personal characteristics of the care provider (Modin and 
Fritzell 2009), his family background (Jager 2012), academic achievements (Modin and Fritzell 
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2009; Osler et al. 2005), resources (LaFave et al. 2017), and time investment.5 Both parents and 
grandparents can read to children which fosters greater interest of the child in reading at a later 
age (Arnold et al. 1994), creates an advantage of the child over his peers in primary school (Wade 
et al. 2000), and has a positive effect on the literacy achievement of the child (Weinberger 1996). 
Parents and grandparents can also transfer skills and knowledge to children by playing with them, 
teaching them the alphabet and the numbers, academic concepts and math problems, creating an 
enjoyable environment which facilitates giving educational advice to the child, engaging them in 
activities stimulating learning and creativity, and helping them do homework and handle with 
academic and personal difficulties at school. The impact of all of the above-mentioned activities 
is likely to be higher for grandparents than for parents, provided that grandparents’ supervision is 
more valuable than parents’ time with the child and/ or that children are more willing to learn 
from lessons taught by someone different from their parents. 
In addition, the effect of grandparental care on the cultural, social, educational, and moral 
development of the child may be expanded over parental one through grandparents’ ability to 
serve as mentors or role models to the child, and through transmission of life wisdom, which less-
experienced parents may not be able to pass on children. Specifically, grandparents’ stories about 
their life experience help children draw lessons and morals, define values, teach them how to 
handle with obstacles in life, help them learn about family history and culture, and teach them to 
                                                          
5 Jager (2012) finds an association between family background of the extended family (parents, grandparents, 
aunts and uncles) and years of completed schooling of a child (Jager 2012). Personal characteristics of the extended 
family are correlated with cognitive development (Modin and Fritzell 2009), academic outcomes and health (Modin 
and Fritzell 2009; Osler et al. 2005) of the child as well. Evidence from Indonesia also shows that the resources of 
parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles affect child’s height as a measure of health, non-verbal cognitive assessment 
performance and age at which the child starts school (LaFave et al. 2017). 
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listen. Such factors prepare children for listening to their teachers at school, and affect their 
educational attainment at a later age. However, it is crucial that wisdom, experience and 
knowledge transmission is performed at an early age because studies provide evidence that 
contact frequency between grandparents and grandchildren declines with age between ages 18 
and 35 (Geurts et al. 2009) because contact is initiated by parents and grandparents when children 
are small (Brown 2003), while it is initiated by children when they grow up (Roberto and Stroes 
1992). In addition, grandchildren may prefer peer relationships when they enter adulthood in 
order to obtain information and establish contacts (Carstensen 1992). 
In addition, while children are small, grandparents can also provide emotional and mental 
support which may be an integral part of the development of the child while sometimes being 
impossible to be provided by the parents. For example, a study conducted in Boston College 
found that “an emotionally close relationship between grandparent and grandchildren is 
associated with fewer symptoms of depression for both generations.” 
6.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The determinants of child development at an early age are important for the implementation 
of policies whose goal is to either improve child outcomes directly, or improve other economic 
outcomes without forfeiting child development. 
First, if provision of child care by the grandparents has a positive influence on child 
outcomes, it may be worthwhile that governments take action to provide incentives to 
grandparents to assist in the child-rearing process of their grandchildren. Some countries in 
Europe have started to exploit this opportunity. For instance, the UK implemented such a policy 
in 2011. Grandparents who renounce work in order to take care of a grandchild under 12 at least 
20 hours per week are eligible for national insurance credits contributing to their basic state 
30 
 
pension. In Portugal, working grandparents are entitled to claim a financial allowance and leave 
of work up to 30 days per year to provide child care to a sick grandchild. Germany and Hungary 
have transferable parental leave and allowances, i.e. parents are allowed to transfer leave to 
grandparents. 
In addition, such policies may be found to have even greater impact than other Head Start 
programs which promote education and development at an early age. The reason is that if 
grandparental childcare provision has a positive impact on grandchildren or the effect is the same 
as that of care provided by the parents, then such programs could not only contribute to child 
development but can also be used as tools to improve other economic outcomes without 
negatively affecting child success. Such economic outcomes include improved fertility rates, and 
higher female labor participation rates. In particular, Del Boca (2002) shows that grandparenting 
is associated with higher probability of the mother being in the labor force and a higher 
probability that the family has had a child in the last two years (Del Boca, 2002). Receiving help 
from grandparents for child-rearing reduces the cost of childcare, and thus may increase fertility. 
In fact, a study of 11 countries in Europe provides evidence that receiving help from grandparents 
increases the likelihood of child-rearing, potentially because receiving help facilitates raising 
children and reduces child care costs. The effect is stronger in Southern Europe where public 
childcare is less common. Given that, policies encouraging time intergenerational transfer from 
grandparents to grandchildren may potentially increase fertility in Europe where natality rates 
have recently been declining. Such a reform is likely to contribute to the improvement of the 
demographic composition of European countries. 
Receiving help from grandparents with child-rearing is also associated with higher female 
labor force participation rate (Ogawa et al. 1996; Del Boca 2002; Marenzi et al. 2008). Such an 
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increase in the available labor resources of a country can on its part improve the potential of these 
countries to produce goods and services and to initiate growth. 
Therefore, if grandparents have a positive effect on children, then it might be worthwhile 
that governments attempt to implement policies encouraging grandparenting as a tool to improve 
child development and to solve other impending economic issues. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This article compares the effect of grandparents’ and parents’ investment of supervision 
time in a child on the cognitive, social and behavioral development of children during the first 6 
years of life. We find that grandparents have a larger effect than parents on children’s vocabulary 
skills. Although parents' supervision time on average influences the picture similarities score of 
cognitive ability of children more than does the time children are supervised by grandparents, 
grandparental care has a significant, positive impact larger than that of the parents provided that a 
child has been supervised by a grandparent at least 13 hours per week. This positive impact of 
grandparents' supervision time rises with an increase in the threshold of the time a grandparent 
supervises a grandchild at the expense of parental supervision time. However, parents influence 
social and behavioral development of children more than grandparents do, regardless of the 
number of hours the child has been supervised by each care provider. More specifically, the 
difference between the effects of an additional hour per week under the supervision of the 
grandparents and parents on the TD score is negative 0.1%, while the same difference for the NV 
score is 0.22%. The opposite signs for different development outcomes provide evidence that 
parents and grandparents complement rather than substitute each other in the mental and 
behavioral development of the child. 
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The article provides the grounds for the investigation of the effect of allocating supervision 
time, rather than material and financial assets, to children on their outcomes. However, the study 
also has limitations. First, none of the development measures we take into account is available for 
more than 2 or 3 years of childhood. This prevents a researcher from employing more dynamic 
panel data methods, such as Arellano-Bond, Arellano-Bover and Blundell dynamic approaches. 
Finding a unified measure of development available for more or all years of childhood analyzed 
in the study would solve this issue. It would even be sufficient to have different child outcomes 
for each year if they measure the same type of development, i.e. either cognitive, or social and 
behavioral.6 
Second, we are able to identify the relative effect of grandparental time input as compared 
to the effect of time investment of the parents but fail to quantify the precise effect of 
grandparental care on child’s outcomes. Estimating the latter effect would be a potential 
extension of the paper if one could obtain data on the “quality time” each provider spends with a 
child. 
Finally, fixed effects estimation yields consistent estimates, given that all covariates are 
exogenously determined. In the case of Scotland, external care is a response to its exogenously 
determined availability7 and cost8 so exogenous factors drive the decision of the number of hours 
                                                          
6 If the latter kind of data were available, we could apply a method similar to the one used by Bernal and Keane 
(2010, 2011). Under the assumption that the parameters in the production function are invariant across all test 
outcomes, they pool all scores, and run the main regression, but including dummy variables for each outcome, except 
one base outcome, as well as interaction terms of the score indicators with a subset of controls. Such a strategy 
improves efficiency due to the higher sample size, but is infeasible if the outcomes indicate different aspects of 
development. 
7 External child care is not available to all children and in all areas across Scotland, especially in some remote parts 
of the country. Some nurseries are willing to provide more openings but only if they can cover the delivery costs. In 
order to cover those costs, they either provide lower-quality care, or charge more than some parents are willing or 
able to afford. In either case, families often turn to alternatives either due to the shortage of childcare, or due to its 
lack of affordability. 
8 The cost of childcare in Scotland is high relative to other OECD countries, and it is rising much faster than the rate 
of inflation. According to Citizens Advice Scotland (CAS), such costs put many families at the threshold for poverty 
if they do not look for alternative sources of care. The Scottish government tried to alleviate the issue by increasing 
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of care provided by external care providers, and thus influence the utilization of its substitutes, 
such as parental and grandparental care. Our analysis can be generalized to countries where 
external child care is cost-prohibitive or restricted depending on the area. However, if similar 
analysis is conducted for another country where external care is affordable and ubiquitously 
available across all parts of the country, then childcare provision would not be randomly 
determined but instead, it would more likely be a result of a strategic choice of the parents, the 
grandparents or both. In that case, appropriate instruments have to be found to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns.9 
Further research is needed to solve the above-mentioned limitations of this study. In 
addition, the analysis can be extended by accounting for more factors which are likely to affect 
development, and later-age outcomes can also be investigated.  
                                                          
free annual care from 475 to 600 hours for 3- and 4-year-old children, as well as for disadvantaged 2-year-old 
children. However, the majority of the childcare cost still has to be paid by the parents. More specifically, the 
approximate annual cost of placing a child under 2 in a nursery for 25 hours a week is £5514, and the same cost but 
for children between 2 and 5 is £5307 on average. The agency’s reports show that families spend 27% of their annual 
household income on childcare, as compared to 12% on average across the OECD countries. Although not part of 
our study, childcare costs increased even further in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, the Family and Childcare Trust 
estimated that childcare costs became 4.5% higher as compared to the previous year. Such statistics incentivize 
families to search for alternatives, and parenting and grandparenting are the common solutions. Even if care provided 
by parents and/ or grandparents would not be the preferred choice of families, some of them have no alternative if 
external childcare is cost-prohibitive for them. Some families in which a grandparent is unavailable to serve as a 
childcare provider, even prefer one of the parents to not work rather than spend all or the majority of their income on 
child care. 
9 Additionally, as long as the number of hours of childcare provided by external sources is driven to a large extent by 
availability and affordability of care, and given the number of hours worked by the parents, the number of hours of 
grandparental involvement in the child-rearing process is mostly affected by these exterior factors. Furthermore, 
although supervision of the child in the past can affect present outcomes, reverse causality is unlikely in this context. 
Therefore there is little reason to expect that the allocation of supervision time between different care givers is 
endogenous. Despite that, it is worth mentioning that the estimates would be biased if grandparents’ and parents’ 
hours of care are not exogenous. This might be the case if part of the ability endowment of the child, and parents’ or 
child’s tastes for care are unobserved determinants of the outcomes of a child, and the time each provider devotes to 
a child is influenced by this endowment and preferences. 
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TABLES 
Table 1.1. Summary statistics of the continuous variables used in the analysis (by wave of the survey) 
Variable Grand 
Mean 
Std. dev. Min Max Mean 
Wave 1 
Mean 
Wave 2 
Mean 
Wave 3 
Mean 
Wave 4 
Mean 
Wave 5 
Mean 
Wave 6 
PSscore 15.142 4.253 0 31 - - 14.318 - 16.016 - 
NVscore 15.871 4.370 0 31 - - 16.887 - 14.798 - 
TDscore 27.535 4.602 1 35 - - - 27.275 27.471 27.856 
HrsChdCareGrp 4.980 9.719 0 168 5.797 5.892 5.389 4.835 4.296 3.094 
TotalNumPplInHhld 3.925 1.049 2 12 3.738 3.793 3.906 4.019 4.065 4.126 
Income 23131.34 12716.47 1930.309 68965.52 20396.22 22309 23547.68 24189.38 24534.44 24751.31 
NumSiblings 1.005 0.928 0 11 0.770 0.863 0.991 1.108 1.175 1.239 
ChildBirthOrder 1.740 0.883 1 9 - - - - - - 
HoursMomWorksPerWk 15.873 17.482 0 97 24.961 5.212 3.566 31.118 26.095 3.379 
HoursDadWorksPerWk 12.795 20.551 0 97 43.145 19.900 2.398 3.276 3.218 3.453 
HrsOtherChdCare 
 
7.700 12.735 0 168 
 
7.021 9.512 11.532 8.271 5.635 3.588 
Note: Source: Data are obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth cohort 1 longitudinal dataset. 
 
Table 1.2. Summary statistics of the binary (dichotomous) variables used in the analysis (by wave of the survey and 
total) 
Variable Percent 
Total 
Percent 
Sw. 1 
Percent 
Sw. 2 
Percent 
Sw. 3 
Percent 
Sw. 4 
Percent 
Sw. 5 
Percent 
Sw. 6 
GrpInHhld 3.67 6.08 3.95 3.43 2.95 2.48 2.21 
MotherInHhld 99.52 99.83 99.73 99.55 99.40 99.27 99.18 
FatherInHhld 82.06 80.99 82.62 82.78 83.02 82.05 81.00 
BothParInHhld 81.83 80.93 82.54 82.61 82.75 82.71 80.50 
ParInHhldMarried 37.28 43.82 39.12 36.49 34.83 33.63 33.11 
HigherEducMom 75.55 71.82 74.05 75.98 77.02 77.85 78.23 
HigherEducDad 12.54 57.35 0.62 0.72 1.18 0.99 1.39 
MaleChd 51.43 - - - - - - 
HealthChdNotGood 5.74 5.75 7.09 5.25 6.61 4.41 5.06 
Note: Source: Data are obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth cohort 1 longitudinal dataset. 
 
  
40 
 
Table 1.3. Estimates from regressions under different specifications of the effect of grandparental, parental and alternative child care 
supervision time input on child’s TD score, years 2008 - 2010 
 
Dependent variable: lnTDscore   
 
Variable 
(1) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(2) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(3) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(4) 
(Combined) 
Average 
number of 
hours 
(5) 
Average 
hours in the 
past & 
separately, 
present hours 
(6) 
Current 
period 
hours and 1 
lag 
(7) 
Current 
period 
hours, lag 
1, and lag 2 
(8) 
Time FE 
included 
(9) 
Time and 
residential 
area FE 
included 
HrsChdCareGrp -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
- -0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
HrsOtherChdCare -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
- -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.00005 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
L.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
- - 
L.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
- - 
L2.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - - 0.0001 
(0.0002) 
- - 
L2.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - - -0.0003* 
(0.0057) 
- - 
AvgHrsGrpCare - - - -0.0038*** 
(0.0011) 
- - - - - 
AvgHrsCC - - - -0.0021** 
(0.0008) 
- - - - - 
L.AvgHrsGrpCare - - - - -0.0011 
(0.0009) 
- - - - 
L.AvgHrsCC - - - - -0.0017* 
(0.0007) 
- - - - 
Method FE RE POLS FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Time FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Residential area FE No No No No No No No No Yes 
Excluded outliers No No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 10,724 10,724 10,724 10,098 10,098 10,417 10,234 10,724 10,723 
(Within) R-sq 0.0110 0.0079 0.0079 0.0122 0.0134 0.0132 0.0140 0.0169 0.0171 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using data from 2008 to 2010 for which the TD score is relevant. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain the results respectively, from FE, RE and pooled OLS regression 
models, using only the current number of supervision time provided by grandparents and external child care providers. Column (4) presents 
estimates from a FE model taking into account the average effect of involvement of grandparents, parents and alternative childcare from the first 
round of the survey until the present, while Column (5) shows the estimates from a model which distinguishes between the effect of the average 
supervision time in the past, and the current period time input into child development. Columns (6) and (7) represent the results obtained from the 
same model considered in (1) but with added lags of the time spent with the child by grandparents and external child care providers. One and two 
lags of the latter variables have been included in the models in Columns (6) and (7), respectively. Columns (8) and (9) present the results from the 
specification of the model in (1) with fixed effects accounting for different types of unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, specifically time 
and residential FE. Since the dependent variable is used in log terms, one has to multiply the estimate by 100 in order to obtain the effect of the 
corresponding variable on the TD score in percentages. The following variables have been used as controls: MaleChd, HigherEducMom, 
HigherEducDad, ChildBirthOrder, lnIncome, HealthChdNotGood, TotalNumPplInHhld, NumSiblings, BothParInHhld, and ParInHhldMarried. 
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Table 1.4. Estimates from regressions under different specifications of the effect of grandparental, parental and alternative child 
care supervision time input on child’s NV score, years 2007 and 2009 
 
Dependent variable: lnNVscore   
 
Variable 
(1) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(2) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(3) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(4) 
(Combined) 
Average 
number of 
hours 
(5) 
Average 
hours in 
the past & 
separately, 
present 
hours 
(6) 
Current 
period 
hours and 
1 lag 
(7) 
Current 
period 
hours, lag 
1, and lag 
2 
(8) 
Time 
FE 
included 
(9) 
Time and 
residential 
area FE 
included 
HrsChdCareGrp 0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
- 0.0020*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0018** 
(0.0008) 
0.0019** 
(0.0009) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
HrsOtherChdCare 0.0028*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0018*** 
(0.0003) 
- 0.0029*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0024*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
L.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - 0.0011 
(0.0008) 
0.0008 
(0.0008) 
- - 
L.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - -0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
- - 
L2.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - - 0.0004 
(0.0005) 
- - 
L2.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - - -0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
- - 
AvgHrsGrpCare - - - -0.0071*** 
(0.0020) 
- - - - - 
AvgHrsCC - - - -0.0060*** 
(0.0013) 
- - - - - 
L.AvgHrsGrpCare - - - - 0.0024 
(0.0015) 
- - - - 
L.AvgHrsCC - - - - -0.0021* 
(0.0012) 
- - - - 
Method FE RE POLS FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Time FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Residential area FE No No No No No No No No Yes 
Excluded outliers No No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 7,123 7,123 7,123 6,871 6,871 6,982 6,914 7,123 7,123 
(Within) R-sq 0.0590 0.0301 0.0301 0.0502 0.0628 0.0619 0.0636 0.1485 0.1524 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using data from 2007 and 2009 for which the NV score is relevant. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain the results respectively, from FE, RE and pooled OLS regression 
models, using only the current number of supervision time provided by grandparents and external child care providers. Column (4) presents 
estimates from a FE model taking into account the average effect of involvement of grandparents, parents and alternative childcare from the first 
round of the survey until the present, while Column (5) shows the estimates from a model which distinguishes between the effect of the average 
supervision time in the past, and the current period time input into child development. Columns (6) and (7) represent the results obtained from the 
same model considered in (1) but with added lags of the time spent with the child by grandparents and external child care providers. One and two 
lags of the latter variables have been included in the models in Columns (6) and (7), respectively. Columns (8) and (9) present the results from the 
specification of the model in (1) with fixed effects accounting for different types of unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, specifically time 
and residential FE. Since the dependent variable is used in log terms, one has to multiply the estimate by 100 in order to obtain the effect of the 
corresponding variable on the NV score in percentages. The following variables have been used as controls: MaleChd, HigherEducMom, 
HigherEducDad, ChildBirthOrder, lnIncome, HealthChdNotGood, TotalNumPplInHhld, NumSiblings, BothParInHhld, and ParInHhldMarried. 
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Table 1.5. Estimates from regressions under different specifications of the effect of grandparental, parental and alternative child care 
supervision time input on child’s PS score, years 2007 and 2009 
 
Dependent variable: lnPSscore   
 
Variable 
(1) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(2) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(3) 
Only 
current 
period 
hours 
(4) 
(Combined) 
Average 
number of 
hours 
(5) 
Average 
hours in the 
past & 
separately, 
present 
hours 
(6) 
Current 
period 
hours and 1 
lag 
(7) 
Current 
period hours, 
lag 1, and 
lag 2 
(8) 
Time FE 
included 
(9) 
Time and 
residential 
area FE 
included 
HrsChdCareGrp -0.0022** 
(0.001) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
- -0.0022** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0022** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0021* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
HrsOtherChdCare -0.0026*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
- -0.0026*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
L.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - -0.0003 
(0.0012) 
-0.0003 
(0.0013) 
- - 
L.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - 0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
- - 
L2.HrsChdCareGrp - - - - - - 7.85e-06 
(0.0008) 
- - 
L2.HrsOtherChdCare - - - - - - 0.0007 
(0.0008) 
- - 
AvgHrsGrpCare - - - -0.0054* 
(0.0030) 
- - - - - 
AvgHrsCC - - - -0.0046*** 
(0.0018) 
- - - - - 
L.AvgHrsGrpCare - - - - -0.0004 
(0.0022) 
- - - - 
L.AvgHrsCC - - - - 0.0025 
(0.0018) 
- - - - 
Method FE RE POLS FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Time FE No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Residential area FE No No No No No No No No Yes 
Excluded outliers No No No No No No No No No 
Obs. 7,145 7,145 7,145 6,891 6,891 7,002 6,934 7,145 7,145 
(Within) R-sq 0.0274 0.0190 0.0190 0.0236 0.0309 0.0307 0.0309 0.0920 0.0941 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using data from 2007 and 2009 for which the PS score is relevant. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain the results respectively, from FE, RE and pooled OLS regression 
models, using only the current number of supervision time provided by grandparents and external child care providers. Column (4) presents 
estimates from a FE model taking into account the average effect of involvement of grandparents, parents and alternative childcare from the first 
round of the survey until the present, while Column (5) shows the estimates from a model which distinguishes between the effect of the average 
supervision time in the past, and the current period time input into child development. Columns (6) and (7) represent the results obtained from the 
same model considered in (1) but with added lags of the time spent with the child by grandparents and external child care providers. One and two 
lags of the latter variables have been included in the models in Columns (6) and (7), respectively. Columns (8) and (9) present the results from the 
specification of the model in (1) with fixed effects accounting for different types of unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity, specifically time 
and residential FE. Since the dependent variable is used in log terms, one has to multiply the estimate by 100 in order to obtain the effect of the 
corresponding variable on the PS score in percentages. The following variables have been used as controls: MaleChd, HigherEducMom, 
HigherEducDad, ChildBirthOrder, lnIncome, HealthChdNotGood, TotalNumPplInHhld, NumSiblings, BothParInHhld, and ParInHhldMarried. 
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Table 1.6. Estimates from a SUR model  
Outcome: Log of picture similarity raw score, 2007 (age 3)   
HrsChdCareGrp -0.0011 (0.001)   
Outcome: Log of naming vocabulary raw score, 2007 (age 3)  
HrsChdCareGrp 0.0007 (0.001)   
Outcome: Log of picture similarity raw score, 2009 (age 5)   
HrsChdCareGrp -0.0008* (0.0005)   
Outcome: Log of naming vocabulary raw score, 2009 (age 5)  
HrsChdCareGrp 0.0007* (0.0004)   
Breusch-Pagan test of independence:  
Chi2 – statistic 
p-value 
1698.943 
0.000 
 
 
 
Notes: All estimates are obtained from the estimation of a SUR model consisting of a system with 4 equations. The variables taken into account 
are the following: MaleChd, HigherEducMom, HigherEducDad, ChildBirthOrder, HrsChdCareGrp, HrsOtherChdCare, lnIncome, 
HealthChdNotGood, TotalNumPplInHhld, NumSiblings, BothParInHhld, and ParInHhldMarried. All of them are considered only in the current 
time period. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
 
  
44 
 
 
Table 1.7. Test of the hypothesis that grandparents accept a parents' role if they supervise a grandchild more 
than a certain amount of time per week: Effect of grandparents' supervision time for various thresholds of 
grandparents' supervision time 
Hours of grandparents' 
supervision time per week 
(1) 
Effect on TD score 
(2) 
Effect on NV score 
(3) 
Effect on PS score 
<20 -0.0011*** 
[0.0003] 
0.0032*** 
[0.0010] 
-0.0050*** 
[0.0013] 
<30 -0.0011*** 
[0.0003] 
0.0029*** 
[0.0008] 
-0.0047*** 
[0.0012] 
≥ 10 -0.0013*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0007 
[0.0011] 
0.0018 
[0.0015] 
≥ 12 -0.0013*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0007 
[0.0012] 
0.0024 
[0.0016] 
≥ 13 -0.0013*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0007 
[0.0013] 
0.0034** 
[0.0017] 
≥ 15 -0.0013*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0008 
[0.0013] 
0.0034** 
[0.0017] 
≥ 20 -0.0014*** 
[0.0004] 
0.0009 
[0.0017] 
0.0052** 
[0.0021] 
≥ 30 -0.0015*** 
[0.0005] 
0.0047 
[0.0032] 
0.0092*** 
[0.0020] 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using FE estimation using the years for which each score is relevant. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Only current period hours different care providers supervise the child are taken into account. The 
table provides the effect of supervision time provided by grandparents under different restrictions on grandparental supervision time. Column (1) 
presents the effect of grandparents' supervision time on the TD score of social and behavioral development. Column (2) shows the effect of the 
same variable on the NV score of cognition or the vocabulary skills of the grandchild, and Column (3) presents the effect of the supervision time 
provided by grandparents on PS score of cognitive ability of the grandchild. 
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Table 1.8. Diagnostic tests of the FE estimation of the effect of grandparental, parental and alternative childcare time input on child 
TD score (years 2008 – 2010), NV and PS score (years 2007 and 2009) 
Verification test\ Results (1) 
TD 
(2) 
NV 
(3) 
PS 
Hausman test: FE vs. RE 
Ho: non-systematic differences in 
coefficients 
Chi2 = 162.46 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, use FE 
Chi2 = 154.89 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, use FE 
Chi2 = 41.88 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, use FE 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for random 
effects: Pooled OLS vs. RE 
Chibarsq = 3501.76 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, RE is 
preferred to pooled OLS 
Chibarsq = 316.03 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, RE is 
preferred to pooled OLS 
Chibarsq = 95.59 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, RE is 
preferred to pooled OLS 
Test for time fixed effects (testparm) F-statistic = 16.14 
p-value = 0.0000 
Rejection of Ho, Presence of 
time effects 
F-statistic = 289.81 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, Presence of 
time effects 
F-statistic = 201.08 
p-value = 0.000 
Rejection of Ho, Presence of 
time effects 
Modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroskedasticity in FE model 
Chi2 = 2.3e+35 
p-value = 0.0000 
Rejection of Ho, Exists 
evidence of heteroscedasticity 
Solution: usage of robust 
standard errors 
Chi2 = 8.9e+34 
p-value = 0.0000 
Rejection of Ho, Exists 
evidence of heteroscedasticity 
Solution: usage of robust 
standard errors 
Chi2 = 9.1e+35 
p-value = 0.0000 
Rejection of Ho, Exists 
evidence of heteroscedasticity 
Solution: usage of robust 
standard errors 
Notes: All diagnostic checks have been conducted based on the FE regression model whose results have been presented in Tables 5 (Column 1), 6 
(Column 1) and 7 (Column 1). Columns (1), (2) and (3) of this table present the results from the verification tests for the regressions with 
dependent variables, respectively TD score, NV score, and PS score. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1.1. Distribution of the number of hours grandparents 
supervise grandchildren per week 
 
Notes: The graph represents the distribution of the number of supervision hours provided by grandparents. Data are 
obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth Cohort 1. 
 
Figure 1.2. Distribution of the number of hours other childcare 
providers supervise a child per week 
 
Notes: The graph represents the distribution of the number of supervision hours provided by external care providers. 
Data are obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth Cohort 1. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE EFFECT OF FAMILY WELFARE SUPPORT ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF HAVING 
ANOTHER CHILD AND PARENTS’ LABOR SUPPLY10 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Governments have recently attempted to reverse the below-replacement fertility rates in 
Europe by reducing child-rearing costs through child benefits, grants and paid leaves. This article 
examines the causal effect of family allowances on the likelihood of having another child, and on 
the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. Evidence from Switzerland suggests that 
higher child benefits incentivize parents to have more children but do not affect their employment 
choice. The effect is larger for low-income families. These findings imply that policies aimed at 
improving the economic well-being of families are likely to increase fertility rates without 
distorting labor market outcomes. 
Keywords: allowance, fertility, employment, endogeneity, instrument, DD 
 
                                                          
10 I thank helpful comments from Andrei Barbos, Padmaja Ayyagari, and Joshua Wilde. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Child allowances, or benefits regularly granted to families to partially compensate the 
expenses associated with child-rearing and to facilitate the balance between work and family 
responsibilities, can be an important source of income support, especially for low-income 
families. Because family benefits reduce the financial burden of raising a child, they are expected 
to have a positive impact on fertility. That is why many countries provide financial assistance to 
families with children, especially in European countries where the recent decline in the fertility 
rate contributes to an aging population and raises concerns about future labor supply and 
sustainability. However, due to the costs such policies impose on local governments, it is useful 
to evaluate the potential impact of the implementation of programs providing family grants. 
The effect of such policies on fertility, mothers' or parents’ labor supply, child outcomes and 
maternal mental health has been studied by prior authors in the context of Canada, Hungary, 
Norway, Spain, and Australia. This article extends previous literature in several ways. First, we 
explore the effect of family welfare support through child allowances on the likelihood of having 
another child, the extensive margin of labor supply measured by the dichotomous outcome of 
being employed or not, and the intensive margin of labor supply captured by the hours worked by 
the parents. More generally, we investigate whether the benefits received by Swiss families have 
an impact on family decision-making. 
As a measure of the actual amount of allowances families receive we employ the benefits 
reported by respondents in the Swiss Household Panel survey. However, there is a discrepancy 
between the reported and the actual amount of assistance, attributable to one of the following 
reasons: respondents' misunderstanding of the survey question asking them to report the benefits 
they receive, reporting additional benefits provided by some but not all employers at their 
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discretion, or misreporting due to imperfect information or inability to distinguish between 
different income sources when salary and child allowances are received simultaneously. 
In either case, a mismatch between the reported benefits and the actual amount received 
indicates that the reported allowances are a noisy measure of the actual ones. Using an imperfect 
measure of the actual assistance creates an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates of the effect of 
allowances on the outcomes of interest. In order to avert this bias, we adopt an instrumental 
variable approach. Specifically, we use the eligibility amount of benefits, as well as indicators 
reflecting a change in the allowances after the introduction of the Federal Family Allowance Act 
(FamZG) which imposed a federal floor on child benefits, common to all 26 cantons in 
Switzerland11 as instruments for the reported benefits. The proposed instruments have not been 
used by previous authors in the context of Switzerland. 
Finally, in addition to examining the effect of child allowances on fertility and labor market 
outcomes, we also study a second, related but distinct matter. Specifically, we identify the causal 
impact of the introduction of a universal floor on child benefits in all cantons in Switzerland.  
The findings indicate that an increase in the family support by 1% improves the likelihood of 
having another child by 0.01%, but does not affect labor market outcomes. Moreover, the 
analysis of the effect of the introduction of a minimum amount of child allowances all cantons 
are obliged to pay indicates that a floor on benefits leads to a significant increase in the likelihood 
of having a child by 4.3% in affected cantons relative to unaffected ones while there is no 
                                                          
11 Our approach is similar to that of Milligan et al. (2011) in that we also consider both the reported and the 
eligibility amount of benefits. However, while Milligan et al. (2011) examines the effect of those amounts on child 
mental, physical and test scores and mother's deprivation level, we use the eligibility amount as an instrument for 
the reported amount. We also investigate the impact of the benefits received by individuals on a different set of 
outcomes. 
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significant difference between the differential effect of the policy on labor supply in the treated 
cantons and the controls. 
From a policy perspective, these results imply that providing financial support to families to 
lower the cost of raising children is likely to positively affect fertility without having an adverse 
effect on the labor market in countries where federal decision-makers aim to improve fertility 
rates. In addition, such a reform would have a greater positive impact if targeted at families at the 
lower tail of the household income distribution. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature, and 
provides an overview of the federal law about child allowances in Switzerland. Section 3 presents 
the identification strategy. In Section 4, we describe the data used for the empirical analysis. 
Section 5 contains a summary of the findings. In Section 6, we examine the causal effect of the 
imposition of a universal floor on benefits in all cantons in Switzerland. Section 7 discusses a 
potential harvesting effect and the policy implications of the study, and Section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. PRIOR LITERATURE ON CHILD BENEFITS 
In some countries where a decline in the fertility rate has been observed, governments have 
introduced child benefits, family allowances, child tax credits and tax exemptions, to incentivize 
families to have more children. Prior papers which investigate the impact of such family-
incentivizing policies on fertility find a positive effect (Zhang et al. 1994; Gauthier et al. 1997; 
Gabos et al. 2009; and Gonzalez 2013). For example, Zhang et al. (1994) found a positive, 
significant effect of child tax credit, family allowances, and tax exemption on the fertility rate in 
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Canada from 1921 to 1988. Gauthier et al. (1997) found that governmental support in the form of 
family allowances had a positive, but economically small effect on fertility in 22 OECD countries 
between 1970 and 1990. The results of Gabos et al. (2009) suggested a small, positive effect of 
child benefits on fertility rate in Hungary from 1950 to 2006. The magnitude of this effect 
increased with birth order up to order 4 (and then, dropped to the effect found on first-order 
birth), implying that the elasticity of demand was higher for higher birth orders, i.e. higher-order 
births were more responsive to child benefits. 
Another study, conducted by Gonzalez (2013), examined the effect of a one-time child 
benefit of 2500 euros introduced unexpectedly in Spain on fertility, household expenditure 
patterns, and mother’s labor supply. The findings suggested that the benefit led to an increase in 
fertility by 6% per year, and there was no significant change in the consumption of child-related 
goods and services. After the introduction of the child benefit, eligible mothers also stayed out of 
the labor force longer after delivery. 
The implementation of policies introducing child benefits does not affect only fertility but 
also child and maternal outcomes, as well as parents’ employment. Specifically, Havnes et al. 
(2011) found that an expansion of subsidized child care had a positive, long-run impact on the 
educational achievement of children in Norway, and the largest effect was extracted from the 
subsample of girls and children of low-educated mothers (Haynes et al. 2011). Milligan and 
Stabile (2009) also investigated the impact of benefits on family outcomes in the context of the 
expansion of family benefits for children under the age of 5 in the province of Manitoba in 
Canada in 2001 and the subsequent expansion to age 11 in 2003. Both reforms allowed recipient 
families to invest more in children, while working less and spending more time with them at 
home. Milligan et al. (2009) examined the effect of the policy change by comparing the treated 
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families from Manitoba to those from the rest of Canada, but found no significant effect of the 
reform on labor supply and income after the policy change in 2001, positive effects on social 
assistance income and child outcomes, and a difference in the effect on child outcomes for girls 
and boys (Milligan et al. 2009). The latter paper by Milligan et al. (2009) has been further 
extended by Milligan et al. (2011)12 who studied the effect of both reported and derived from 
eligibility criteria (based on year, province, number of children and/ or income) child benefits in 
Canada on child mental, physical, and test scores, and mother’s deprivation level.13 They found 
that an expansion of child benefits had a positive impact on child scores and maternal mental 
health. The reform also had a larger effect on mental health for girls than for boys, while the 
impact on physical health and educational outcomes was stronger for boys than for girls 
(Milligan et al. 2011).14 Similarly to Milligan et al. (2011), we look at both reported and 
eligibility amounts, but unlike them, we use the eligibility amount as an instrument for the 
benefits received. We also discuss the effect of these allowances on a different set of outcomes. 
                                                          
12 Milligan et al. (2011) paper was motivated by Currie and Stabile (2009) and Currie et al. (2010) who find a strong 
relationship between child early mental health and both short- and long-run educational outcomes, and Oreopoulos 
(2008) who finds a strong relationship between shocks to parental socioeconomic status, specifically the 
displacement of the father from work, and child well-being measured by future earnings and unemployment. 
13 Since OLS estimates may be biased if individuals who receive benefits are systematically different from those who 
do not, Milligan et al. (2011) use variation in eligibility for benefits, which is not related to individual characteristics, 
but only to the number of children and province (an approach similar to the one proposed by Currie and Gruber, 
1996). More precisely, they take a random sample from the SLID dataset, and simulate the benefits each family 
would be eligible for in each province, in each year from 1994 to 2004, and for each number of children 
combination. Then, using family characteristics, they impute the simulated values (child benefits the family is 
eligible for) in the NLSCY dataset, use the simulated cells as instruments for benefits and perform a 2SLS 
estimation. 
14 The motivation of almost all authors who examine child benefits, including Milligan et al. (2011), relies on 
insights offered by Yeung et al. (2002). Yeung et al. (2002) describes the channels through which child benefits can 
improve child outcomes. He distinguishes between a direct (“family resources”) channel and an indirect (“family 
process”) channel. According to the former channel, higher family income allows families to purchase more goods 
(food, books, etc.) for the child, which has a positive effect on him/ her. The “family process” channel suggests that 
higher family income reduces stress, and thus, improves household relations and family well-being, which benefits 
both parents and children, and improves child outcomes by facilitation of learning, improvement of ability to 
function, and so on. In addition to this theory, Yeung et al. (2002) explore the validity of the two channels using data 
from the US. His empirical results provide strong evidence only for the “family” channel: higher family income 
reduces parents’ stress about whether they provide adequate resources for the child, which improves parents – 
children interaction, and thus, boosts child’s outcomes (Yeung et al. 2002). 
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In addition to Milligan et al. (2009) and Gonzalez (2013), Guest (2013) also explored the 
effect of child benefits and family allowances on employment. He developed a utility-
maximization theoretical model of at-birth support, cash family benefits and childcare subsidies, 
calibrated it, and estimated it empirically. His findings suggested that a reduction in childcare 
expenditure induced by a government childcare subsidy imposed on employed parents led to an 
increase in household labor supply in Australia. 
Our article differs from prior literature in the following ways. First, it examines the case of 
Switzerland, and provides evidence that the effect of family allowances on fertility and labor 
market outcomes of the parents can be quite different when measurement errors are taken into 
account. Second, we propose instruments to control for attenuation bias due to this measurement 
error. Finally, separately from the IV approach, we examine the causal effect of the introduction 
of a federal floor on child benefits in Switzerland on family decision-making. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous paper has investigated the impact of this policy change. 
2.2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Family allowances in Switzerland include child and education allowances given to families 
to facilitate child rearing by compensating at least part of the costs of raising a child. The Swiss 
Family Allowance Law (Familienzulagengesetz) was announced in 2006, and came into effect in 
2009. Its purpose was to harmonize the legal systems of various cantons by entitling all families, 
regardless of the canton, to a legal minimum of child benefits of 200 Swiss francs (appr. $181) 
per month per child under 16. Although all cantons are obliged to comply with the minimum 
allowance federal law, they are also allowed to grant aid larger than the statutory floor. Payments 
are not automatically transferred but rather a parent has to submit an application which then, has 
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to be approved by a cantonal office. Either of the two parents can apply for allowances but only 
one allowance is permitted per child. 
In order to be eligible for allowances, a person has to satisfy the following two requirements. 
First, he has to live in Switzerland. Second, he must be either employed/ self-employed and earn 
at least 587 Swiss francs per month, or not employed and not receiving more than 42,300 Swiss 
francs of annual taxable income. If an applicant lives in a EU or EFTA country but commutes to 
Switzerland, (s)he is entitled to the benefits in Switzerland as well. Natural, adoptive, foster and 
step parents, as well as grandparents and elder siblings who provide care are eligible to apply. 
Employed individuals have to submit an application to the employer. Then, the employer has to 
transfer the application to a relevant family compensation fund administered at cantonal level. 
Therefore applications of employed parents are submitted in the canton of employment rather 
than the canton of residence. After submission, a compensation fund processes the application, 
and the employer pays the monthly allowance to the employee simultaneously with the monthly 
salary. Unemployed and self-employed parents have to submit an application directly to the 
family compensation fund in their canton of residence.  
The family compensation fund is funded by employers and self-employed individuals. In 
particular, employers are obliged to contribute to the fund an amount equal to some percentage of 
the salary of eligible workers. Self-employed people make contributions to the fund as well, 
cantons contribute to the fund for unemployed people and are allowed to impose taxes to finance 
the system. Valais is the only canton where employers require employees to contribute to the 
fund. 
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3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND IDENTIFICATION 
This section presents the empirical model and the identification strategy. Subsections 3.1 and 
3.2 specify respectively, a preliminary model and an instrumental variable approach for studying 
the effect of child benefits on fertility and labor market outcomes. We discuss identification 
challenges in Subsection 3.2.1. 
3.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We explore the effect of child allowances on the likelihood of having a first or a higher order 
child and the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. The extensive margin is captured 
by the binary outcome of being employed or not, while the intensive margin is measured by the 
number of hours worked by the parents. 
Because two of the outcomes are binary and one is quantitative, we estimate two Probit and 
one OLS regression models specified as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = Φ(𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)       (1) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = Φ(𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)  (2) 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                 (3) 
In these equations, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑), 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑), and 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 
are the previously mentioned dependent variables used in the analysis. 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
captures the annual amount of benefits families have received, and varies across individuals 
(based on the number and age of children), cantons and time. We use natural logarithm of this 
variable. The set of controls 𝑿𝑖𝑡 captures personal characteristics of individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡. 
The term 𝛼𝑖 denotes individual-specific fixed effects, or unobserved, time-invariant cross-
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sectional heterogeneity, and  𝜏𝑡 are time trends which allow for systematic differences across 
years. Finally, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Subscript 𝑖 identifies individuals and subscript 𝑡 
denotes time. 
The set of controls employed in the regression for the probability of having another child 
includes age, education and hours worked per week of the individual, net household income, 
number of children and age of the youngest child in the prior period, and indicators for whether 
the individual is married and whether (s)he is in average or better health. In equations (2) and (3), 
we control for the number of children, household income, marital status of the parents, their 
presence in the household, age, health status and educational attainment of the respondent, 
income of the spouse, number of people in the household, age of the youngest child, presence of 
a child in worse than the average health, and incidence of problems with children. 
In addition to estimating (1), (2) and (3) in the whole population, we also estimate them in 
various subsamples. Specifically, we distinguish between high and low-income families, where a 
high-income family is defined as one whose annual household income exceeds the average 
annual income of the families in the sample for the given year. The rationale behind estimating 
the effects for families earning above and below-average income separately is that child 
allowances are expected to have a larger impact on low-income individuals for whom the 
assistance contributes to a larger percentage of their wealth. 
3.2. TWO-STEP MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A mismatch between the amount of benefits individuals report and the true amount they 
receive indicates that the reported benefits are a noisy measure of the actual allowances. Using an 
imperfect measure of the actual support leads to an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates of the 
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effect of allowances on the outcomes in models (1), (2) and (3) due to a measurement error in a 
key explanatory variable.  
Reported benefits above the actual amount indicate that either the family is a recipient of 
“excessive” support from non-federal sources, usually employers, or the respondent has imperfect 
information about the amount the family receives, or there is an error in the reported amount. In 
contrast, reporting benefits below the actual amount signals either imperfect information about 
the allowances received and perceptions lower than the true amount, or an error in the reported 
benefits. A family is likely to perceive lower allowances because when the parent submitting the 
application is employed, his/ her child benefits are received simultaneously with the employment 
income. Thus it is often difficult to distinguish between salary and allowances. 
Given that a major covariate used in the analysis is measured imperfectly, a remedy aimed to 
correct for attenuation bias and endogeneity driven by this measurement error is required. As a 
solution, we adopt a 2-stage least square approach with instruments for the actual benefits. In 
what follows we motivate the choice of instrumental variables. 
We consider the introduction of the Federal Act on Family Allowances, better known as 
FamZG, which standardized cantonal laws concerning minimum child benefits. Based on the 
eligibility criterion, we derive the amount each family is entitled to receive, and use the simulated 
values (EligibilityAmnt) as instruments for the actual amount of benefits. Additional instruments 
we take into account in some of the specifications rely on the facts that FamZG was passed in 
March 2006 but came into effect on January 1st, 2009 when the standardization of benefits was 
implemented. Given this, the additional instruments we utilize include an indicator for the 
transition period, i.e. the period between the time when the law was introduced and the time when 
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it came into effect (DBn2006and2009), and an indicator for the post-reform period 
(D2009andAfter). 
The eligibility amount of allowances by legislation captures the family-level variation in the 
actual amount of benefits received which is determined by changes in the amount families are 
entitled to within cantons across time. Therefore the estimated allowances are highly correlated 
with the endogenous actual allowances, but uncorrelated with other determinants of the 
outcomes. There are also no confounding canton-year-number of children trends, and there are no 
other policies which make the exclusion restriction invalid. As a result all conditions for 
acceptably strong instruments have been satisfied. 
In addition to this theoretical motivation, in order to formally verify that the chosen 
instruments are good predictors of the actual benefits and are acceptably strong, we use the 
conventional criteria based on the F-test from the first-stage regression, proposed by Stock et al.  
(2002). 
Given that the instruments are not weak, the reduced-form equation would be a regression of 
the imputed benefits on the benefits a family is eligible for and exogenous covariates controlling 
for observable characteristics. The first and second stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach, respectively, have the following forms: 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝝃𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (4) 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                 (5) 
where 𝒁𝒊𝒕 is a vector of instruments legitimate for individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, and 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂ 𝑖𝑡 are the predicted values from the first stage. 
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3.2.1. IDENTIFICATION CHALLENGES 
In this subsection, we discuss the challenges to our identification strategy. 
First, canton of residence must be exogenous in order for the identification strategy to be 
valid. Canton of residence is exogenous under the assumption that families do not move in order 
to obtain higher benefits. Given the relatively small amount of the allowances compared with the 
average household income, this is unlikely because the costs of the change would exceed its 
benefits. However, this assumption imposes limitations on our study if families change cantons 
driven by the amount of benefits or unobserved factors. 
Another potential concern is that our analysis implicitly assumes constant marginal reported 
benefits for all children of one individual, regardless of child birth order. This assumption might 
be violated given that some cantons provide a significantly larger amount of allowances for 
higher-order children which contributes to a considerable change in individuals' family planning 
and labor market outcomes. However, it is unlikely that this would be of a concern in our analysis 
because the amount of child allowances varies with birth order only in 8 cantons15 in Switzerland, 
it differs between first and second child only in one canton and the difference is about 15 Swiss 
francs, and the gap between the benefits provided for a third and higher-order children is not of 
high magnitude. Specifically, in 6 out of the 8 cantons where allowances vary with child order, 
the increase in benefits for a third child is between 5 and 50 Swiss francs, or in the range from 
2.78% to 16.25% in percentage terms. Only the increase in benefits for a third child in Valais and 
Vaud vary respectively, between 84 and 100 Swiss francs (or 32.23-36.36%), and between 120 
and 170 Swiss francs (or approximately 100%), depending on the year. Although we do not 
                                                          
15 The cantons in which child benefits are a function of child order are Zug, Fribourg, Appenzell Innerrhoden, St. 
Gallen, Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel and Jura. 
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expect that our findings would be affected by the above-mentioned assumption, to formally 
explore the possibility of spurious results due to its failure, we run all regressions using data 
excluding the canton of Vaud in which benefits significantly increase for higher-order births, 
separately leaving out Vaud and Valais, and finally, again distinctly dropping the 8 cantons 
where the amount of benefits for third and higher-order children is higher than the amount 
granted for first and second child. The results are reported in Section 5.2 where we discuss the 
robustness checks. They are robust to the exclusion of the above-mentioned cantons. 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section discusses the data used for the empirical analysis and their sources. In 
Subsection 4.1, we describe the variables, and the way some of them have been constructed. 
Subsection 4.2 presents summary statistics. 
4.1. VARIABLES 
For this empirical work, we merge individual and family-level data from the Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP) for the period from 2004 to 2016. The major purpose of SHP is to trace 
the social dynamics in Switzerland by interviewing the same representative sample of individuals 
every year. It records information about households, income, employment, leisure, health, quality 
of life, values, and so on. Individuals were also asked to report the amount of child benefits they 
receive every year. In this article, we refer to these allowances as reported benefits. They are the 
level that is perceived by the respondents in the survey. We use them as a proxy for the actual 
support, and identify their impact on family decision-making. 
In addition to the SHP, we use administrative data about the family allowances households 
are eligible for, based on certain criteria, collected from the Federal Social Insurance Office 
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(FSIO) in Bern, Switzerland, and from the Cantonal Compensation Offices in each of the 26 
cantons in Switzerland. Each canton started to implement or expand allowances at different times 
and at different paces. Therefore the amount families are eligible for, whose precise amounts are 
presented in Appendix B1, differs across cantons, years, number and age of children. We use 
these geographical and temporal sources of variation in order to calculate the amount of child 
benefits a family is entitled to receive based on the above-mentioned criterion, and given that it 
applies for allowances. The latter variable is what we refer to as eligibility amount of benefits in 
this article. 
Then, we match the SHP dataset with the eligibility benefits based on the data collected from 
the Cantonal Offices. The matching is based on canton, year, and number of children belonging 
to the age groups under 12, between 12 and 15, 15, and 16 and above. We use data from the 
canton of residence rather than the canton of employment because the SHP contains information 
only about the canton of residence but not about the canton where the parents work although 
benefits received by each family are based on the canton of employment of the applicant. We 
employ both the reported amount of benefits received by each family, and the amount of benefits 
each family is entitled to receive. The latter two variables serve respectively, as a main 
explanatory and an instrumental variable, as previously explained in section 3.2. 
It is important that the reported and the actual amounts are correlated but not identical. From 
correspondence with the Swiss Center of Expertise in Social Sciences (FORS) in Switzerland, we 
obtained a better understanding of what the “family and child benefits” variable in the dataset 
includes and what drives the difference. Respondents report allowances as they understand the 
term, and FORS is not able to verify the reported amount with the registry. Therefore errors due 
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to misunderstanding and/ or misreporting are inevitable. Apart from these errors, there are several 
configurations in which a difference is expected. 
The first, most commonly observed reason for the discrepancy, is that there is no clear 
definition of what child and family allowances are. There are mandatory allowances defined by 
federal floors and cantonal legislation, but many employers grant their workers with 
supplementary, non-compulsory benefits, which are termed based on the companies’ preferences. 
Second, families sometimes receive allowances for children who live outside of the household. If 
the parents are separated or divorced, the parent living with the child usually receives the 
allowance. In case this parent is not employed or self-employed, the employed parent usually 
receives the benefits but is required to forward them to the parent residing with the child. It is not 
clear in the dataset whether the parent living with the child declares this amount as “income from 
another person” or “child and family allowance.” Similarly, it is possible that a parent not living 
with the child has declared to receive child benefits. Third, the administrative procedure for 
determining whether a family is eligible for allowances, and if it is, for calculating the amount the 
family is entitled to, sometimes takes several months. This is the reason why benefits are 
sometimes received retrospectively in which case it is not clear whether individuals report 
benefits in the year when the allowances are obtained, or the year when the application has been 
filed. 
Finally, some individuals forget to declare their family allowance either in reality, or just in 
the survey. Some parents do not take the time to submit an application to request their benefits. 
Even when they do apply and receive allowances, this additional source of income is collected 
with the salary, and therefore, some parents are not aware of its exact amount. It is also likely that 
the parent who receives the allowance is not taking part in the survey and the participating parent 
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fails to report all child benefits granted to the household. In such cases, some allowances are not 
detected accurately in the dataset. 
The latter configuration would lead to a reported amount which is lower than the benefits 
actually received while all previous ones explain cases where family and child allowances 
indicated by the household exceed the actual allowances. 
In addition, there are two reasons for why a household may not receive benefits: first, a 
parent has not applied for allowances, or second, there is no child in the eligible age range in the 
family. Due to the latter possibility, we use only families in which there is at least one child under 
the age of 16 for the majority of the empirical work. 
The outcome variables used in the analysis are the likelihood of having another or a first 
child, the likelihood of being employed, and labor supply, measured by the number of hours 
worked by the mother and the father. The explanatory variable of interest is the amount of child 
benefits as reported by respondents. We also use a set of controls presented in Appendix B2. 
They include age, education, hours worked per week, net household income, number of children, 
age of the youngest child, marital status, health status, number of household members, presence 
of a child in worse than the average health, and incidence of problems with children. 
All household members different from parents and children are irrelevant to the analysis, and 
thus have been excluded. We use information about the relationship of each family member to 
the reference person to construct indicators for children, mothers and fathers. This allows us to 
identify the role of each member of the household (parent, child, or other) which is not directly 
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available in the Swiss Household Panel.16 After excluding the irrelevant household members, our 
dataset contains a total of 143,581 individuals belonging to 70,994 families. 
4.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Summary statistics of the variables presented in section 4.1 are reported in Table 1. They 
indicate that the average annual amount of child benefits a family reports is 634.63 Swiss francs 
while the average allowance families are eligible for is 1723.57 Swiss francs. The legitimate 
amount is larger than the reported amount. However, the maximum allowance an individual has 
reported exceeds the maximum federal amount one can be eligible for based on cantonal 
legislation. This is indicative of the presence of supplementary child benefits provided by some 
employers in Switzerland or over-reporting in some instances, but also, on average, of under-
perception or under-estimation of the amount received. 
The average number of children a family has is 1.271 with a standard deviation of 1.333, but 
this number drops below 1 if we exclude children above the age of 16. Children under 16 are on 
average 8.431 years old, and the mean age of the youngest child in a household is about the same. 
The majority of the respondents (97.54%) enjoy average or better health, and about 7% of them 
claim that they have a problem with their children. 
More than 60% of all respondents (excluding children) are currently married, and in 44.27% 
of the households, the parents of the child are married and present in the household. 
                                                          
16 Given the information in the dataset, there were three households for which identification of the role of each 
family member was not possible, which is the reason why we dropped these three households from the original 
dataset. There was a reference person, spouse, 2 (or 3 in one case) children, and 1 grandchild in these three 
households. The grandchild must be the child of one of the children but we do not have information about which one 
of the 3 children is the parent so we cannot even say whether that child lives with his/her mother or father, as well as 
the characteristics (education, etc.) of the parent the child lives with. That is why, we drop these three households. 
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The net household income has a mean of 105041.3 Swiss francs with a standard deviation of 
92016.04, indicating a large variability and income inequality between families in Switzerland. 
5. RESULTS 
This section presents the findings of the study. In Subsection 5.1, we elaborate on the effect 
of child allowances on fertility and labor market outcomes. Subsection 5.2 summarizes some 
robustness checks.  
5.1. EFFECTS OF CHILD BENEFITS ON FERTILITY AND EMPLOYMENT 
Table 2 summarizes the OLS and the 2SLS estimates of the effect of child support on the 
likelihood that a family has another child, as well as the first-stage regression results. Regardless 
of whether we distinguish between individuals in the upper or lower tail of the household income 
distribution, the higher the family allowances, the higher the likelihood of having another child. 
However, OLS significantly and consistently underestimates the effect of interest. 
First, without distinguishing between categories, the results in Table 2 show that a 1% 
increase in allowances increases the likelihood of having another child by 0.00055%. When using 
one instrument, this probability becomes about 18 times larger. Specifically, it rises to 0.01%, or 
an increase in benefits by 10% leads to 0.1% higher probability of having another child. Using 
three instruments rather than one reduces this effect by a negligible amount. 
Second, as indicated in Table 2, an increase in the benefits has a larger impact on low-
income families. Precisely, using one instrument, families are 0.01167% and 0.01147% more 
likely to have another child as benefits rise by 10%, correspondingly when their household 
income is below and above the average earned by families in the sample in the corresponding 
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year. Estimating our models using data only on families with children under the age of 16 
enhances these effects to 0.01250% and 0.01218%, respectively. 
These results are consistent and unbiased, given that the instruments are strong enough. The 
latter is confirmed by the results from the first-stage regressions. They show that the actual 
amount of benefits received by families and the eligibility federal amount used as an instrument 
are strongly correlated. Specifically, a 1% increase in the amount a person is eligible for is 
associated with an increase in the reported benefits by 0.17% for all families, by 0.16% for 
below-average income families, and by 0.13% for families in the upper tail of the household 
income distribution. In addition, the F-statistic on the amount of allowances individuals are 
entitled to varies between 13.92 and 67.76 in all specifications. These F-statistics are far beyond 
the conventional threshold of 10, implying a strong enough instrument. 
In Tables 3 to 6, we explore the effect of child benefits on the employment decisions of the 
parents. The effect of the amount of allowances on the extensive margin of labor supply is 
reported in Table 3, and the remaining tables focus on the intensive margin. We present the 
results from an analysis of mothers and fathers separately, as well as of all parents regardless of 
the gender. Similarly to the fertility analysis, we distinguish between families with household 
income below and above the average. However, irrespective of the specification, family 
allowances have no significant effect on either the choice whether to work or not, or the number 
of hours either of the parents chooses to work given that (s)he is employed. 
5.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
First, in order to explore the possibility that the results might be imprecise in case of a 
violation of the assumption that the marginal benefits for any child of a given individual are 
constant, we perform all major estimations on data excluding individuals residing in Vaud (the 
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canton in which the benefits are significantly higher for a third and higher-order children), 
separately excluding individuals from both Vaud and Valais (the two cantons in which the 
increase in benefits for children of higher order is highest in percentage terms), and also, 
dropping all 8 cantons where there is some variation in benefits depending on child order even if 
the difference is negligible. The results are presented in Table 7. Comparing these estimates to 
the ones obtained from the major estimation, we do not observe a significant difference in either 
the significance, or the magnitude of the effects of interest. Therefore the potential concern that 
the primary estimates may be spurious due to a variation in the marginal allowances across 
children of a single individual is not problematic in our analysis. 
Second, we estimate all major models in the analysis including cantonal effects and time 
trends, in addition to individual-specific effects. As suggested by the results reported in Table 8, 
taking into account time trends and canton-specific fixed effects does not lead to any significant 
changes in either the magnitude, or the significance of the effects of interest. In addition, it is 
possible that the effect of the allowances on the outcomes is driven by the largest cantons because 
they typically provide higher benefits and employers running businesses there are generally more 
willing to distribute additional benefits to remain competitive and to improve their reputation 
among potential employees. Therefore, as an additional robustness check, we exclude each one of 
the three biggest cantons, one at a time. The estimates reported in Table 9 confirm that the results 
presented in the previous section are robust to the exclusion of the largest (Grisons/ Graubünden), 
the second largest (Bern), and the third largest (Valais) canton in Switzerland. 
Finally, we distinguish between the effect of allowances on the likelihood of giving a first 
and subsequent births. The number of observations is heavily reduced when we take into account 
only first births, so due to power issues, these results are inconclusive. Contrary, the results for 
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subsequent births, presented in Table 10, confirm the significant, positive impact of child benefits 
on the likelihood of having another child. This result is consistent with the findings of the main 
estimation. 
6. EFFECT OF A UNIVERSAL FLOOR ON BENEFITS 
Besides studying the effect of child allowances on fertility and labor market outcomes 
presented earlier, we also distinctly investigate a related research question. Specifically, we 
examine the causal effect of the imposition of a statutory floor on child benefits each canton is 
obliged to pay families with children, on the same outcomes. Subsection 6.1 presents some 
background information. Subsection 6.2 describes the method we use to estimate the effect of 
interest, the identification assumption and the tests performed to check its validity. In Subsection 
6.3, we elaborate on the results and the validity of the identifying assumption. 
6.1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The Swiss government publicly announced the Swiss Family Allowance Law 
(Familienzulagengesetz) in 2006. As a result, all 26 cantons became obliged to grant eligible 
applicants a minimum of 200 Swiss francs (appr. $181) of child benefits per month per child 
under 16. Although the policy officially came into effect in 2009, the majority of cantons did not 
alter the benefits at the time of implementation of the reform but instead, initiated gradual 
increases starting immediately after the floor has been announced and progressing between 2006 
and 2009. Because the increase in benefits had been taking place in most cantons since 2006 and 
because the upcoming floor was publicly declared, families have been experiencing the higher 
allowances and have been taking the new amount into account in family decision-making since 
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the announcement rather than the introduction of the policy. We use this fact in the choice of a 
post-reform period in the following section. 
6.2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We employ a difference-in-differences design to analyze the causal effect of the 
announcement of a universal floor on child benefits in Switzerland. 
Defining the treatment group relies on the fact that each canton offers a different amount of 
family allowances, and increases them in different years, while the floor was imposed on a 
country level. As a result, the floor was binding only for cantons paying benefits lower than the 
cutoff amount of 200 Swiss francs. Therefore affected families living in cantons which used to 
offer benefits below the universal threshold and were thus influenced by the reform constitute the 
treatment group in our difference-in-differences analysis. 
We further define the post-intervention period as the years strictly after 2006. The reason is 
that cantons started to increase the benefits after the announcement of the floor in 2006, and the 
new amount of allowances families were eligible for had been taken into account in household 
choices since 2006. However, given that child planning is a process, we allow for a one-year 
response time to the incentives triggered by the reform. 
Given the fore-mentioned choice of a treatment group and a post-reform period, and under 
the assumptions that families in affected and unaffected cantons in Switzerland would have 
evolved similarly in the absence of the reform (which we later verify through formal tests), the 
causal effect of the floor can be identified through the following difference-in-differences model: 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿3𝐷𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝝑𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                 (6) 
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In this equation, 𝐷𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006 is an indicator for the post-intervention period. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is 
a dummy variable for offering benefits below the universal threshold. 𝐷𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2006 ∗
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is an interaction term, and 𝑿 is a vector of controls identical to the ones taken into 
account in the analysis of the effect of child benefits on fertility and labor market outcomes 
discussed previously. The outcomes are also the same as the ones previously chosen and 
described in previous sections: the likelihood of having another child for parents in the most 
fertile age under 45, and the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply of the parents. 
A key identification assumption of the difference-in-differences method above is that there 
would have been no difference in the relevant outcomes of the control and the treatment group in 
the absence of the imposition of a floor on benefits. In order to show that the two groups 
exhibited parallel trends prior to the enactment of the policy, we perform the following tests. 
First, we run a falsification test which uses an earlier treatment period. Specifically, we use an 
alternative date of the announcement of the reform, and thus adopt years 2004 and 2005 as a pre-
reform period. A significant interaction term would indicate spurious results from the difference-
in-differences estimation while an insignificant effect would be desirable. Second, we perform a 
formal test proposed by Autor (2003), in which we interact year dummy variables with the 
treatment indicator.17 Insignificant interactions with periods prior to the imposition of the floor on 
benefits would indicate no difference in the underlying trends between the affected and the 
unaffected cantons. 
                                                          
17 We omit the interactions for 2004 and 2005 pre-treatment periods in order to avoid a dummy variable trap. 
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6.3. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 11 provides summary statistics separately for the treatment and the control group prior 
and after the reform. Based on the statistics presented for the covariates, the two groups appear to 
be very similar both before and after the introduction of the benefits floor. Specifically, 51.7% of 
the respondents belonging to the treatment group and 50.6% of those in the control group were 
married before the intervention, while the percent of married parents was 44.9% and 49.4% after 
the reform, respectively for treated and control individuals. The average age of the parents varies 
between 34.8 and 35.7 years depending on the category of the group. The mean household 
income is also quite stable with a mean value of 100,832 Swiss francs for the treated individuals 
and 111,719 Swiss francs for the controls prior to the intervention, and slightly higher for both 
groups after 2006. Individuals in both groups have an average of approximately 14 years of 
education both pre and post-reform, and more than 98% of them enjoy above-average health. 
6.4. RESULTS AND VALIDITY OF THE PARALLEL TRENDS ASSUMPTION 
The results from the difference-in-differences estimation presented in Table 12 confirm our 
previous findings. Specifically, they suggest that compared to families in cantons unaffected by 
the reform, families in cantons affected by the benefits floor become 4.3% more likely to have 
another child after the policy has been announced. There is no significant change in the extensive 
or intensive margins of labor supply between affected and unaffected cantons, before and after 
the policy change. These results imply a beneficial impact of the introduction of a universal floor 
on child allowances on the child planning behavior of families in Switzerland. 
We also present the results from the tests used to confirm the validity of the parallel trends 
assumption in Table 13. Since we found that the enactment of the policy has a significant impact 
only on fertility, we perform tests validating the parallel trends assumption using only the 
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likelihood of having another child as an outcome variable. First, we run a refutability test using a 
counterfactual year of the introduction of the reform, particularly 2005. We run the difference-in-
differences regression using this alternative post-treatment period. The results from the 
falsification test are presented in Panel A of Table 13. The insignificant interaction term implies 
that the parallel trends assumptions is satisfied, and identification of the parameters in the true 
difference-in-differences model does not yield spurious estimates. 
Second, we perform a test proposed by Autor (2003). The results presented in Panel B of 
Table 13 indicate that the lead is insignificant. This implies that the difference-in-differences is 
not significantly different between the cantons affected by the floor and the ones which have not 
been affected by the reform, i.e. the two groups of cantons moved on the same trend before the 
announcement of the benefits floor and there would have been no difference in the fertility trends 
between the two groups in its absence. Autor's test also shows that the lags are positive and the 
positive significant effect of the policy change on fertility is primarily driven by families who had 
a child in 2011 or 2014. 
Additionally, we provide a scatter plot of the average likelihood of having a child for 
individuals residing in cantons affected and unaffected by the floor on family allowances in each 
year of the study. Figure 1 suggests that prior to the announcement of the reform in 2006, 
individuals living in cantons eventually not affected by the change were more likely to have a 
child. After the floor was imposed the two groups became much more equal in their child-rearing 
decisions, and the average likelihood of having a child in cantons affected by the reform even 
exceeded that in unaffected cantons in 2008, 2011 and 2014. Therefore the net change in the 
mean probability of having a child after relative to before the reform is higher in affected than in 
unaffected cantons. This implies a successful policy change, in that it achieved higher equity in 
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the child rearing opportunities driven by an equalization of the granted child benefits across 
cantons. 
7. DISCUSSIONS 
7.1. POTENTIAL HARVESTING EFFECT 
The results from the investigation of both the effect of family allowances and the 
introduction of a universal floor on child benefits on the likelihood of having further children 
presented previously suggest that higher child support increases the likelihood of having another 
child. This positive effect can be explained in two ways. 
First, since higher allowances reduce the costs of bearing and raising a child, higher benefits 
might provide an incentive to families who have not planned a child or higher-order children to 
have a first or a further child, respectively. An effect through this channel has a direct beneficial 
impact on fertility. 
Second, an increase in the likelihood of having a further child might be indicative of a 
change in the preference of families towards a reduction of the spacing between births. If the 
positive effect is driven mainly by this channel, then an increase in child allowances is likely to 
induce more births in earlier time periods rather than lead to an overall increase in fertility. To 
test this hypothesis, we examine whether there is a significant difference in the average spacing 
between subsequent children by child order in the cantons which were affected by the imposition 
of the floor on child benefits and those which were not influenced by the reform18. The results are 
                                                          
18 In the calculation of the average spacing between children born in each year, we had to exclude third- and higher-
order children born prior to 2004 who have a younger sibling. The reason is that we cannot determine the year those 
children were born given only the age of the youngest and the oldest of all siblings, and thus cannot determine the 
age gap between such children and their siblings. 
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illustrated in Figure 2. There is no apparent difference in the net change in the average gap 
between children in the two groups. The age gap between first and second children of a given 
individual living in a treated canton seems relatively constant over time with a minor decline after 
2013. This decline is also observed in cantons unaffected by the reform. The average spacing 
between second and third children is higher in the treatment group both before and after 2006, 
and although it is slightly lower after 2006 as compared to the pre-reform period, the decline is 
also present in unaffected cantons. This implies that the decline in the gap between children is 
likely to be driven by factors different from the imposition of a floor on child benefits. We do not 
observe any significant change in the spacing between third and fourth children in the treatment 
group in the pre-reform relative to the post-reform period. These findings are suggestive of a 
potential increase in overall births or an earlier timing of the first birth rather than a reduction in 
spacing as a result of the reform although there is no way to test how the reform affected the 
timing of first births because one cannot know when a family would have had their first child in 
the absence of the reform. 
Alternatively, we interact indicators for each year after the reform with the treatment dummy 
variable, and estimate a model similar to the main difference-in-differences but including all of 
the previously mentioned interactions and year indicators. Positive, significant interaction terms 
for the majority of the years after the policy implementation would indicate a sustained 
differential effect on fertility rather than only an immediate impact altering solely the timing of 
giving birth. The results show that all but one interaction terms are positive and the largest (and 
highly significant) differential effect is extracted in 2011, followed by the years of 2007, 2009 
and 2014, suggestive of the possibility that the reform contributed to an increase in overall 
fertility in addition to or rather than a shift of the timing of having a child. 
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To further investigate the harvesting hypothesis, we examine the dynamic relationship 
between child benefits and the likelihood of having another child. The possibility of such a 
relationship is introduced by allowing the outcome in year  𝑡 to be affected by the reported 
benefits for up to 5 years prior to year 𝑡. Although the magnitude of the coefficient is highest one 
year after the disbursement of the benefits, there is a positive impact of allowances on fertility 2 
and 5 years later as well. This positive effect of the lagged values of child benefits indicates both 
a short and a long-run, sustained beneficial impact of family support on fertility. These results 
suggest that higher child benefits are more likely to improve overall fertility rather than affect 
only the timing of child birth in the case of Switzerland. 
In addition, previous authors (e.g., Lalive and Zweimuller 2009) provide evidence that any 
factor which induces births earlier is likely to increase fertility in the long run because giving a 
birth earlier reduces the likelihood of not having a further child due to shocks to health, 
relationships and economic issues which are more prevalent in the longer run. Therefore, even if 
higher child benefits reduce the spacing between children, they also improve overall fertility rate 
either in the short, or in the long run. 
As an additional insight, data on benefits in Switzerland suggests that child allowances have 
been increasing since 2004 in Switzerland, and the tendency is towards further expansion. Such a 
trend makes it less likely for individuals to induce births earlier unless the policy incentivized 
them to change their preferences over the number of children they would like to have over their 
most fertile age range. In addition, having a child at an earlier time period implies that this child 
will reach fertile age earlier than it would have if he was born later, and thus, would be able to 
bear and raise children of his own sooner. This suggests that even if benefits do not lead to an 
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increase in total births of the current generation, they are likely to increase fertility in the long 
run. 
7.2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Many countries, including Germany, the UK, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Finland, 
Norway, Australia, Poland, Ireland and Austria grant child subsidies in the form of either a 
recurrent payment, or a tax reduction of a different magnitude based on the number of children. 
The purpose of the assistance is to support families and to promote child-rearing. In the context 
of providing larger child allowances, our study shows that this attempt is likely to encourage 
families to have a child or higher order children. This result has at least two policy implications. 
First, awareness of the effect of child allowances on fertility is important for social 
assistance planning by policy decision makers and evaluation of various reforms. Although a 
thorough evaluation of child support policies would require considering not only the benefits 
which family-friendly programs provide to beneficiaries, but also the costs of the social program 
which are not a matter of investigation in this article, our study provides a step towards such an 
assessment. It reveals that financial support to families tends to promote child rearing, a finding 
which can be used to partially evaluate the impact of reforms implemented or proposed in other 
countries. For instance, Canada recently increased child benefits to provide Canadians with more 
opportunities to succeed and to enhance citizens' confidence in the future. Our study suggests that 
it is possible that this policy will additionally promote child rearing. 
Second, various European countries, especially Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece, have 
recently been experiencing a decline in the birth rate, which tends to be lower than the 
replacement rate. The average number of live births per woman necessary to keep the population 
at a constant level is not met. Combined with the increased life expectancy, this trend has 
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contributed to aging of the European population since 2010. There are not enough workers to 
support the elderly who retire. The trends are expected to negatively affect growth and the 
demographics of the continent, and thus challenge governments to investigate potential remedies 
to reverse the present demographic decline. According to this study, child benefits have a positive 
impact on fertility which suggests that increasing child support is likely to be a potential 
mechanism to improve fertility rates and to initiate growth in Europe. 
8. CONCLUSION 
This article studies the effect of family allowances on child rearing and employment in the 
context of Switzerland, and uses the amount of benefits families are eligible for as an instrument 
for the reported assistance. It also examines the effect of the introduction of a universal floor on 
child benefits in all cantons in Switzerland. 
Results from a two-stage least squares estimation show that a 10% increase in the federal 
family support increases the likelihood of having another child by 0.1%. They further indicate 
that benefits have a larger impact on the child-rearing inclination of low-income families 
although all families are incentivized by the allowances. While higher benefits positively affect 
fertility, they do not have a significant effect on the extensive margin of labor supply and do not 
seem to reduce the number of hours employed parents choose to work. In addition, difference-in-
differences estimation of the impact of the introduction of a minimum amount of benefits cantons 
are obliged to pay families with children, shows that families in cantons affected by the policy 
become 4.3% more likely to have another child relative to unaffected families, after relative to 
before the reform.  
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These findings provide evidence that financial help intended to reduce the costs of raising a 
child is likely to improve the willingness of families to have children and thus to reverse the trend 
towards having fewer babies in Europe. Such a policy or a reform making child rearing more 
affordable to families can be considered a potential remedy for the declining birth rate, aging 
population and widening gap between the number of children and elderly individuals. 
Although this article evaluates the total beneficial impact of such a reform, it does not 
examine the costs of its implementation. This is a limitation of the study and a potential area of 
further investigation. In addition, allowances received are self-reported in the Swiss Household 
Panel, and therefore errors are likely to occur. We attempt to solve this issue through an 
instrumental variable approach, but if one could use registry data or combine the SHP survey 
with registry data, a more precise evaluation of the effect of benefits on the outcomes would be 
obtained. This is another potential improvement of this article and an area of future research. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the quantitative variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
NumKids 1.271 1.333 0 14 
AllowancesTotal (for the family, annual) 634.628 1916.222 0 42000 
Age (of children under 16) 8.431 4.477 0 15 
Age (of parents) 54.153 16.307 14 99 
AgeYoungestChildInHh 8.647 5.322 0 17 
HrsWorked (of parents) 1.945 8.818 0 112 
HrsWorkedOfMomInHh 1.932 8.064 0 112 
HrsWorkedOfFatherInHh 2.006 9.825 0 110 
YrsEduc (of parents) 13.426 3.005 0 21 
YrsEduc (of mothers) 12.894 2.845 0 21 
YrsEduc (of fathers) 14.145 3.065 0 21 
NetHhldIncome 105041.3 92016.04 0 6185400 
NetIncomeFatherInHh 58416.6 62603.13 0 2430000 
NetIncomeMotherInHh 33018.68 51076.41 0 5502500 
NumHhld 2.422 1.289 1 12 
NumChildrenInHh 0.696 1.035 0 8 
EligibilityAmntAnnual 1723.566 2725.819 0 24000 
Panel B: Summary statistics of the binary (dichotomous) variables 
Variable Percent    
AnotherChild 5.48    
BothParInHh 32.36    
Married (excluding children) 60.76    
MarriedParInHh 44.27    
AvgOrBetterHealth (excluding children) 97.54    
ExistsChInBadHealthInHh 0.15    
ProblemsWithKids 7.12    
Panel C: Summary statistics of received annual allowances and amount of benefits a family is eligible for based on cantonal legislation, by year 
Year 
Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
Allowance 
Eligibility 
Amount 
 Allowance 
Eligibility 
Amount 
 Allowance 
Eligibility 
Amount 
 Allowance 
Eligibility 
Amount 
2004 380.703 1090.323  1459.845 2022.325  0 0  19200 15420 
2005 353.778 1113.331  1341.629 2084.266  0 0  14400 15720 
2006 555.539 1101.932  1716.964 2090.578  0 0  36000 15720 
2007 571.452 1059.041  1829.379 2104.364  0 0  37800 16920 
2008 608.980 1040.548  1938.475 2107.908  0 0  30000 18120 
2009 665.376 1093.185  1931.357 2247.909  0 0  28800 18120 
2010 713.266 1058.771  1993.892 2201.587  0 0  17400 15600 
2011 770.300 1018.463  2050.149 2130.861  0 0  18000 15600 
2012 766.190 977.033  2103.593 2119.265  0 0  19200 15600 
2013 404.500 1049.383  1567.354 2213.758  0 0  24000 21600 
2014 797.802 1039.803  2091.055 2212.679  0 0  18000 21600 
2015 845.864 1005.007  2250.553 2201.065  0 0  42000 22800 
2016 783.440 968.697  2184.891 2160.53  0 0  40000 24000 
Overall 634.628 1044.055  1916.222 2154.533  0 0  42000 24000 
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Note: Source: Data are obtained from the Swiss Household Panel longitudinal dataset, the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) in Bern, 
Switzerland for child benefits by canton by year, and the Cantonal Compensation Offices in the 26 cantons in Switzerland. 
Table 2.2. Effect of family allowances on the likelihood of another child: OLS FE and IV results  
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
All income levels 
 (2) 
Below average income households 
 (3) 
Above average income households 
  1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibility 
AmntAnnual 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
 0.173*** 
(0.030) 
0.168*** 
(0.031) 
0.171*** 
(0.030) 
0.165*** 
(0.031) 
  0.160*** 
(0.049) 
0.151*** 
(0.050) 
0.161*** 
(0.049) 
0.152*** 
(0.050) 
  0.134*** 
(0.044) 
0.129*** 
(0.044) 
0.132*** 
(0.044) 
0.126*** 
(0.044) 
DBn2006and20
09 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
 - 
 
- 
0.030 
(0.036) 
0.035 
(0.036) 
  - 
 
- 
-0.005 
(0.055) 
0.0002 
(0.055) 
  - 
 
- 
0.072 
(0.053) 
0.074 
(0.053) 
D2009andAfter 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
 - 
 
- 
0.059 
(0.046) 
0.068 
(0.046) 
  - 
 
- 
-0.023 
(0.071) 
-0.016 
(0.071) 
  - 
 
- 
0.113* 
(0.067) 
0.121* 
(0.067) 
Individual-
specific effects 
  Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
  
40.71 
39.65 
 
33.46 
32.65 
   
17.69 
17.06 
 
14.47 
13.95 
   
16.68 
16.39 
 
13.92 
13.72 
Obs. 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
  
4,497 
4,437 
 
4,497 
4,437 
   
2,042 
2,020 
 
2,042 
2,020 
   
2,455 
2,417 
 
2,455 
2,417 
Within R2  
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
  
0.1130 
0.1118 
 
0.1136 
0.1125 
   
0.1197 
0.1175 
 
0.1198 
0.1176 
   
0.0951 
0.0947 
 
0.0970 
0.0968 
Between R2  
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
  
0.0442 
0.0436 
 
0.0451 
0.0445 
   
0.0451 
0.0436 
 
0.0445 
0.0431 
   
0.0263 
0.0255 
 
0.0275 
0.0267 
Overall R2 
- all 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16  
  
0.0447 
0.0439 
 
0.0462 
0.0455 
   
0.0385 
0.0378 
 
0.0375 
0.0370 
   
0.0313 
0.0297 
 
0.0328 
0.0312 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  
- all 
 
 
- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
0.811*** 
(0.105) 
[0.055***] 
0.923*** 
(0.111) 
[0.064***] 
19.342*** 
(1.281) 
[1.009***] 
20.851*** 
(1.390) 
[0.989***] 
19.423*** 
(1.343) 
[0.962***] 
20.430*** 
(1.465) 
[0.150***] 
 0.845*** 
(0.157) 
[0.060***] 
0.910*** 
(0.163) 
[0.068***] 
20.703*** 
(1.967) 
[1.167***] 
21.944*** 
(2.072) 
[1.250***] 
19.801*** 
(1.854) 
[1.156***] 
21.345*** 
(1.988) 
[1.244***] 
 0.870*** 
(0.160) 
[0.051***] 
0.990*** 
(0.165) 
[0.057***] 
25.983*** 
(2.677) 
[1.147***] 
28.474*** 
(3.043) 
[1.218***] 
24.207*** 
(2.703) 
[1.010***] 
24.243*** 
(3.092) 
[1.030***] 
Obs. 
- all 
 
5,463 
4,400 
 
9,645 
9,525 
 
9,645 
9,525 
  
2,407 
2,022 
 
4,573 
4,538 
 
4,573 
4,538 
  
3,056 
2,418 
 
5,072 
4,987 
 
5,072 
4,987 
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- only families 
with a child 
under 16 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2), and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2), and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between low- and high-income families, and between individuals who 
report higher or lower benefits than the amount they are eligible for. The estimates in (2) have been obtained using data only for low-income 
(below average) income families, while (3) takes into account only families with household income above the average for the particular year. The 
following are the controls used in all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, Married, Age, HrsWorked, YrsEduc, AvgOrBetterHealth, 
l.AgeYoungestChildInHh, l.NumKids. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Table 2.3. Effect of family allowances on employment status (extensive margin) by the parents: OLS FE and IV results 
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
Both parents 
 (2) 
Mothers 
 (3) 
Fathers 
  1 IV 3IV   1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibility 
AmntAnnual 
 0.191*** 
(0.039) 
0.188*** 
(0.039) 
  0.126* 
(0.074) 
0.114 
(0.074) 
  0.206*** 
(0.043) 
0.211*** 
(0.044) 
DBn2006and2009  - 0.087*** 
(0.033) 
  - 0.095 
(0.060) 
  - 0.076** 
(0.037) 
D2009andAfter  - 0.099** 
(0.046) 
  - 0.222*** 
(0.085) 
  - 0.003 
(0.051) 
Individual-
specific effects 
 Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic  49.37 42.45   13.68 12.17   45.86 39.39 
Obs.  4,076 4,076   1,745 1,745   2,331 2,331 
Within R2  0.2038 0.2065   0.1442 0.1508   0.2929 0.2963 
Between R2  0.2638 0.2726   0.1810 0.1872   0.3872 0.3786 
Overall R2   0.2569 0.2654   0.1606 0.1660   0.3868 0.3800 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Prob (being employed) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  0.249*** 
(0.093) 
[0.009***] 
-0.755 
(0.588) 
[-0.065] 
0.443 
(0.435) 
[0.038] 
 0.169 
(0.109) 
[0.009] 
-0.874 
(0.960) 
[-0.103] 
0.917*** 
(0.353) 
[0.109***] 
 0.216 
(0.192) 
[0.004] 
-0.544 
(1.510) 
[-0.019] 
-0.124 
(1.436) 
[-0.004] 
Individual-
specific effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,579 8,935 8,935  2,013 5,849 5,849  2,566 3,086 3,086 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2) and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2) and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between parents’ gender. The estimates in (2) have been obtained using 
data only for mothers, while (3) takes into account only fathers. The following are the controls used in all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, 
BothParInHh, Married, Age, ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, 
ExistsChInBadHealthInHh. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.4. Effect of family allowances on hours worked by the mother: OLS FE and IV results  
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
All income levels 
 (2) 
Below average income 
households 
 (3) 
Above average income 
households 
  1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibilityAmnt 
Annual 
 0.122* 
(0.075) 
0.107 
(0.075) 
  -0.128 
(0.110) 
-0.135 
(0.111) 
  0.089 
(0.130) 
0.090 
(0.129) 
DBn2006and2009  - 0.068 
(0.060) 
  - 0.036 
(0.079) 
  - 0.090 
(0.100) 
D2009andAfter  - 0.243*** 
(0.086) 
  - 0.061 
(0.114) 
  - 0.379*** 
(0.144) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
 Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic  14.66 13.15   8.62 7.28   4.30 4.45 
Obs.  1,690 1,690   865 865   825 825 
Within R2   0.1573 0.1655   0.1975 0.1982   0.1191 0.1424 
Between R2   0.1628 0.1768   0.0905 0.0908   0.1335 0.2055 
Overall R2  0.1466 0.1586   0.0843 0.0851   0.1384 0.2077 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked by the mother 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  -0.293 
(0.548) 
-1.738 
(5.091) 
-2.606 
(2.497) 
 -0.652 
(0.859) 
7.522 
(8.127) 
5.673 
(7.231) 
 0.360 
(0.877) 
5.455 
(10.367) 
-5.791** 
(2.359) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,960 4,713 4,713  980 2,257 2,257  980 2,456 2,456 
Within R2  0.0127 0.0199 0.0203  0.0639 0.0303 0.0301  0.0226 0.0170 0.0224 
Between R2  0.0003 0.0001 0.0002  0.0077 0.0004 0.0002  0.0090 0.0001 0.0001 
Overall R2 0.0010 0.0015 0.0016  0.0170 0.0039 0.0040  0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2), and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2), and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between low- and high-income families, and between individuals who 
report higher or lower benefits than the amount they are eligible for. The estimates in (2) have been obtained using data only for low-income 
(below average) income families, while (3) takes into account only families with household income above the average for the particular year. The 
following are the controls used in all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, BothParInHh, Married, Age, ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, 
NetIncomeFatherInHh, NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, ExistsChInBadHealthInHh. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.5. Effect of family allowances on hours worked by the father: OLS FE and IV results  
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
All income levels 
 (2) 
Below average income households 
 (3) 
Above average income 
households 
  1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibilityAmnt 
Annual 
 0.205*** 
(0.043) 
0.209*** 
(0.044) 
  0.319*** 
(0.085) 
0.325*** 
(0.087) 
  0.108* 
(0.058) 
0.109* 
(0.059) 
DBn2006and2009  - 0.065* 
(0.037) 
  - 0.054 
(0.065) 
  - 0.104* 
(0.054) 
D2009andAfter  - -0.004 
(0.051) 
  - 0.007 
(0.089) 
  - 0.017 
(0.070) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
 Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic  43.53 37.29   17.72 14.81   29.22 16.71 
Obs.  2,306 2,306   891 891   1,415 1,415 
Within R2   0.2845 0.2874   0.3256 0.3274   0.2353 0.2407 
Between R2   0.3979 0.3877   0.3947 0.3926   0.2927 0.2864 
Overall R2  0.3930 0.3846   0.4042 0.4036   0.2834 0.2884 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked by the father 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  1.029 
(0.808) 
3.579 
(5.765) 
0.446 
(5.242) 
 2.406 
(1.712) 
1.921 
(8.483) 
2.181 
(8.170) 
 0.152 
(0.981) 
22.383 
(13.381) 
-5.781 
(8.595) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,549 2,943 2,943  961 1,107 1,107  1,588 1,836 1,836 
Within R2  0.0114 0.0056 0.0054  0.0567 0.0325 0.0326  0.0087 0.0080 0.0055 
Between R2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0017 0.0028 0.0028  0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Overall R2 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004  0.0001 0.0011 0.0011  0.0009 0.0002 0.0000 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2), and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2), and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between low- and high-income families, and between individuals who 
report higher or lower benefits than the amount they are eligible for. The estimates in (2) have been obtained using data only for low-income 
(below average) income families, while (3) takes into account only families with household income above the average for the particular year. The 
following are the controls used in all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, BothParInHh, Married, Age, ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, 
NetIncomeMotherInHh, NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, ExistsChInBadHealthInHh. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.6. Effect of family allowances on hours worked by the parents: OLS FE and IV results  
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
All income levels 
 (2) 
Below average income 
households 
 (3) 
Above average income 
households 
  1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibilityAmntAnnual  0.187*** 
(0.039) 
0.182*** 
(0.039) 
  0.112 
(0.069) 
0.112 
(0.070) 
  0.115** 
(0.056) 
0.111** 
(0.056) 
DBn2006and2009  - 0.069** 
(0.033) 
  - 0.035 
(0.052) 
  - 0.073 
(0.050) 
D2009andAfter  - 0.101** 
(0.047) 
  - 0.023 
(0.072) 
  - 0.127* 
(0.067) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
 Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic  49.23 42.16   19.44 16.46   18.92 16.32 
Obs.  3,996 3,996   1,756 1,756   2,240 2,240 
Within R2   0.2067 0.2088   0.2192 0.2197   0.1657 0.1686 
Between R2   0.2615 0.2720   0.1843 0.1835   0.2259 0.2268 
Overall R2  0.2542 0.2641   0.2000 0.1995   0.2205 0.2314 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  0.283 
(0.472) 
1.449 
(3.083) 
1.265 
(2.775) 
 0.591 
(0.850) 
0.170 
(9.386) 
0.393 
(8.643) 
 0.256 
(0.649) 
11.589* 
(6.959) 
4.387 
(5.102) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,509 7,656 7,656  1,941 3,364 3,364  2,568 4,292 4,292 
Within R2  0.0058 0.0076 0.0076  0.0290 0.0160 0.0160  0.0082 0.0073 0.0064 
Between R2  0.0010 0.0010 0.0009  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000  0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 
Overall R2 0.0008 0.0022 0.0022  0.0003 0.0000 0.0000  0.0003 0.0007 0.0009 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2), and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2), and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between low- and high-income families, and between individuals who 
report higher or lower benefits than the amount they are eligible for. The estimates in (2) have been obtained using data only for low-income 
(below average) income families, while (3) takes into account only families with household income above the average for the particular year. The 
following are the controls used in all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, BothParInHh, Married, Age, ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, 
NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, ExistsChInBadHealthInHh. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal 
effects are specified in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.7. Robustness tests: Excluding cantons in which benefits vary with birth order 
Panel A: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
 (1) 
All cantons 
 (2) 
Vaud excluded 
 (3) 
Vaud and Valais excluded 
 (4) 
8 cantons excluded 
 OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  
 
0.811*** 
(0.105) 
[0.055***] 
19.342*** 
(1.281) 
[1.009***] 
 0.804*** 
(0.112) 
[0.055***] 
18.423*** 
(1.263) 
[0.975***] 
 0.795*** 
(0.112) 
[0.056***] 
18.322*** 
(1.310) 
[0.986***] 
 0.776*** 
(0.122) 
[0.057***] 
20.995*** 
(1.643) 
[1.118***] 
Individual 
FE 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 5,463 9,645  4,821 8,618  4,633 8,231  3,690 6,483 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV  OLS 1 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  
 
0.283 
(0.472) 
1.449 
(3.083) 
 0.215 
(0.502) 
0.323 
(3.209) 
 0.213 
(0.513) 
-0.258 
(3.308) 
 0.413 
(0.574) 
1.034 
(3.297) 
Individual 
FE 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,509 7,656  4,010 6,843  3,842 6,558  3,051 5,207 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using either OLS FE or 2SLS, and include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the probability of having another child, while the dependent variable in Panel B is the hours worked 
by either of the parents. The basic specification in (1) does not exclude individuals from any canton. The regressions in (2) exclude residents of 
Vaud (the canton in which benefits increase the most for third and higher-order children); those in (3) exclude residents of Vaud and Valais (the 
two cantons with highest increase in benefits for third and higher-order children), and (4) excludes individuals from all 8 cantons where benefits 
vary with child order. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are presented in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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Table 2.8. Robustness tests: including year and canton FE 
Panel A: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.811*** 
(0.105) 
[0.055***] 
19.342*** 
(1.281) 
[1.009***] 
19.423*** 
(1.343) 
[0.962***] 
 0.642*** 
(0.102) 
[0.042***] 
19.799*** 
(1.634) 
[0.930***] 
19.799*** 
(1.634) 
[0.930***] 
 0.828*** 
(0.106) 
[0.055***] 
20.943*** 
(1.381) 
[1.092***] 
21.065*** 
(1.459) 
[1.030***] 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Canton FE No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5,463 9,645 9,645  5,463 9,645 9,645  5,441 9,645 9,645 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.283 
(0.472) 
1.449 
(3.083) 
1.265 
(2.775) 
 0.177 
(0.474) 
1.487 
(3.253) 
1.487 
(3.253) 
 0.267 
(0.482) 
1.507 
(3.231) 
1.279 
(2.950) 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Canton FE No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,509 7,656 7,656  4,509 7,656 7,656  4,509 7,656 7,656 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using either OLS FE or 2SLS, and include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the probability of having another child, while the dependent variable in Panel B is the hours worked 
by either of the parents. The basic specification in (1) includes only individual FE. The regressions in (2) include both individual effects and time 
trends. The regressions in (3) include individual and cantonal FE, while those in (4) take into account individual and interacted cantonal and year 
FE. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are presented in square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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Table 2.9. Robustness tests: Excluding largest cantons one-by-one  
Panel A: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
 (1) 
All cantons 
 (2) 
Grisons/ Graubünden excluded 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.811*** 
(0.105) 
[0.055***] 
19.342*** 
(1.281) 
[1.009***] 
19.423*** 
(1.343) 
[0.962***] 
 0.790*** 
(0.105) 
[0.054***] 
18.938*** 
(1.274) 
[0.995***] 
19.189*** 
(1.338) 
[0.954] 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5,463 9,645 9,645  5,365 9,437 9,437 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Hours worked 
 (1)  (2) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.283 
(0.472) 
1.449 
(3.083) 
1.265 
(2.775) 
 0.322 
(0.479) 
1.351 
(3.096) 
1.256 
(2.833) 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,509 7,656 7,656  4,424 7,492  7,492 
 
Panel A: OLS and second-stage regression IV results – cont. 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
  (3) 
Bern excluded 
 (4) 
Valais excluded 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.873*** 
(0.116) 
[0.058***] 
18.742*** 
(1.330) 
[0.979***] 
18.560*** 
(1.310) 
[0.982***] 
 0.813*** 
(0.106) 
[0.056***] 
19.369*** 
(1.310) 
[1.027***] 
19.347*** 
(1.379) 
[0.971***] 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,828 8,530 8,530  5,275 9,258 9,258 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results – cont. 
Dependent variable: Hours worked 
 (3)  (4) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
̂
 
 
0.086 
(0.503) 
0.815 
(3.031) 
1.240 
(2.907) 
 0.283 
(0.483) 
0.975 
(3.105) 
0.689 
(2.773) 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,964 6,708 6,708  4,341 7,371 7,371 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using either OLS FE or 2SLS, and include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the probability of having another child, while the dependent variable in Panel B is the hours worked 
by either of the parents. The basic specification in (1) does not exclude individuals from any canton. The regressions in (2) exclude residents of 
Grisons/ Graubünden (the largest canton in Switzerland); those in (3) exclude residents of Bern (the second largest canton), and (4) excludes 
individuals from Valais (the third largest canton). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are presented in square 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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Table 2.10. Effect of family allowances on the likelihood of another child: Distinguished first and subsequent births 
Panel A: Reduced-form (first-stage) regression results with FE 
Dependent variable: lnAllowancesTotal 
 (1) 
All 
 (2) 
Subsequent births 
  1 IV 3 IV   1 IV 3 IV 
lnEligibilityAmntAnnual 
 
 0.173*** 
(0.030) 
0.171*** 
(0.030) 
  0.177*** 
(0.032) 
0.175*** 
(0.032) 
DBn2006and2009  - 
 
0.030 
(0.036) 
  - 0.022 
(0.037) 
D2009andAfter 
 
 - 0.059 
(0.046) 
  - 
 
0.043 
(0.048) 
Individual-specific effects   Yes   Yes Yes 
F-statistic  40.71 33.46   38.24 31.35 
Obs.  4,497 4,497   4,094 4,094 
Within R2   0.1130 0.1136   0.1162 0.1164 
Between R2   0.0442 0.0451   0.0481 0.0491 
Overall R2   0.0447 0.0462   0.0511 0.0525 
Panel B: OLS and second-stage regression IV results 
Dependent variable: Probability (another child) 
 (1)  (2) 
 OLS 1 IV 3 IV  OLS 1 IV 3 IV 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙̂  
 
0.811*** 
(0.105) 
[0.055***] 
19.342*** 
(1.281) 
[1.009***] 
19.423*** 
(1.343) 
[0.962***] 
 0.185** 
(0.080) 
[0.011**] 
9.874*** 
(1.359) 
[0.496***] 
9.597*** 
(1.423) 
[0.479***] 
Obs. 5,463 9,645 9,645  4,982 8,846 8,846 
Notes: All regressions include individual-specific effects. Panel A reports the results from the first-stage regressions, while Panel B reports both 
OLS estimates, as well as the results from 2-stage least squares estimation. The first column in (1), (2) and (3) of Panel B always reports the 
results from OLS estimation with FE, without controlling for endogeneity; the second column always reports the results from the second stage of 
2-stage least squares estimation using 1 instrument with FE, and the third column of (1), (2) and (3) in Panel B presents the estimates from two-
stage least squares estimation using 3 instruments. (1) does not distinguish between first and subsequent births while (2) reports the effect of 
allowances only on subsequent births. The following are the controls used all regressions: lnNetHhldIncome, Married, Age, HrsWorked, YrsEduc, 
AvgOrBetterHealth, l.AgeYoungestChildInHh, l.NumKids. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in 
square parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2.11. Summary statistics for the treatment and the control group 
Variable 
Treatment group  Control group 
Before  After  Before  After 
Mean Std. 
deviation 
 Mean Std. 
deviation 
 Mean Std. 
deviation 
 Mean Std. 
deviation 
Married 0.517 0.500  0.449 0.497  0.506 0.500  0.494 0.500 
Age 35.151 7.015  34.803 7.220  35.512 6.585  35.704 6.963 
NetHhldIncome 100832.4 60328.09  112243.1 68760.48  111719.2 101748.6  115932.4 61928.09 
HrsWorked 2.490 9.908  2.866 10.638  2.459 10.244  2.579 10.131 
YrsEduc 13.534 2.816  14.159 3.014  13.666 2.997  14.158 3.141 
AvgOrBetterHealth 0.985 0.121  0.987 0.111  0.980 0.140  0.986 0.119 
AgeYoungestChildInHh 7.064 4.826  6.513 4.807  6.828 4.734  6.613 4.769 
NumKids 1.059 1.214  0.813 1.156  0.009 0.109  0.002 0.047 
Note: Source: Data are obtained from the Swiss Household Panel longitudinal dataset, the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) in Bern, 
Switzerland for child benefits by canton by year, and the Cantonal Compensation Offices in the 26 cantons in Switzerland. 
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Table 2.12. Difference-in-differences results 
 (1) 
Prob (another 
child) 
(2) 
Prob (being 
employed) 
(3) 
Hours 
worked 
(4) 
Hours worked 
by mother, 
given employed 
(5) 
Hours worked by 
father, given 
employed 
DAfter2006 0.207 
(0.272) 
0.261* 
(0.149) 
0.989 
(0.804) 
1.702** 
(0.843) 
-0.820 
(1.737) 
Treatment -0.268 
(0.293) 
0.080 
(0.161) 
1.226 
(1.916) 
-0.054 
(2.142) 
3.562 
(3.674) 
DAfter2006xTreatment 0.561* 
(0.311) 
[0.043*] 
0.070 
(0.164) 
[0.006] 
-0.702 
(0.830) 
-1.285 
(0.875) 
0.711 
(1.779) 
Individual-specific 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,354 10,254 8,816 5,454 3,362 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using OLS/ OLS FE. The variables of interest are Dafter2006, TreatedCanton and the interaction of the latter 
two variables. A DD approach has been adopted. The dependent variables are the following: Prob (another child) in Column (1); Prob (being 
employed) in Column (2); Hours worked by the parents, given that they are employed in Column (3); Hours worked by the mother, given 
employment in Column (4); and Hours worked by the father, given employment in Column (5). The following are the controls: lnNetHhldIncome, 
Married, Age, HrsWorked, YrsEduc, AvgOrBetterHealth, l.AgeYoungestChildInHh, and l.NumKids (Column (1)); BothParInHh, Married, Age, 
ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, and ExistsChInBadHealthInHh (Columns (2)); 
BothParInHh, Married, Age, ProblemsWithKids, AvgOrBetterHealth, NumHhld, AgeYoungestChildInHh, YrsEduc, NumKids, and 
ExistsChInBadHealthInHh (Columns (3), (4) and (5)). Regressions (3), (4) and (5) include individual-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square parentheses in the cases of probit regression models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10.  
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Table 2.13. Verification of the validity of the parallel trends identification 
assumption of the difference-in-differences 
Panel A: Falsification test (Counterfactual pre- and post-reform period) 
 (1) 
AfterxTreatment 0.594 
(0.421) 
[0.045] 
Obs. 7,354 
Panel B: Autor's test 
 (1) 
year2006xTreatment 0.253 (0.484) 
year2007xTreatment 0.836 (0.701) 
year2008xTreatment 0.723 (0.694) 
year2009xTreatment 0.787 (0.633) 
year2010xTreatment 0.654 (0.548) 
year2011xTreatment 1.808*** (0.610) 
year2012xTreatment 0.344 (0.447) 
year2013xTreatment 0.447 (0.485) 
year2014xTreatment 0.712* (0.408) 
year2015xTreatment 0.076 (0.430) 
year2016xTreatment 0.589 (0.470) 
Obs. 7,354 
Notes: The table represents the results from tests of the validity of the parallel trends identification assumption of the difference-in-differences. All 
regressions are estimated using FE. The dependent variable is the Prob (another child), while the controls are the following: lnNetHhldIncome, 
Married, Age, HrsWorked, YrsEduc, AvgOrBetterHealth, l.AgeYoungestChildInHh, and l.NumKids. Panels A reports the results from a 
falsification test using an earlier year (2005) of the implementation of the reform. The effect is insignificant, implying that the parallel trends 
assumption is not violated. Panel B reports the results from formal Autor's test. Insignificant interaction terms of the treatment indicator with the 
years before the reform indicate parallel trends. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects are specified in square 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Mean likelihood of having a child in each year in cantons affected and 
unaffected by the floor on family benefits 
 
Notes: The graph illustrates the likelihood of having a child in each year on average in cantons affected and 
unaffected by the imposition of a universal floor on child benefits across all 26 cantons in Switzerland. 
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Figure 2.2. Average spacing between children 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph represents the average spacing (in years) between children separately for cantons affected and 
cantons unaffected by the imposition of a floor on benefits. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE EFFECT OF MATERNITY LEAVE EXPANSIONS ON FERTILITY INTENTIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND19 
(Co-authored with Dr. Barbos) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We study the effect of the expansion of the mandatory paid maternity leave, implemented in 
Switzerland in 2005, on individuals’ fertility intentions. Earlier literature found evidence of fertility 
increases induced by maternity leave expansions from other countries of a relatively large 
magnitude of one year. The expansion that we consider was smaller, from 8 unpaid weeks to 14 
mandatory paid weeks, and thus its effect on fertility decisions is less evident ex ante. Nevertheless, 
we find that it positively impacts fertility planning even though, by construction, our model 
specification cannot capture its full effect. The strongest effects are elicited in the subsamples of 
men, individuals with 2 children, and individuals aged between 31 and 36. There are several 
channels through which the maternity leave expansion may affect individuals’ child planning, all 
indicative of a positive effect on the fertility rate.   
Keywords: maternity leave; child planning; fertility. 
  
                                                          
19 We thank helpful comments from Padmaja Ayyagari, Giulia La Mattina, and Joshua Wilde. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Birth rates in most European countries have been below replacement levels for several 
decades (OECD 2017a). Combined with an increasing life expectancy, this has led to the aging of 
the population, raising concerns among policy makers about potential adverse long term socio-
economic consequences. To address this issue, governments have attempted to stimulate fertility, 
primarily by means of lowering the economic costs of bearing and raising a child, with a key policy 
tool in this respect being laws that define maternity leave benefits (OECD 2017b). Expansions of 
maternity benefits have been implemented throughout most of Europe over the past 30 years. Due 
to the significant costs incurred by these expansions on the government and private sector entities, 
an important public policy question is whether they have made a contribution towards an increased 
fertility rate.20 Our paper examines this question in the context of the expansion of the maternity 
benefits (MB) implemented in Switzerland in 2005, which included an expansion from 8 weeks of 
maternity leave, which depending on the choice of the employer, could be paid or unpaid, to 14 
weeks of mandatory paid leave. We investigate the effect of this policy reform on individuals’ 
medium term fertility intentions, as captured by their self-declared likelihood that they plan to 
conceive a child in the 3 years following the date they were interviewed. 
Several earlier papers examined the effect on fertility outcomes or fertility intentions of 
changes in the duration of the paid parental leave from Austria (Lalive and Zweimuller 2009), 
Russia (Malkova 2017), and Australia (Bassford and Fisher 2016). They found that the relatively 
large 1-year extensions implemented in Austria and Russia led to significant increases in fertility 
rates, whereas the smaller extension implemented in Australia had a more ambiguous impact. The 
                                                          
20 While cost considerations, particularly to private enterprises, play a secondary role in the public debate surrounding 
the topic of maternity leave extensions from European countries, they are the main consideration in the corresponding 
debate in the United States, where concerns about the national fertility rate are currently less serious (Averett and 
Wittington 2001).   
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MB expansion implemented in Switzerland in 2005 was of a relatively small magnitude, and thus 
its effect on fertility choices is less evident ex ante.  
 Since MB expansions, including the one from Switzerland that we investigate, typically 
provide potential benefits to the whole population of child bearing age, disentangling the effect of 
a particular policy change from an underlying trend often poses an identification challenge in the 
absence of a valid control group. In our study, we circumvent this issue by examining instead the 
effect of experiencing the expanded MB. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that the net 
change in the fertility intentions of past beneficiaries of the reform after its implementation, i.e., 
individuals who have already experienced the expanded MB, is higher than the net change in 
fertility intentions of the individuals who have been eligible for these benefits, and thus may have 
considered them in their fertility decisions, but who have not yet experienced the benefits. If 
confirmed, this hypothesis would imply a successful policy reform, even if our exercise would not 
capture its unidentifiable full effect on the fertility intentions. 
We examine our hypothesis by estimating a difference-in-differences model, employing data 
from two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from the years 2004 and 2010. The treatment 
group in this estimation consists of the individuals who conceived a child in the 6 years prior to the 
time of the interview. A subset of the individuals from the treatment group interviewed in 2010 
experienced the expanded MB because of the policy reform.21 As a control group, we utilize 
individuals with no children at the time of the interview. While eligible for the expanded MB in 
2010, such individuals have not yet experienced them. The role of this control group in our analysis 
                                                          
21 Some individuals benefited from a paid maternity leave as generous as the one implemented by the policy reform 
even before 2005, either because their employers offered them voluntarily, or because they lived in the Bern canton 
which was mandating these more generous benefits even before 2005 (the dataset we employ does not allow identifying 
either of these two categories of individuals, and therefore they cannot be used as a control group). Our analysis thus 
elicits intended-to-treat effects. 
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is to capture the counterfactual underlying trend in fertility intentions between 2004 and 2010 that 
would have manifested in the absence of the MB expansion. Note however that the composition of 
both the treatment and control groups may have changed specifically because of the reform. We 
account for this possibility when evaluating the possible channels through which the reform 
affected fertility planning. To test the validity of this control group, we run a placebo test on data 
from France and Germany, the two neighboring countries of Switzerland, for which the available 
data allow estimating the same model. The test shows no significant difference in trends between 
the two groups in those two other countries in the absence of a policy change. 
While most benefits introduced by the new law applied exclusively to mothers, we also 
examine the effect of this law on men’s fertility intentions, as men also benefit from a longer 
maternity leave, even if only indirectly, and their willingness to conceive a child plays a role in a 
couple’s fertility decisions. 
The findings from our estimations provide evidence of a differential change in fertility 
intentions between the two waves in the treatment group relative to the control group, suggestive 
of a positive effect of the implementation of the MB expansion on fertility intentions. An analysis 
of the heterogeneity of responses elicits the strongest effects in the subsample of men, the 
subsample of individuals with 2 children, and the subsample of individuals aged between 31 and 
36. The key interaction coefficient is however positive in most subsamples, and is statistically 
significant in other subsamples.  
An evaluation of the channels though which this effect may take place, identifies three 
possibilities.  
The first channel corresponds to a behavioral effect by which individuals who have already 
experienced the benefits became more likely to plan higher order children either because they 
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became aware of these new benefits or because they learned their impact on their child bearing 
costs.  
The second possible channel is determined by the specific dependent variable that we employ 
in the analysis, which elicits the medium term individuals’ fertility intentions, i.e., for the 3 years 
following the date of the interview, rather than their lifetime fertility intentions. It is possible that 
individuals who had a child after the reform were more likely to reduce the spacing between higher 
order births, as the extended maternity leave for a future child may also reduce the cost of raising 
the existing older children. An individual who recently had a child and who, with a reduced 
maternity leave, would have planned another one later than the 3 years subsequent to the date of 
the interview, may choose to plan the future child sooner. This is because the benefit on the current 
child of the extended leave due to be received because of the future child, is higher when the current 
child is younger. This effect is referred to in Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) as the future child effect 
in the context of the maternity leave expansion from Austria. However, unlike the expansion from 
Austria, which increased the maternity leave from 1 to 2 years, the expansion from Switzerland is 
of a much smaller magnitude, from 8 to 14 weeks. While the additional 6 weeks can significantly 
reduce the cost of bearing a newborn child, their effect on reducing the cost of raising an older 
child is arguably less significant. If this effect is present in our case, it is thus likely to be less strong 
than the one that Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) measure in their analysis.  
Finally, a third possible channel is created by the possibility that some individuals may have 
been induced to conceive a child earlier by the expanded maternity leave, and thus be in the 
treatment group by the time of the second wave interview specifically because of the policy reform. 
The key result from our difference-in-difference estimation may be generated in this manner for 
certain prior distributions of fertility intentions in the population. In our analysis of this channel, 
we argue that if the policy reform affected fertility intentions in this manner, then it could not have 
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been determined solely by individuals who would complete their fertility by 2010. In other words, 
some individuals who had a child earlier because of the reform must have continued to plan higher 
order children after 2010.  
If the maternity leave reform affected fertility intentions primarily through the behavioral 
channel, it would determine a clear increase in long term fertility rate.22 On the other hand, if the 
effect that we uncover is determined solely through the latter two channels, then, in principle, it 
could be that the reform only changed the timing of an individual’s child bearing rather than the 
total number of children. Nevertheless, as Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) argue, any policy change 
that induces individuals to conceive children earlier is likely to increase long term fertility, since 
having a child earlier alleviates the potential adverse effects to fertility induced by shocks to health, 
relationships, or economic circumstances that can emerge in long term.23 While our data do not 
allow disentangling these possible channels, or measure the full effect of the policy change, the 
analysis suggests that despite the Swiss expansion of the maternity leave being significantly smaller 
in magnitude than the expansions studied in other articles, it does have a positive impact on 
individuals’ child planning, likely to determine an increase in fertility. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a summary of the relevant existing 
literature. Section 3 provides background information regarding the context and content of the 
policy reform. Section 4 presents the empirical model and the identification strategy. In Section 5, 
we describe the data used in this study. Section 6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 7 
                                                          
22 Bassford and Fisher (2016) present a review of evidence that fertility intentions predict fertility outcomes from 
studies such as Morgan (2001), Schoen et al. (1999), and Berrington (2004). 
23 On the other hand, several studies showed an adverse effect of a reduction in birth spacing on children’s educational 
attainment (Pettersson-Lidbom and Thoursie 2009, Buckles and Munnich 2012, Hill and Slusky 2017), and on the 
mother’s labor outcomes (Karimi 2014, Gough 2017).    
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discusses the possible channels through which the reform may have affected fertility intentions. 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) investigated the effect of the 1990 extension by one year, and 
subsequent 1996 reduction, in the length of the parental leave in Austria on women’s higher-order 
fertility choices and subsequent career outcomes. As their main results, they found that following 
the 1990 extension, short term fertility (within 3 years) increased by about 36% relative to the 
baseline, while longer term fertility (between 3 and 10 years) also increased. When evaluating the 
effect on higher-order fertility, they distinguished between the so-called “current child effect” and 
“future child effect”. The former is a consequence of the relatively long maternity leave offered in 
Austria (1-2 years) and of the fact that according to the Austrian law, a mother is exempt from the 
work requirement, typically imposed for applying for maternity leave benefits, if she gives birth to 
another child within a certain period after the expiration of the maternity leave offered for giving 
birth to the previous child. No such regulations exist in the Swiss maternity leave laws, and thus 
this effect cannot emerge in our analysis. On the other hand, the “future child effect” is due to the 
fact that a longer maternity leave for a future child also reduces the cost of raising the current child, 
and this effect is stronger the younger the current child is. This is one of the channels through which 
the results in our study can be generated.  
Malkova (2017) studied the short-term and long-term fertility responses of a cash benefit and 
a one year paid maternity leave implemented in Soviet Russia starting with 1981. The paper showed 
that fertility increased by approximately 10% in the year following the implementation, and 
continued to stay at that elevated level in the long term over a 10 year period evaluated in the 
analysis.  
103 
 
Besides the fact that we investigate the effect of a maternity leave reform from a different 
country, there are two key differences between our study and this earlier literature. First, we 
examine the effect of an increase in the maternity leave duration of a much smaller magnitude, for 
which the individuals’ response is ex-ante less evident. A second difference is that our analysis 
studies the effect of a maternity leave extension on fertility intentions rather than fertility outcomes. 
While outcomes are generally more relevant from a policy perspective, in this context, due to the 
significant delay with which individuals’ preferences over fertility outcomes can typically be 
implemented, real outcomes may also be affected by various exogenous shocks. The fertility 
intentions allow thus for a less noisy measurement of the impact of the policy reform on 
individuals’ preferences. 
Closer to our study, the effect of an increase in the duration of the maternity leave of a 
relatively smaller magnitude was studied in Bassford and Fisher (2016), who examined the impact 
of a newly introduced 18 week paid maternity leave in Australia in 2001. They found that this 
policy change did not raise the probability of a woman’s intending to bear a child, but that for those 
women who did intend to have children, the planned number of children increased on average by 
13% relative to the baseline level. 
Several other papers have presented findings relevant to our study. Averett and Wittington 
(2001) and Cannonier (2014) showed that the introduction of an unpaid mandatory parental leave 
increased fertility in the United States. Another stream of literature studied the effect of financial 
incentives on fertility decisions. Cohen et al. (2013) studied the effect of an increase in the child 
subsidy received from the Israeli government, showing that it increased the probability that a 
woman conceives a child in a given year. Milligan (2005) and Ang (2014) found that the 
introduction in the Canadian province of Quebec of a cash subsidy for the birth of a child, and the 
implementation of a financially more generous paid maternity leave, respectively, were both 
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associated with higher birth rates. Cygan-Rehm (2016) studied the effect of a policy shift of 
parental leave benefits from a means tested scheme, aimed primarily at lower income mothers, to 
a payment scheme that substituted pre-birth earnings, and thus offered more benefits to higher 
income individuals. Their main finding was that low-income mothers, whose benefits were 
reduced, extended the spacing of their higher order births without seeming to catch up later, 
possibly leading to a reduced fertility rate in this group. 
3. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Some form of maternity benefits has been available in Switzerland since 1945, when voters 
approved in a referendum to include such benefits in the Swiss Constitution. Prior to the reform 
from 2005, the mothers of a newborn were entitled by law to 8 weeks of maternity leave, which, 
depending on the choice of her employer, could be paid or unpaid. This rule set a lower bound on 
MB, but certain public or private employers were voluntarily offering up to 16 weeks of fully paid 
maternity leave ("Maternity leave..." 2005). Additionally, a mandatory paid maternity leave of 16 
weeks was in effect prior to 2005 in the Bern canton.24 After being rejected at the federal level in 
four previous referendums, a law mandating universal paid maternity leave was approved in a 
referendum in September 2004, and announced on November 24th, 2004 to be implemented starting 
with July 1st, 2005. The new entitlement is funded by a proportional tax on wages, with equal 
contribution from the employer and the employee. With this change of legislation, mothers became 
entitled to 14 weeks of job-protected, paid maternity leave that starts on the day of birth of the 
baby. Women are required by law to take a maternity leave of 8 weeks, while the remaining 6 
                                                          
24 The new maternity leave policy did not apply to mothers residing in Bern since their prior benefits were more 
generous. They also did not actually provide benefits to new mothers working for employers that had been offering 
benefits who were at least as generous as the mandatory minimum levels before July 1st, 2005. Since the observations 
in our dataset do not have geographical information, we cannot use individuals from the Bern canton as a control 
group. 
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weeks are optional. Additionally, after the expiration of the fourteenth week, a mother can take 
additional 2 unpaid weeks of leave. Fathers are not entitled to any paid parental leave, and neither 
parent is entitled to any additional unpaid homecare leave (OECD 2017b). 
The eligibility for MB extends to both natural and adoptive mothers. To claim these 
benefits, a new mother must be either employed for at least 5 months during pregnancy (full-time 
or part-time), self-employed, or, if unemployed, then she must have been receiving social security 
or disability benefits. Additionally, she must have had public health insurance for 9 months prior 
to birth in Switzerland, or any country of the European Union or of the European Free Trade 
Association (Ray 2008). A mother who returns to work prior to the expiration of the maternity 
leave, loses her eligibility. During the maternity leave period, mothers are compensated at a level 
of up to 80% of their previous earnings.25 While the extension of the mandatory paid maternity 
leave constitutes the main benefit implemented by the policy reform of 2005, several other 
maternity benefits have been introduced into law on this occasion. Employers are not allowed to 
fire women during their maternity leave. During the whole pregnancy, a woman cannot be asked 
to work more than 9 hours per day, during the night, or under hazardous working conditions, and 
after her sixth month of pregnancy, the maximum number of hours that a woman can work 
reduces to 6. Employers are also obliged to provide mothers a couch and a 1-hour nursing break 
at the workplace until the baby turns one (Ray 2008). Both parents of a child under 15 can refuse 
working overtime, and can request a 90-minute lunch break. 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND IDENTIFICATION 
                                                          
25 At the time of the policy change in 2005, most cantons did not set a universal ceiling on the payments. The exception 
was canton Thurgau, which set a ceiling of CHF172/day (https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/maternity-benefit-finally-sees-
light-of-day/8578). Currently, a universal ceiling of CHF196/day is in place everywhere. The resulting average 
payment rate in 2016 was 56.4% of the mother’s previous earnings (OECD 2017b).  
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Our analysis relies on a difference-in-differences estimation in which the treatment group 
consists of individuals with at least one child born during the 6 years prior to the interview, and the 
control group consists of individuals with no children. Thus, treated individuals interviewed in 
2004 had at least one child born in one of the years 1999 - 2004, while treated individuals 
interviewed in 2010 had at least one child born in one of the years 2005 - 2010. A subset, but not 
all, of the individuals from the latter group experienced the benefits of the expanded maternity 
leave implemented starting with 2005. 26 Some of the individuals interviewed in 2004 were already 
benefiting from a paid maternity leave at least as generous as the one mandated in the new law if 
they were working for employers offering such benefits even before 2005, or, in case of men, if 
their partners were in that situation. The key coefficient that we obtain in our estimation, which 
elicits the effect of the MB expansion, is thus likely biased towards zero. 
The identifying assumption, which allows us to disentangle the effect of the policy reform 
from an underlying trend in fertility intentions, is that in the absence of this reform, the treatment 
and control groups would have moved on the same trend. The validity of this assumption is verified 
with a placebo test on data from France and Germany, the two countries neighboring Switzerland 
for which the EES dataset allows performing this test. It is worth mentioning here that, due to the 
reform, some individuals who would otherwise be in the control group at the time of the interview 
in 2010 may have moved into the treatment group, i.e. they may have conceived a child by 2010. 
We account for this possibility when discussing in section 7 the possible channels that can generate 
                                                          
26 The new maternity leave benefits that were to be offered starting with July 1st, 2005 were announced on November 
24th, 2004. Women who gave birth to children between the date of the announcement and July 1st, 2015 were eligible 
to claim the paid maternity leave starting with July 1st, 2005 (https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/maternity-benefit-to-
become-reality-from-july/4215604 ) but only for the remaining number of weeks up to 14 from the day of the birth. 
For instance, a mother who gave birth to a child 2 weeks before July 1st, was eligible for only the 12 weeks of paid 
maternity leave instead of 14. Thus, women who gave birth to children after April 1st, 2005 experienced these 
expanded benefits, at least partially, provided that their employer had not offered them before the reform. To obtain a 
larger treatment group, we included the respondents who had a child in 2005 in the analysis, at the expense of having 
the key coefficient potentially biased towards zero. 
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our key findings. The placebo test only shows that the two groups would have moved on the same 
trend in the absence of an exogenous shock. 
Since our dependent variable is ordinal, we estimate an ordered Logit regression as follows: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖 = 𝑗|𝑿𝒊) = 𝑓(𝛿1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝛿3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝜷, ∝𝑗 , ∝𝑗+1) 
where j is one of the possible ordered responses to the interview question that elicited individuals’ 
fertility intentions (or a transformation of it), while ∝𝑗 and ∝𝑗+1 are the underlying threshold 
parameters from the latent variable model. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 equals 1 if the individual belongs 
to the treatment group, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 equals 1 if the individual is interviewed 
in 2010, i.e. after the MB expansion from 2005, and equals 0 if the individual is interviewed in 
2004. 𝑿𝒊 is the vector of control variables for individual 𝑖, which includes gender, age, number of 
children, income bracket, education level, number of hours worked per week, relationship status, 
and age of partner, if a partner exists. In our main modeling specification, we estimate a Logit 
regression. As a robustness check, we verify that the marginal effects are similar to those from a 
Probit regression. 
The causal impact of the policy change on individuals who have experienced benefits from 
the reform is reflected in the coefficient 𝜹𝟑 of the interaction term. This coefficient captures the 
differential effect of the policy on the fertility intentions of individuals who have enjoyed the 
expanded MB relative to those that have not yet enjoyed them. 𝜹𝟑 does not capture the full effect 
of the policy on fertility intentions, though, because individuals who have not experienced the 
benefits after 2005 may have still been aware of them, and thus their child planning may have 
been influenced by the implementation of the policy. Nevertheless, a positive and significant 
coefficient 𝜹𝟑 suggests a successful policy reform implementation through at least other 
channels. 
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5. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section describes the source of the data employed in our study, and various descriptive 
statistics. Subsection 4.1 presents the variables, and subsection 4.2 contains the summary statistics. 
5.1. VARIABLES 
Our data consist of a repeated cross-section dataset extracted from the 2004 and 2010 waves 
of the European Social Survey (ESS). This is an academically-driven annual survey designed to 
study changes in behavior and perceptions of the general population in Europe, with the aim of 
encouraging and facilitating the research of academics and policy-makers in social sciences. 
Participants are interviewed face-to-face and have to answer questions regarding their behavior, 
attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs. Since 2002, when the ESS was initiated, 36 countries have taken 
part in at least one of its rounds. There are slight differences in the questions that participants are 
asked in each round. For instance, only Round 2 (2004) and Round 5 (2010) contain information 
about the individuals’ fertility intentions, which explains our choice of utilizing data from these 
two rounds. 
Our analysis is performed on individuals aged between 25 and 42 years at the time of the 
survey. The typical ages at which individuals conceive children range from 21 to 45,27 and in fact, 
EES only elicits the fertility intentions of individuals that are at most 45 years old. The lower end 
of the age group that we consider in our analysis is chosen to allow for sufficient individuals in the 
treatment group for each age, so as to increase the similarity between the treatment and control 
groups. The higher end allows for an additional period of 3 years of potential child bearing age (the 
fertility intentions measured in the survey are over 3 years after the interview). The results are 
robust to the choice of the age bracket, although the value of the key interaction coefficient 
                                                          
27 See, for instance, page 6 in OECD (2017c). 
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decreases when more individuals outside of the prime age for child bearing are included in the 
analysis. This is expected since these individuals are less likely to contemplate conceiving a child 
in the near future, and thus to respond to the policy reform.  
The key dependent variable of interest in the paper is a categorical variable indicating an 
individual’s fertility intentions in the 3 years following the time of the interview. After dropping 
observations with uninformative answers about the individual’s fertility intentions, such as, “Not 
Applicable,” “Refusal” or “No Answer,” we are left with 5 possible ordered answers: “Definitely 
Not,” “Probably Not,” “Don’t Know,” “Definitely Yes,” and “Probably Yes”. Based on these 
answers, we construct 3 categorical variables that are employed in the empirical analysis as 
dependent variables. The first of these variables considers all these 5 answers separately, taking 
thus 5 possible values. The second variable combines the two responses “Definitely Not” and 
“Probably Not” into one value, and the two responses “Definitely Yes” and “Probably Yes” into 
another value. This second variable can take thus 3 possible values. Finally, the last categorical 
dependent variable is constructed from the preceding variable by attributing a missing value to 
entries with answer “Don’t Know.” The corresponding observations are therefore dropped from 
the analysis, when employing this variable, which can thus take 2 values. We estimate our model 
and report the results for each of the three specifications of the dependent variable.  
The complete set of variables used in the analysis is presented in appendix C1. The 
conditioning variables elicit information regarding the number of children, gender, age, 
relationship status, age of partner if in a relationship, income, education, and number of hours 
worked in a week.  
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After extracting the observations as outlined above, the Swiss sample contains 593 
respondents in the 2004 wave (215 in the treatment group, and 378 in the control group), and 309 
respondents in the 2010 wave (132 in the treatment group, and 177 in the control group), for a 
total of 902 observations. Women are 302 and 138, in 2004 and 2010, respectively, for a total of 
440, or 44.80% of the sample. 
5.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis, categorized by the 
four groups employed in the difference-in-differences estimation. The average number of children 
for the individuals in the treatment group is 1.87, whereas the individuals in the control group have 
no children, by the design of this group. The treatment group has a higher proportion of women 
than the control group, 53.60% versus 45.76%.28 Not surprisingly, individuals in the treatment 
group also tend to be slightly older, 34.53 years versus 32.36. Looking more closely at the 
distribution of the individuals across age groups, the treatment group has more individuals in the 
upper age brackets, 49.57% in the 31-36 bracket, and 33.71% in the 37-42 bracket, and only 
16.71% in the 25-30 bracket. On the other hand, the control group is more evenly distributed, with 
42.34% of the individuals in the 25-30 bracket, 31.89% in the 31-36 bracket, and 25.76% in the 
37-42 bracket. The mean number of years of education is similar in the two groups. Individuals in 
the control group work on average more hours per week, 42.02 versus 36.83, which is again 
expected. The household income distribution between the two groups is also very similar, with 
approximately 21% of the individuals having a household income below 24,000 CHF/year29, 42% 
                                                          
28 This could be explained by the fact that women tend to have children earlier in life than men since in the typical 
couple, the woman is younger. In the fixed age bracket that we consider, a person with a child is thus more likely to 
be a woman, whereas one without is more likely to be a man. Another possible explanation is that men answered that 
they do not have a child if they did not have custody of their children, which in a case of separation of parents is 
predominantly the case. 
29 CHF denotes Swiss franc. 
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between 24,000 and 60,000 CHF/year, 16% between 60,000 and 90,000 CHF/year, and 18% above 
90,000 CHF/year. Finally, unsurprisingly, individuals in the treatment group are significantly more 
likely to have a partner than those in the control group, 96.25% versus 41.26%  
Table 2 presents the distribution of responses to the survey question eliciting the individuals’ 
fertility intentions. As expected, these distributions differ between the treatment and the control 
group, both before and after the reform. When looking into the whole population, the individuals 
in the treatment group exhibit a clear shift towards an increased likelihood of planning a child after 
the reform, while a shift in the control group is much less evident. In the subsample of women, a 
shift towards increased fertility intentions is observed after the reform both for the treatment and 
the control groups. On the other hand, in the subsample of male respondents, there is a clear shift 
towards increased fertility intentions in the treatment group, and towards decreased intentions in 
the control group. As a preliminary insight suggested by these observations, it is apparent that 
experiencing the extended MB is likely to have a stronger positive impact on the fertility intentions 
of the male respondents. This is confirmed later by our regression analysis. 
6. RESULTS 
This section reports the main findings of the different specifications of the model. 
6.1. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE REFORM 
The results from our main specification are reported in Table 3, with p-values reported in 
parenthesis. We estimate our model for each of the three variants of the dependent variable that we 
consider, i.e. corresponding to 2, 3 or 5 possible outcomes. For each of these variants, we perform 
an estimation on the whole population of individuals in the sample, and two additional estimations 
on the samples of female and male respondents, respectively. 
The results of this analysis confirm the hypothesis of a differential impact of the policy reform 
on fertility intentions in the two groups employed in the difference-in-differences analysis. The 
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coefficient on the interaction term between the Treated and After variables is positive and 
statistically significant in the estimations corresponding to a specification of the dependent variable 
based on 2 and 3 outcomes. It is also positive, but statistically insignificant with a 5-outcome 
dependent variable (the coefficient does become statistically significant with certain choices of the 
age brackets that restrict the estimation to age groups which are more likely to conceive a child). 
While the coefficient is positive in the subsample of women respondents, its value is higher and 
becomes statistically significant in the male population, suggesting that its significance in the whole 
population is primarily driven by the male respondents. 
The results of the estimation also suggest that the fertility intentions increase after the reform 
and, as expected, that the individuals from the treatment group have significantly stronger 
intentions to conceive children in the future than those from the control group. The coefficients on 
the control variables uncover intuitive findings. Fertility intentions are stronger for women than 
men, and for individuals who have a partner than for those without, they decrease in the number of 
children that the individual already has, and in both the age of the respondent and the age of the 
partner. Being in the lower bracket of the income distribution or having more years of education is 
associated with stronger intentions to conceive children, while working more hours per week has 
a positive but small effect. 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects implied by the estimation of the model with 2 possible 
outcomes for the dependent variable. Since with only 2 outcomes, the marginal effect on the 
probability of an outcome is the negative of the marginal effect on the probability of the alternative 
outcome, the table presents only the marginal effects on the probability that the individual chooses 
“Definitely Yes” or “Probably Yes” to the question eliciting fertility intentions. As a robustness 
check, we also calculate and include in Table 4 the marginal effects implied by a Probit model. The 
marginal effects implied by the Logit and Probit models are similar. The unreported marginal 
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effects implied by the two alternative models are also similar with a specification of the dependent 
variable with 3 or 5 possible outcomes. 
To identify the categories of individuals most likely to respond to the extended MB, we 
investigate the degree of heterogeneity in responses by age groups and by the number of children 
that an individual already has at the time of the interview. 
Table 5 reports the estimation results from subsamples determined by age groups. While the 
lower number of observations in each estimation exercise reduces the statistical power of the 
results, the analysis identifies the main driver of the positive response to the policy reform to be 
the individuals from the middle group, aged between 31 and 36. When looking into the whole 
population, they are seconded by the younger individuals between 25 and 30. When evaluating the 
responses according to the individuals’ gender, the younger women respond stronger to the reform 
than the women from the middle group. Finally, there is a negative differential impact on the 
fertility intentions of the individuals from the older group, aged between 37 and 41, driven 
primarily by women. 30 The interaction coefficient is negative and especially large in magnitude 
when the dependent variable allows for 5 outcomes. 
Table 6 presents results from estimations that restrict the treatment group to individuals with 
1 or 2 children, respectively. In the model specification with a treatment group of individuals with 
1 child, the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive in most estimations, and is statistically 
non-negative with near 10% confidence level when the dependent variable allows for 2 or 3 
outcomes, driven again primarily by men. On the other hand, when the treatment group consists of 
                                                          
30 A possible explanation for this fact is that some of the individuals from this age group made a child after the reform 
was implemented, induced by its expanded MB, and then completed their fertility (we consider this channel in section 
7 where we analyze the possible channels that can drive the key results of our analysis). Such an effect would reduce 
the likelihood that this group would plan a higher order child in the future, explaining the negative coefficient in the 
regression. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, if this is the explanation for the negative coefficient, it is likely that the 
overall effect on the fertility rate is positive in this age group as well because earlier births reduce the impact of 
unexpected negative shocks to fertility. 
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individuals with 2 children, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant, or nearly so, under most estimations. These results suggest that individuals with 2 
children respond more strongly to the extended maternity benefits, although it is likely that 
individuals with 1 child respond as well. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the variable Treated 
is also positive, but statistically significant when the treatment group are individuals with 1 child, 
since these individuals are likely to plan another child in the near future. The same coefficient is 
negative and large in magnitude for individuals with 2 children explained by the frequent choice 
of families to have exactly 2 children. 
6.2. TEST OF THE PARALLEL TRENDS ASSUMPTION 
Testing the common trends assumption using consecutive waves of the survey from before 
or after the reform is not feasible in our context, as the only waves in the ESS that contain 
information about the individuals’ fertility intentions are the waves from 2004 and 2010, which we 
employ in our analysis.  
As an alternative, we perform a placebo test on data from France and Germany to verify 
whether typically there would be a differential change in the fertility intentions between the 
treatment and the control group from 2004 to 2010, by defining the two groups using the same 
criteria as in our main estimation exercise on the Swiss data. France and Germany are the two 
neighbor countries of Switzerland for which the ESS dataset contains information on the 
individuals’ fertility intentions, and thus allows performing this test. The results are reported in 
Table 7. 
The estimation is again performed for each of the three variants of the dependent variable, in 
the whole sample, and then separately in the subsamples of women and men. The coefficient on 
the interaction term is statistically insignificant in most specifications, and when it is statistically 
significant, its sign is negative, i.e. opposite to the one elicited from the estimation of the model on 
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Swiss data. Additionally, for several of the estimations with an insignificant coefficient, we can 
statistically reject the null hypothesis of a positive value of the interaction coefficient. These results 
suggest that there is no evidence that the individuals from the treatment group are more likely to 
increase their fertility intentions than those from the control group in the absence of an exogenous 
shock, such as a change in maternity benefits, supporting thus the validity of the estimation exercise 
we perform on the Swiss data. 
7. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE CHANNELS 
In this section, we discuss the possible channels through which the policy reform may have 
had a different impact on the fertility intentions in the group of individuals who experienced its 
benefits, relative to a group of individuals who have not yet experienced them. 
The first possible channel is behavioral: some individuals who conceived a child after the 
reform, and who would have completed their fertility with that child in the absence of the reform, 
may have decided to plan another child because experiencing the expanded MB improved their 
perception about the cost of having a child. By the universal nature of the expansion of the MB that 
we investigate, all individuals were eligible for these benefits. Therefore, in a population of fully 
rational individuals, who know all information relevant to a decision problem and have well 
defined preferences over the relevant outcomes, experiencing these benefits should have no impact 
on fertility intentions. If experiencing the expanded benefits did impact fertility planning, there are 
two behavioral mechanisms that can explain it. First, experiencing the benefits may have induced 
a change in the individual’s information by making her or him aware of the existence of these 
expanded MB. Additionally, even an individual fully aware of the expanded MB may not fully 
comprehend their effect on the cost of having a child. A second potential mechanism consists, thus, 
of an update in an individual’s preferences over whether to conceive another child once they 
learned the new diminished cost. 
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A second channel is determined by a possible change in individuals’ preferences over the 
spacing of child births. An extended maternity leave received because of a future child may reduce 
the cost of raising the current child. As this impact is arguably stronger when the current child is 
younger, this may induce individuals to plan a future child earlier. Since in our analysis, the fertility 
intentions are measured over the 3 years following the date of the interview, rather than as intended 
lifetime fertility, it is possible that individuals who would have otherwise waited a longer period 
before conceiving another child, move their intended child birth earlier. While our data do not 
allow evaluating whether such an effect did exist, due to the relatively small increase in the duration 
of the maternity leave implemented by the reform, it is unlikely that the perceived effect on the 
cost of raising an older child is large. We conjecture thus that the magnitude of the effect of the 
reform through this channel is probably small. 
The third channel through which the expanded MB may have affected the fertility intentions 
measured in the two groups is by changing the composition of these groups. Since our control 
group is made up of the individuals with no children, if the reform prompted some individuals who 
would have otherwise not yet conceived a child, to conceive one, this would change the 
composition of both the treatment and the control groups. The net effect on the average fertility 
intentions in the two groups depends on the preferences of individuals who are shifted between the 
two groups. If the reform moved individuals who were more likely to continue having higher order 
children, and thus express intentions to continue conceiving children at the time of the second wave 
in 2010, the effect is positive. On the other hand, if the extended MB affected mostly individuals 
who would complete their fertility intentions after the birth of the child, then the sign of the effect 
is generically ambiguous, but may result in a positive sign of the relevant interaction coefficient 
from our regression analysis, depending on the prior distribution of fertility intentions in the two 
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groups.31 We analyze this latter potential channel formally in appendix C2, and show that our key 
estimation results could not be due solely to such a shift between the two groups of individuals 
who complete their fertility. The significance of this insight is that if the differential effect in the 
fertility intentions between the two groups were to be solely determined by a change in the 
composition of the treatment and control groups, this fact would leave open the possibility that the 
reform improved the fertility rate not just by inducing a shift in the timing of the birth of a child 
(and thus, as argued earlier, by pre-empting the potential adverse shocks to fertility), but also by 
increasing the total number of children that an individual plans to conceive.  
8. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study is to examine the impact of an extended and more generous maternity 
benefits policy implemented in 2005 in Switzerland on the fertility intentions of individuals who 
have experienced the extended benefits induced by the reform, relative to individuals who have 
been eligible for the extended benefits, but have not yet experienced them. Our analysis unveils a 
significant difference between the changes in the fertility intentions for the two groups after the 
maternity leave expansion.  
There are three channels that can explain the differential effect of the policy reform on the 
fertility intentions in the two groups. The first is a behavioral channel, which is created by the 
possibility that experiencing the benefits increases the likelihood that an individual would plan 
additional children. The second is an intertemporal substitution channel determined by the fact that 
                                                          
31 An intuitive explanation is as follows. Shifting an individual from the subset of individuals of the control group 
who would have responded in 2010 that they plan a child into the subset of individuals from the treatment group 
who respond in 2010 that they do not plan a child decreases the probabilities that the individuals from both the 
treatment and the control group respond in 2010 that they plan an additional child. It can be shown 
mathematically that it would decrease this probability more in the control group if the number of individuals from 
the control group who respond that they plan to have a child is smaller than the number of individuals from the 
control group who respond that they do not plan a child. 
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the extended maternity leave reduces the cost of raising older children, which may induce 
individuals to reduce the spacing between child births, potentially with or without affecting lifetime 
fertility intentions. Finally, the last channel is determined by the fact that the reform may have 
induced some individuals who would have delayed the birth of their first child, conceive this child 
earlier, while continuing to plan higher order children. Since the intertemporal substitution that 
would be induced through the latter two channels at individual level is towards earlier births, it is 
likely that the country’s fertility rate would increase not just in the short term, but also in the longer 
term, by preventing potential negative shocks to an individual’s fertility choices that may occur if 
the birth of the child is delayed. Our paper offers thus evidence suggesting that the expansion of 
the maternity leave benefits is likely to have contributed to a higher fertility rate in Switzerland, 
despite the lower magnitude of the additional benefits relative to the extensions from other 
countries studied in the earlier literature. Further research employing additional data may measure 
the precise effects through each of the potential channels that the reform affects child planning. 
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TABLES 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of the quantitative variables used in the analysis 
Variable: 
             Treatment Group              Control Group 
Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation 
Number of children 1.876 0.821 0 0 
Female 0.536 0.499 0.457 0.498 
Age 34.53 4.125 32.365 5.192 
Age 25-30 0.167 0.373 0.423 0.494 
Age 31-36 0.495 0.500 0.318 0.466 
Age 37-42 0.337 0.473 0.257 0.437 
Years of Education 11.79 3.441 12.119 3.867 
Weekly Work Hours 36.832 16.105 42.018 12.549 
Household Income:     
               <24,000 0.236 0.425 0.218 0.413 
                24,000-60,000 0.429 0.495 0.427 0.495 
               60,000-90,000 0.152 0.360 0.169 0.375 
           <90,000 0.181 0.386 0.185 0.389 
            Partner 0.962 0.190 0.412 0.492 
Notes:  The source of the data are Rounds 2 (2004) and 5 (2010) of the ESS survey for Switzerland. Sample restricted 
to individuals between 25 and 42 years old at the time of the interview. The Treatment Group consists of individuals 
who had a child in the 6 calendar years prior to the year of the interview. The Control Group consists of individuals 
with no children at the time of the interview.  
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Notes: The source of the data are Rounds 2 (2004) and 5 (2010) of the ESS survey for Switzerland. Sample restricted 
to individuals between 25 and 42 years old at the time of the interview. The Treatment and Control Groups are as 
defined in Table 1. Columns (1-4) elicit the percentages of the respondents in the group specified in the column header 
who chose the answer specified in the row header to the question about their fertility intentions. Columns (5-7) are 
computed as follows: Column (5) = Column (2) – Column (1); Column (6) = Column (4) – Column (3); Column (7) = 
Column (5) – Column (6).  
 
Table 3.2.  Summary statistics of the fertility intentions for the treatment and control groups 
Do you plan to have 
a child in the next 3 
years? 
Treatment Group Control Group    
Before 
reform 
(1) 
After 
reform 
(2) 
Before 
reform 
(3) 
After 
reform 
(4) 
∆𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒕𝒓 
 
(5) 
∆𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 
 
(6) 
DD 
 
(7) 
All individuals        
Definitely Not 45.54% 41.67% 25.93% 24.86% -3.87% -1.07% -2.80% 
Probably Not 18.78% 12.12% 23.02% 28.81% -6.66% 5.79% -12.45% 
Neutral 4.23% 2.27% 10.58% 7.34% -1.96% -3.24% 1.28% 
Probably Yes 13.15% 21.21% 25.93% 24.86% 8.06% -1.07% 9.13% 
Definitely Yes 18.31% 22.73% 14.55% 14.12% 4.42% -0.43% 4.85% 
Observations 213 132 378 177    
Women        
Definitely Not 47.54% 41.27% 25.70% 22.67% -6.27% -3.03% -3.24% 
Probably Not 12.30% 11.11% 21.23% 17.33% -1.19% -3.9% 2.71% 
Neutral 4.92% 3.17% 8.38% 9.33% -1.75% 0.95% -2.70% 
Probably Yes 15.57% 19.05% 27.93% 32.00% 3.48% 4.07% -0.59% 
Definitely Yes 19.67% 25.40% 16.76% 18.67% 5.73% 1.91% 3.82% 
Observations 122 63 176 75    
Men        
Definitely Not 42.86% 42.03% 26.13% 26.47% -0.83% 0.34% -1.17% 
Probably Not 27.47% 13.04% 24.62% 37.25% -14.82% 12.63% -27.45% 
Neutral 3.30% 1.45% 12.56% 5.88% -1.85% -6.68% 4.83% 
Probably Yes 9.89% 23.19% 24.12% 19.61% 13.3% -4.51% 17.81% 
Definitely Yes 16.48% 20.29% 12.56% 10.78% 3.81% -1.78% 5.59% 
Observations 91 69 199 102    
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Notes: All regressions are estimated using an ordered Logit model. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***    p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The variable “After” takes value 1 for individuals interviewed after the reform, and 0 otherwise. 
The variable “Treated” takes value 1 for individuals in the Treatment Group, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1-3) present 
regressions with the dependent variable taking 2 possible ordered values “Definitely or Probably Yes” and “Probably 
or Definitely Not.” Columns (4-6) present regressions with the dependent variable taking 3 possible values “Definitely 
or Probably Yes,” “Don’t Know,” and “Probably or Definitely Not.” Columns (7-9) present regressions with the 
dependent variable taking 5 possible values “Definitely Yes,” “Probably Yes,” “Don’t Know,” “Probably Not,” and 
“Definitely Not.” 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Results from the DD estimation 
Dependent variable: Fertility intentions 
 2 outcomes  3 outcomes  5 outcomes 
 
All 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
 
All 
(4) 
Women 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
 
All 
(7) 
Women 
(8) 
Men 
(9) 
After X Treated 0.766** 
(0.041) 
0.577 
(0.311) 
0.988* 
(0.058) 
 0.652* 
(0.064) 
0.294 
(0.565) 
1.004** 
(0.015) 
 0.170 
(0.567) 
0.269 
(0.532) 
0.121 
(0.784) 
After -0.432* 
(0.074) 
-0.329 
(0.392) 
-0.421 
(0.192) 
 -0.417* 
(0.059) 
-0.320 
(0.364) 
-0.455 
(0.116) 
 -0.265 
(0.149) 
-0.298 
(0.341) 
-0.196 
(0.406) 
Treated 2.611*** 
(0.000) 
3.321*** 
(0.000) 
2.036*** 
(0.006) 
 2.650*** 
(0.000) 
3.141*** 
(0.000) 
2.198*** 
(0.004) 
 2.170*** 
(0.000) 
2.816*** 
(0.000) 
1.946*** 
(0.007) 
Number 
Children 
-2.126*** 
(0.000) 
-2.581*** 
(0.000) 
-1.742*** 
(0.000) 
 -2.104*** 
(0.000) 
-2.389*** 
(0.000) 
-1.820*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.535*** 
(0.000) 
-2.069*** 
(0.000) 
-1.252*** 
(0.000) 
Gender 0.390** 
(0.036) 
omitted omitted  0.326* 
(0.059) 
omitted omitted  0.152 
(0.299) 
omitted omitted 
Age Respondent -.054** 
(0.013) 
-0.088*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.638) 
 -0.055*** 
(0.005) 
-0.089*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017 
(0.534) 
 -0.066*** 
(0.000) 
-0.099*** 
(0.000) 
-0.027 
(0.229) 
Years Education 0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.118*** 
(0.002) 
0.068* 
(0.056) 
 0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.001) 
0.051 
(0.105) 
 0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.089*** 
(0.001) 
0.049* 
(0.064) 
Weekly Work 
Hours 
0.005 
(0.391) 
0.003*** 
(0.738) 
0.004 
(0.682) 
 0.005 
(0.393) 
0.002 
(0.768) 
0.005 
(0.570) 
 0.012** 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.401) 
0.011 
(0.156) 
Income             
                
<24000 
0.622* 
(0.061) 
0.955* 
(0.071) 
0.209 
(0.630) 
 0.486* 
(0.095) 
0.880* 
(0.069) 
0.078 
(0.828) 
 0.451* 
(0.073) 
0.824* 
(0.051) 
0.101 
(0.744) 
      
24000<60000 
0.272 
(0.311) 
0.412 
(0.296) 
0.118 
(0.748) 
 0.140 
(0.542) 
0.288 
(0.426) 
0.016 
(0.956) 
 0.134 
(0.509) 
0.333 
(0.300) 
-0.019 
(0.940) 
     
60000<90000 
0.147 
(0.637) 
-0.003 
(0.995) 
0.214 
(0.616) 
 0.018 
(0.949) 
0.037 
(0.930) 
0.015 
(0.968) 
 0.139 
(0.572) 
0.276 
(0.471) 
0.104 
(0.739) 
Partner 1.795** 
(0.020) 
0.886 
(0.328) 
3.181*** 
(0.009) 
 1.763** 
(0.027) 
0.986 
(0.273) 
3.124*** 
(0.006) 
 1.175 
(0.156) 
-0.066 
(0.938) 
3.139*** 
(0.001) 
Age Partner -0.021 
(0.351) 
0.003 
(0.890) 
-0.065* 
(0.077) 
 -0.023 
(0.326) 
0.000 
(0.970) 
-0.069** 
(0.049) 
 -0.013 
(0.604) 
0.025 
(0.298) 
-0.080*** 
(0.006) 
Pseudo R2 0.1908 0.2292 0.1638  0.1485 0.1784 0.1274  0.0832 0.1134 0.0700 
Wald chi2 108.25 63.31 49.51  121.63 75.76 50.16  112.67 86.30 47.19 
Observations 799 386 413  858 414 444  858 414 444 
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Table 3.4. Average marginal effects with Logit and Probit models  
Dependent variable: Probability of an answer “Definitely Yes” or “Probably Yes” to the question “Do you plan 
to have a child in the next 3 years?” with all observations with neutral answers excluded 
 Logit Model   Probit Model 
 
All 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
  
All 
(4) 
Women 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
After 
-0.032 
(0.399) 
-0.021 
(0.704) 
-0.019 
(0.713) 
  -0.030 
(0.439) 
-0.019 
(0.736) 
-0.018 
(0.735) 
Treated 
0.396*** 
(0.000) 
0.399*** 
(0.000) 
0.379*** 
(0.000) 
  0.387*** 
(0.000) 
0.401*** 
(0.000) 
0.360*** 
(0.000) 
Number Children 
-0.400*** 
(0.000) 
-0.465*** 
(0.000) 
-0.328*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.370*** 
(0.000) 
-0.446*** 
(0.000) 
-0.301*** 
(0.000) 
Gender 
0.074** 
(0.035) 
omitted omitted   0.071 
(0.043) 
omitted omitted 
Age Respondent 
-0.010** 
(0.012) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.639) 
  -0.003 
(0.355) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.448) 
Years Education 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.001) 
0.012* 
(0.052) 
  0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
0.013** 
(0.041) 
Weekly Work Hours 
0.001 
(0.390) 
0.000 
(0.738) 
0.000 
(0.682) 
  0.001 
(0.345) 
0.000 
(0.809) 
0.000 
(0.627) 
Income  
        
                <24000 
0.117* 
(0.056) 
0.167** 
(0.050) 
.039 
(0.632) 
  0.119* 
(0.051) 
0.152* 
(0.070) 
0.051 
(0.547) 
      24000<60000 
0.051 
(0.307) 
0.073 
(0.285) 
0.022 
(0.747) 
  0.052 
(0.291) 
0.065 
(0.335) 
0.028 
(0.691) 
     60000<90000 
0.027 
(0.637) 
-0.000 
(0.995) 
0.040 
(0.619) 
  0.032 
(0.581) 
-0.004 
(0.959) 
0.050 
(0.538) 
Partner 
0.317*** 
(0.003) 
0.159 
(0.327) 
0.599*** 
(0.005) 
  0.311*** 
(0.001) 
0.162 
(0.321) 
0.531** 
(0.016) 
Age Partner 
-0.003 
(0.348) 
0.000 
(0.889) 
-0.012* 
(0.067) 
  -0.003 
(0.355) 
0.000 
(0.912) 
-0.009 
(0.156) 
Observations 
799 386 413   799 386 413 
Notes. Regressions are estimated using an ordered Logit model in columns (1-3), and using an ordered Probit model 
in columns (4-6). P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. In the model with 2 possible 
outcomes for the dependent variable, the marginal effects on the probability that the individual responds either 
“Probably Not” or “Definitely Not” are the negative of the values listed in the table. 
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Table 3.5. Results from the DD estimation by Age Groups 
Dependent variable: Fertility intentions 
 2 outcomes  3 outcomes  5 outcomes 
 
All 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
 
All 
(4) 
Wome
n 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
 
All 
(7) 
Women 
(8) 
Men 
(9) 
Age Group 
25-30 
           
After X 
Treated 
0.845 
(0.303) 
0.915 
(0.472) 
0.854 
(0.525) 
 1.219 
(0.105) 
1.553 
(0.216) 
1.162 
(0.401) 
 0.265 
(0.656) 
0.122 
(0.888) 
-0.439 
(0.735) 
After -0.867** 
(0.027) 
-1.138** 
(0.037) 
-0.619 
(0.256) 
 -0.868** 
(0.019) 
-0.999* 
(0.060) 
-0.697 
(0.180) 
 -0.675** 
(0.039) 
-0.850* 
(0.086) 
-0.350 
(0.432) 
Treated 1.439 
(0.214) 
1.952 
(0.197) 
1.588 
(0.444) 
 1.531 
(0.155) 
2.048 
(0.123) 
1.256 
(0.508) 
 2.534*** 
(0.005) 
2.646** 
(0.019) 
3.339* 
(0.096) 
Observatio
ns 
248 118 130  276 134 142  276 134 142 
Age Group 
31-36 
           
After X 
Treated 
1.070 
(0.113) 
0.566 
(0.544) 
1.788* 
(0.074) 
 0.896 
(0.157) 
0.547 
(0.543) 
1.524 
(0.106) 
 0.478 
(0.367) 
0.711 
(0.324) 
0.374 
(0.668) 
After -0.403 
(0.370) 
-0.282 
(0.713) 
-0.403 
(0.483) 
 -0.272 
(0.504) 
-0.261 
(0.726) 
-0.299 
(0.569) 
 -0.312 
(0.376) 
-0.405 
(0.523) 
-0.311 
(0.513) 
Treated 3.949*** 
(0.000) 
4.121**
* 
(0.001) 
4.351**
* 
(0.000) 
 4.076**
* 
(0.000) 
4.223*
** 
(0.001) 
4.455*** 
(0.000) 
 3.063*** 
(0.000) 
2.973**
* 
(0.001) 
4.066*
** 
(0.000) 
Observatio
ns 
313 162 151  330 167 163  330 167 163 
Age Group 
37-42 
           
After X 
Treated 
-0.301 
(0.671) 
-0.835 
(0.479) 
0.215 
(0.831) 
 -0.504 
(0.458) 
-1.755 
(0.157) 
0.073 
(0.938) 
 -1.165** 
(0.048) 
-2.534** 
(0.029) 
-0.735 
(0.344) 
After 0.883* 
(0.079) 
1.659* 
(0.055) 
0.140 
(0.847) 
 0.928* 
(0.052) 
1.764* 
(0.056) 
0.218 
(0.723) 
 1.071*** 
(0.010) 
2.220** 
(0.019) 
0.492 
(0.289) 
Treated 1.772* 
(0.060) 
3.618* 
(0.056) 
1.319 
(0.280) 
 1.749* 
(0.055) 
2.902* 
(0.066) 
1.449 
(0.230) 
 1.171 
(0.174) 
2.924** 
(0.038) 
1.155 
(0.325) 
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Table 3.6. Results from the DD estimation with different treatment groups 
Dependent variable: Fertility intentions 
 2 outcomes  3 outcomes  5 outcomes 
 
All 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
 
All 
(4) 
Women 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
 
All 
(7) 
Women 
(8) 
Men 
(9) 
Treatment group: Individuals with 1 child 
After X 
Treated 
0.609 
(0.244) 
0.196 
(0.793) 
0.883 
(0.236) 
 0.475 
(0.338) 
-0.133 
(0.837) 
0.922 
(0.231) 
 0.044 
(0.914) 
-0.016 
(0.978) 
-0.219 
(0.773) 
After -0.403 
(0.102) 
-0.261 
(0.492) 
-0.431 
(0.196) 
 -0.393* 
(0.079) 
-0.259 
(0.459) 
-0.470 
(0.117) 
 -0.192 
(0.313) 
-0.174 
(0.587) 
-0.166 
(0.502) 
Treated 0.787** 
(0.020) 
1.040** 
(0.017) 
0.681 
(0.219) 
 0.831** 
(0.015) 
1.032** 
(0.016) 
0.762 
(0.195) 
 1.118*** 
(0.001) 
1.033*** 
(0.006) 
1.588** 
(0.025) 
Observations 598 286 312  650 310 340  650 310 340 
Treatment group: Individuals with 2 children 
After X 
Treated 
1.077** 
(0.042) 
1.056 
(0.155) 
1.025 
(0.189) 
 0.798* 
(0.090) 
0.530 
(0.405) 
1.002 
(0.166) 
 0.375 
(0.344) 
0.763 
(0.156) 
-0.126 
(0.842) 
After -0.426* 
(0.078) 
-0.332 
(0.383) 
-0.382 
(0.238) 
 -0.405* 
(0.068) 
-0.312 
(0.374) 
-0.432 
(0.142) 
 -0.254 
(0.189) 
-0.284 
(0.389) 
-0.152 
(0.542) 
Treated -2.243*** 
(0.000) 
-2.350*** 
(0.000) 
-2.037*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.977*** 
(0.000) 
-1.866*** 
(0.000) 
-1.945*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.641*** 
(0.000) 
-1.913*** 
(0.000) 
-1.233*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 627 301 326  683 326 357  683 326 357 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using an ordered Logit model. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***    
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 3 for additional estimation details. 
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Table 3.7. Placebo test on data from France and Germany 
Dependent variable: Fertility intentions 
 2 outcomes  3 outcomes  5 outcomes 
 
All 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
 
All 
(4) 
Wome
n 
(5) 
Men 
(6) 
 
All 
(7) 
Women 
(8) 
Men 
(9) 
France 
           
After X 
Treated 
0.058 
(0.889) 
-0.807 
(0.207) 
0.271 
(0.695) 
 -0.029 
(0.938) 
-0.788 
(0.157) 
0.255 
(0.673) 
 -0.166 
(0.602) 
-0.668 
(0.141) 
0.087 
(0.862) 
After 0.060 
(0.851) 
0.760 
(0.159) 
-0.366 
(0.387) 
 0.076 
(0.782) 
0.669 
(0.129) 
-0.304 
(0.412) 
 -0.006 
(0.976) 
0.505 
(0.143) 
-0.444 
(0.147) 
Treated -0.322 
(0.683) 
-0.625 
(0.447) 
2.012* 
(0.078) 
 -0.288 
(0.692) 
-0.626 
(0.426) 
1.720 
(0.110) 
 0.204 
(0.742) 
-0.107 
(0.889) 
1.412* 
(0.084) 
Observations 677 366 311  719 382 337  719 382 337 
Germany            
After X 
Treated 
-0.368 
(0.297) 
-0.660 
(0.206) 
-0.031 
(0.949) 
 -0.267 
(0.418) 
-0.458 
(0.332) 
0.110 
(0.814) 
 -0.482* 
(0.070) 
-0.634* 
(0.090) 
-0.153 
(0.695) 
After 0.473** 
(0.021) 
0.247 
(0.426) 
0.664** 
(0.016) 
 0.363** 
(0.035) 
0.155 
(0.555) 
0.499** 
(0.030) 
 0.260* 
(0.085) 
0.162 
(0.497) 
0.286 
(0.156) 
Treated 0.664 
(0.196) 
0.270 
(0.691) 
1.137 
(0.169) 
 0.689 
(0.158) 
0.303 
(0.623) 
1.166 
(0.152) 
 0.719** 
(0.048) 
0.554 
(0.233) 
0.972* 
(0.099) 
Observations 979 459 520  1065 501 564  1065 501 564 
Notes: The source of the data are Rounds 2 (2004) and 5 (2010) of the ESS survey for France and Germany. Sample 
restricted to individuals between 25 and 42 years old at the time of the interview. All regressions are estimated using 
an ordered Logit model. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. See Table 3 for 
additional estimation details. 
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APPENDIX A1  
Age of children at different stages of GUS, Birth cohort 1 
Sweep/ Wave Year Age of child 
1 2005/ 2006 10 ½ months 
2 2006/ 2007 2 years 
3 2007/ 2008 3 years 
4 2008/ 2009 4 years 
5 2009/ 2010 5 years 
6 2010/ 2011 6 years 
   
Note: Data are obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth cohort 1 longitudinal dataset. 
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APPENDIX A2  
Set of variables used in the analysis and their descriptions 
Dependent variables: 
PSscore Picture similarity raw score used as a measure of cognitive ability of the study 
child at the age of 34 months (wave 3) and 58 months (wave 5) 
NVscore Naming vocabulary raw score used as a measure of cognitive ability of the study 
child at the age of 34 months (wave 3) and 58 months (wave 5) 
TDscore Total difficulties score used as a measure of the social and behavioral 
development of the study child at the age of 46 months (wave 4), 58 months 
(wave  5) and 70 months (wave 6) 
Explanatory variable of interest (used in all wave): 
HrsChdCareGrp Number of hours of childcare provided by (a) grandparent(s) 
Controls to account for observed household composition characteristics (used in all waves): 
TotalNumPplInHhld Total number of individuals in the household 
Ln(Income) Natural logarithm of total household income 
BothParInHhld An indicator  = 1 if both the biological/ adoptive/ foster mother and father reside 
with the child, and 0, otherwise 
Controls to account for observed parents characteristics (used in all waves): 
ParInHhldMarried An indicator  = 1 if the parents in the household are married, and 0, otherwise 
HigherEducMom An indicator  = 1 if the mother has higher education or higher, and 0, otherwise 
HigherEducDad An indicator  = 1 if the father has higher education or higher, and 0, otherwise 
Controls to account for observed characteristics of the study child (used in all waves): 
NumSiblings Number of siblings the study child has 
MaleChd An indicator  = 1 if the study child is a boy, and 0, otherwise 
ChildBirthOrder Birth order of the study child 
HealthChdNotGood An indicator  = 1 if the health condition of the study child is fair, bad or very 
bad, and 0, otherwise 
Controls to account for other forms of child care (used in all waves): 
HrsOtherChdCare Number of hours of external childcare provision (i.e. not provided by 
grandparents) 
Note: Source: Data are obtained from Growing Up in Scotland – Birth cohort 1 longitudinal dataset. 
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APPENDIX B1  
Legal eligibility for family allowances by canton, year, number and age of children 
Canton 
Canton 
code 
Year(s) Child allowance eligibility Age limit 
Zürich ZH [2004 – 2008] 170/ 195 (above 12 yo) 16 
Zürich ZH 2009 - 2017 200/ 250 (above 12) 16 
Bern BE 2004 - 2008 160/190 (above 12 yo) 16 
Bern BE 2009 - 2017 230 16 
Luzern LU 2004 - 2005 180/ 200 (above 12 yo) 16 
Luzern LU 2006 - 2017 200/ 210 (above 12 yo) 16 
Uri UR 2004 - 2007 190 16 
Uri UR 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Schwyz SZ 2004 - 2014 200 16 
Schwyz SZ 2015 - 2016 210 16 
Schwyz SZ 2017 220 16 
Obwalden OW 2004 170 16 
Obwalden OW 2005 - 2017 200 16 
Nidwalden NW 2004 175 16 
Nidwalden NW 2005 - 2007 200 16 
Nidwalden NW 2008 220 16 
Nidwalden NW 2009 - 2017 240 16 
Glarus GL 2004 - 2007 170 16 
Glarus GL 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Zug ZG 2004 - 2008 250/ 300 (kid 3) 18 
Zug ZG 2009 - 2017 300 18 
Fribourg FR 2004 210/ 230 (kid 3) 15 
Fribourg FR 2005 - 2006 220/ 240 (kid 3) 15 
Fribourg FR 2007 - 2012 230/ 250 (kid 3) 15 
Fribourg FR 2013 - 2017 245/ 265 (kid 3) 16 
Solothurn SO 2004 175 18 
Solothurn SO 2005 - 2007 190 18 
Solothurn SO 2008 - 2017 200 18 
Basel-Stadt BS 2004 - 2006 170 16 
Basel-Stadt BS 2007 - 2017 200 16 
Basel-Landschaft BL 2004 - 2005 170 16 
Basel-Landschaft BL 2006 - 2017 200 16 
Schaffhausen SH 2004 - 2008 180 16 
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Schaffhausen SH 2009 - 2017 200 16 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
AR 2004 - 2007 190 16 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
AR 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI 2004 - 2007 180/ 185 (kid 3) 16 
Appenzell Innerrhoden AI 2008 - 2017 200 16 
St. Gallen SG 2004 - 2007 170/ 190 (kid 3) 16 
St. Gallen SG 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Grisons/ Graubünden GR 2004 175 16 
Grisons/ Graubünden GR 2005 - 2006 185 16 
Grisons/ Graubünden GR 2007 - 2008 195 16 
Grisons/ Graubünden GR 2009 - 2017 220 16 
Aargau AG 2004 150 16 
Aargau AG 2005 - 2008 170 16 
Aargau AG 2009 - 2017 200 16 
Thurgau TG 2004 - 2007 190 16 
Thurgau TG 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Ticino TI 2004 - 2007 183 16 
Ticino TI 2008 - 2017 200 16 
Vaud VD 2004 150/ 320 (kid 3) 16 
Vaud VD 2005 - 2006 160/ 330 (kid 3) 16 
Vaud VD 2007 180/ 350 (kid 3) 16 
Vaud VD 2008 - 2013 200/ 370 (kid 3) 16 
Vaud VD 2014 - 2015 230/ 370 (kid 3) 16 
Vaud VD 2016 - 2017 250/ 370 (kid 3) 16 
Valais VS 2004 - 2007 260/ 344 (kid 3) 16 
Valais VS 2008 273/ 361 (kid 3) 16 
Valais VS 2009 - 2017 275/ 375 (kid 3) 16 
Neuchâtel NE 2004 
163 (first)/ 180 (second)/ 
200 (third)/ 250 (fourth) 
16 
Neuchâtel NE 2005 
164 (first)/ 180 (second)/ 
200 (third)/ 250 (fourth) 
16 
Neuchâtel NE 2006 
165 (first)/ 180 (second)/ 
200 (third)/ 250 (fourth) 
16 
Neuchâtel NE 2007 
170 (first)/ 190 (second)/ 
200 (third)/ 250 (fourth) 
16 
Neuchâtel NE 2008 
180 (first)/ 200 (second)/ 
200 (third)/ 250 (fourth) 
16 
Neuchâtel NE 2009 - 2014 200/ 250 (kid 3) 16 
Neuchâtel NE 2015 - 2017 220/ 250 (kid 3) 16 
Geneva GE 2004 - 2008 200/ 220 (above 15 yo) 18 
Geneva GE 2009 - 2011 200/ 300 (above 16 yo) 18 
Geneva GE 2012 - 2017 300/ 400 (above 16 yo) 18 
Jura JU 2004 - 2006 154/ 178 (>=3 kids) 16 
Jura JU 2007 - 2008 160/ 186 (>=3 kids) 16 
Jura JU 2009 - 2017 250 16 
Note: Source: Data in this table are obtained from the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) in Bern, Switzerland for child benefits by canton by 
year, and the Cantonal Compensation Offices in the 26 cantons in Switzerland. 
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APPENDIX B2 
A complete set of the variables used in the empirical analysis and their descriptions 
Variable Description 
AnotherChild  Indicator for whether the family has had another child since the previous year 
NumKids  Number of children the family has 
AllowancesTotal  Annual amount of child (family) allowances the family has reported to receive 
Age  Age of the respondent 
AgeYoungestChildInHh  Age of the youngest child 
HrsWorked  Hours worked per week by the respondent 
HrsWorkedOfMomInHh  Hours worked per week by the mother in the family 
HrsWorkedOfFatherInHh  Hours worked per week by the father in the family 
YrsEduc  Years of education of the respondent 
NetHhldIncome  Annual net household income 
NetIncomeFatherInHh  Annual net income of the father in the family  
NetIncomeMotherInHh  Annual net income of the mother in the family 
NumHhld  Number of people in the household 
EligibilityAmntAnnual  Annual amount of child (family) benefits the family is eligible for according to the 
cantonal and federal legislation 
BothParInHh  Indicator for whether both parents are present in the household 
Married (excluding 
children) 
 Indicator for whether the respondent is married 
AvgOrBetterHealth 
(excluding children) 
 Indicator for whether the respondent is in average or better health, i.e. it is equal to 1 if 
the health status of the individual is “very well,” “well,” or “so, so (average),” and it is equal to 
0, otherwise (“not very well”, or “not well at all”) 
ExistsChInBadHealthInHh  Indicator for whether there is a child in worse than the average (i.e. bad) health present 
in the household 
ProblemsWithKids  Indicator for whether the respondent has reported that (s)he has problems with his/ her 
children 
DBn2006and2009  Indicator for the transition period between the announcement of the upcoming reform 
at national level and the time it came into effect 
D2009andAfter  Indicator for 2009 and after it (after the benefits floor became mandatory for all 
cantons) 
Note: Source: Data are obtained from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) longitudinal dataset, the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) in Bern, 
Switzerland, and the Cantonal Compensation Offices in the 26 cantons in Switzerland. 
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APPENDIX C1 
A description of the variables used in the analysis 
PlanChild5Outcomes  An ordered categorical variable indicating the respondent’s 
intention to have a child in the next three years. The 5 possible 
values in decreasing order are: Definitely Yes, Probably Yes, Don’t 
Know, Probably Not, and Definitely Not 
PlanChild3Outcomes  An ordered categorical variable indicating the respondent’s 
intention to have a child in the next three years. The 3 possible 
values in decreasing order are: Probably/Definitely Yes, Don’t 
Know, and Probably/ Definitely Not 
PlanChild2Outcomes  An ordered categorical variable indicating the respondent’s 
intention to have a child in the next three years. The 2 possible 
values in decreasing order are: Probably/Definitely Yes, and 
Probably/ Definitely Not 
Number Children  Number of children an individual already has 
Gender  Gender of the respondent 
Age Respondent  Age of the respondent 
Years Education Respondent  Years of full-time education completed 
Weekly Work Hours  Hours worked per week 
HhldIncomeLess24000  A dummy variable indicating that the total annual income of the 
household is less than 24000 euro (= 1 if true, and = 0 otherwise) 
HhldIncomeBn24000and60000  A dummy variable indicating that the total annual income of the 
household is between 24 000 and 60 000 euro (= 1 if true, and = 0 
otherwise) 
HhldIncomeBn60000and90000  A dummy variable indicating that the total annual income of the 
household is between 60 000 and 90 000 euro (= 1 if true, and = 0 
otherwise) 
Partner  A dummy variable for whether the respondent has a partner living 
in the same household (= 1 if yes, = 0 otherwise) 
Age Partner  Age of the partner 
Notes: Source: Rounds 2 (2004) and 5 (2010) of the ESS survey for Switzerland. 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 has 
been calculated by counting the number of family members whose relationship to the respondent is son/ daughter/ step/ 
foster/ adopted child. For each individual, if all 3 household income dummy variables described in the table have a 
value of 0, then the total annual income of the household exceeds 90 000 euros. 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟 takes the value 1 if there 
exists a member in the household whose relationship to the respondent is husband/ wife/ partner.  
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APPENDIX C2 
To simplify the exposition, we focus on the model specification with two outcomes for the 
dependent variable, PlanChild, which takes the value 1 if the respondent is inclined to have a child 
in the 3 years following the interview, and 0 otherwise.  
We employ throughout the following notation: 
 𝑝𝑘
𝑏 ≡ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑋, 𝑁𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 = 𝑘) denotes the probability 
that 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1 for an individual with set of controls X and k children in 2004 
(before); 
  𝑝𝑘
𝑎 ≡ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑋, 𝑁𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 = 𝑘) denotes the probability 
that 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1 for an individual with set of controls X and k children in 2010, 
after the policy reform extending the maternity leave was implemented (after); 
 𝑝𝑘
𝑐 ≡ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑋, 𝑁𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 = 𝑘) denotes the probability 
that 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 = 1 for an individual with set of controls X and k children in 2010 if 
the policy reform extending the maternity leave had not been implemented 
(counterfactual). 
As a reminder, the choice of the treatment group in the difference-in-differences estimation 
implies that out of the set of individuals with children, i.e. with k>0, the analysis restricts attention 
136 
 
to those who had a child in 6 calendar years prior to the year of the interview. The data allow 
estimating 𝑝𝑘
𝑏 and 𝑝𝑘
𝑎, but not 𝑝𝑘
𝑐 .  
Our logistic regression results presented in Table 6, where we consider as treatment groups 
individuals with 1 and 2 children, respectively, imply the following: 
log
𝑝1
𝑎
1 − 𝑝1
𝑎 − log
𝑝1
𝑏
1 − 𝑝1
𝑏 ≥ log
𝑝0
𝑎
1 − 𝑝0
𝑎 − log
𝑝0
𝑏
1 − 𝑝0
𝑏     (1) 
log
𝑝2
𝑎
1 − 𝑝2
𝑎 − log
𝑝2
𝑏
1 − 𝑝2
𝑏 > log
𝑝0
𝑎
1 − 𝑝0
𝑎 − log
𝑝0
𝑏
1 − 𝑝0
𝑏       (2) 
The first equation captures the fact that the coefficient on the interaction term between the 
Treated and After variables is insignificant when the treatment group is defined to consist of the 
individuals who had 1 child born in the 6 years prior to the interview year, and the control group is 
the set of individuals with no children, but the coefficient is positive for all specifications of the 
model, and for most specifications, the null hypothesis that the coefficient is negative can be 
rejected at 10% significance level or close to it. The second equation captures the finding that the 
same coefficient is positive at a significance level of 10% or higher when the treatment group is 
the set of individuals who have 2 children, with at least one of them born in the 6 years prior to the 
interview year.  
Focusing on the case of a treatment group of individuals with 2 children, we can rewrite (2) 
as:  
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( log
𝑝2
𝑎
1 − 𝑝2
𝑎 −  log
𝑝2
𝑐
1 − 𝑝2
𝑐) + ( log
𝑝2
𝑐
1 − 𝑝2
𝑐 −  log
𝑝2
𝑏
1 − 𝑝2
𝑏) > (log
𝑝0
𝑎
1 − 𝑝0
𝑎  –  log
𝑝0
𝑐
1 − 𝑝0
𝑐)
+ (log
𝑝0
𝑐
1 − 𝑝0
𝑐  – log
𝑝0
𝑏
1 − 𝑝0
𝑏)     (3) 
Our underlying parallel trends assumption implies that 
  log
𝑝2
𝑐
1 − 𝑝2
𝑐 −  log
𝑝2
𝑏
1 − 𝑝2
𝑏 = log
𝑝0
𝑐
1 − 𝑝0
𝑐  –  log
𝑝0
𝑏
1 − 𝑝0
𝑏 
   (4) 
i.e. that in the absence of the reform, the two groups of individuals would have moved on the same 
trend. Employing (4), we can rewrite equation (3) as follows:  
( log
𝑝2
𝑎
1 − 𝑝2
𝑎 −  log
𝑝2
𝑐
1 − 𝑝2
𝑐) − (log
𝑝0
𝑎
1 − 𝑝0
𝑎  – log
𝑝0
𝑐
1 − 𝑝0
𝑐) > 0     (5) 
Thus if the parallel trends assumption is satisfied, then the policy reform must have affected 
differently the individuals with 0 children and those with 2 children. Specifically, the net increase 
in the latter’s probability of planning a child is higher than that of the individuals from the former 
category. We investigate next the potential channels through which this effect may emerge.  
To this aim, note first that given (1), we either have  
log
𝑝1
𝑎
1 − 𝑝1
𝑎 − log
𝑝1
𝑐
1 − 𝑝1
𝑐 > log
𝑝0
𝑎
1 − 𝑝0
𝑎 − log
𝑝0
𝑐
1 − 𝑝0
𝑐      (6)  
or, if not, then  log
𝑝2
𝑎
1−𝑝2
𝑎 −  log
𝑝2
𝑐
1−𝑝2
𝑐 > log
𝑝0
𝑎
1−𝑝0
𝑎  – log
𝑝0
𝑐
1−𝑝0
𝑐 =  log
𝑝1
𝑎
1−𝑝1
𝑎 −  log
𝑝1
𝑐
1−𝑝1
𝑐 , where the 
inequality follows from (5), and the equality from the fact that (1) must hold with equality. Thus  
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 log
𝑝2
𝑎
1 − 𝑝2
𝑎 −  log
𝑝2
𝑐
1 − 𝑝2
𝑐 > log
𝑝1
𝑎
1 − 𝑝1
𝑎  – log
𝑝1
𝑐
1 − 𝑝1
𝑐     (7) 
We can combine (6) and (7) into the requirement that 
 log
𝑝𝑘
𝑎
1 − 𝑝𝑘
𝑎 −  log
𝑝𝑘
𝑐
1 − 𝑝𝑘
𝑐 > log
𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎
1 − 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎  –  log
𝑝𝑘−1
𝑐
1 − 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑐     (8) 
must hold for at least one value of  𝑘 ∈ {1,2}. 
Now, note that if the policy reform had no effect on the fertility intentions of individuals 
with 1 or 2 children, then 𝑝𝑘
𝑎 = 𝑝𝑘
𝑐  and 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎 = 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑐 , contradicting condition (8). Therefore, either 
the group of individuals with 1 child or the group of individuals with 2 children must have changed 
their child planning because of the reform. There are several ways in which this change may have 
occurred so as to generate values of the relevant probabilities  𝑝𝑘
𝑎 and 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎  that would satisfy 
condition (8). 
First,  𝑝1
𝑎 and/or 𝑝2
𝑎 may have increased proportionally more than 𝑝0
𝑎 either because of a 
behavioral effect, since individuals who have had one child since the reform have experienced the 
benefits of the extended maternity leave, or because individuals who have already conceived at 
least one child since the reform planned higher order children within the next 3 years following the 
interview rather than later. Alternatively, equation (8) could have been satisfied because the reform 
induced a change in the composition of the groups by determining some individuals to have a child 
that they would yet have not had otherwise by 2010. In the following, we argue that if equation (8) 
is satisfied solely due to an effect of the reform through this latter channel, then it must be that a 
subset of the individuals who made a child because of the reform continued to plan higher order 
children, rather than stopping their fertility.  
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Thus, note that (8) could be satisfied if some individuals who would have otherwise had k-
1 children at the time of the interview in 2010 made a child because of the reform, and thus at the 
time of the interview had k children, but would continue to plan an additional child within the next 
3 years. Such an effect would increase 𝑝𝑘
𝑎 above 𝑝𝑘
𝑐 , as it would expand the set of k-child individuals 
who plan a child in the next 3 years, and at the same time would decrease 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎  below 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑐  since 
it would diminish the set of (k-1)-child individuals who would plan a child in the next 3 years. The 
combined effect of these two adjustments would lead condition (8) to be satisfied. If all individuals 
who move between these sets would have planned at least k+1 children to begin with, and those 
plans would have materialized under both policy regimes, then the effect of the policy reform 
would be solely to reduce the gaps between the times when they conceive their children, without 
an effect on the long term overall fertility rate.  
The second way in which condition (8) could be satisfied is if some individuals who would 
have otherwise had only k-1 children in 2010 made a child because of the reform, and thus would 
have k children in 2010, but would stop planning additional children. Such an effect would decrease 
𝑝𝑘−1
𝑎  below 𝑝𝑘−1
𝑐 , and would simultaneously decrease 𝑝𝑘
𝑎 below 𝑝𝑘
𝑐 . In principle, these adjustments 
may induce condition (8) to be satisfied. We argue next that this cannot be the only way in which 
the reform affected individuals’ child planning so as to lead to satisfy condition (8). 
We will use the following notation: 
 𝐶𝑘 ≡ the number of individuals with k children at the time of the interview, with one 
of them born between 2005 and 2010, who would have planned a child at the time of 
the interview in 2010 in the absence of the policy reform. 
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 𝐴𝑘 ≡ the number of individuals with k children at the time of the interview, with one 
of them born between 2005 and 2010, who would have planned a child at the time of 
the interview in 2010 with the policy reform. 
Also, denote by 𝑆̅ the number of individuals in the complement of a set S. Then, 𝑝𝑘
𝑎 =
𝐴𝑘
𝐴𝑘+?̅?𝑘
, and  𝑝𝑘
𝑐 =
𝐶𝑘
𝐶𝑘+?̅?𝑘
, so 
𝑝𝑘
𝑎
1−𝑝𝑘
𝑎 =
𝐴𝑘
?̅?𝑘
, and 
𝑝𝑘
𝑐
1−𝑝𝑘
𝑐 =
𝐶𝑘
?̅?𝑘
. Assume therefore by contradiction that the 
only effect of the policy was that a number ∆> 0 of individuals moved from the set whose 
cardinality is denoted by 𝐴𝑘−1 to the set whose cardinality is denoted by ?̅?𝑘. Therefore, 𝐴𝑘−1 =
𝐶𝑘−1 − ∆, ?̅?𝑘−1 = 𝐶?̅?−1, 𝐴𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘, and ?̅?𝑘 = 𝐶?̅? + ∆ (*). Substituting these in the expressions for 
the various probabilities stated above, condition (8) becomes 
𝐶𝑘
?̅?𝑘+∆
?̅?𝑘
𝐶𝑘
>
𝐶𝑘−1−∆
?̅?𝑘−1
 
?̅?𝑘−1
𝐶𝑘−1
, which with 
some straightforward manipulations, can be rewritten as 𝐶?̅? + ∆> 𝐶𝑘−1, and then employing the 
expressions derived above in (*), as ?̅?𝑘 > 𝐴𝑘−1 + ∆. For this condition to be satisfied for some 
value of ∆, it is sufficient that it is satisfied when ∆= 1, i.e. it is sufficient that  ?̅?𝑘 > 𝐴𝑘−1 + 1.  
Restricting attention to the individuals between 25 and 42 years old, which we consider in 
our preferred model specification, we have ?̅?2 = 15, 𝐴1 = 17,  ?̅?1 = 40 and 𝐴0 = 185. 
Thus,  ?̅?2 < 𝐴1 + 1 and   ?̅?1 < 𝐴0 + 1. Additionally,  ?̅?2 < 𝐴1 + 1 when we categorize 
individuals according to the control variables that indicate the respondent’s gender and whether or 
not he or she has a partner. The same relationship holds for all but one category defined by the age 
group, the hours worked per week and the income bracket, and to all but two categories when 
categorizing based on the partner’s age. On the other hand, the inequality  ?̅?1 < 𝐴0 + 1 holds for 
all categories defined by the control variables. Finally, a weighted averages of the difference 
between indicator variables corresponding to  ?̅?2 and 𝐴1, on the one hand, and between  ?̅?1 and 
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𝐴0, that accounts for the sample weights, are negative. These findings allow us to conclude that  
 ?̅?2 < 𝐴1 + 1 and   ?̅?1 < 𝐴0 + 1 in our dataset. Note that this does not mean that the sizes of these 
two populations can be ordered in this manner in general. We did not perform a statistical test to 
check such a hypothesis. Instead, we argued that in the case of our specific dataset and estimation, 
the sizes of the two populations satisfy this property aiming to demonstrate that the results from 
our estimation could not have been driven solely by this channel. This argument suggests thus that 
the second potential channel through which equation (8) could be satisfied does not exist. 
  
 
 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Stefani Milovanska-Farrington graduated from the American University of Bulgaria in 2015 
with a CGPA of 3.98 which made her the salutatorian of her class. In the same year, she was admitted 
to a graduate program in Economics at the University of South Florida, and was awarded a Graduate 
Presidential Fellowship for her doctoral study. 
At high school, Stefani focused mainly on Mathematics, and won 1 third, 2 second and 9 first 
places in mathematical contests. She became the valedictorian of her class with the highest possible 
CGPA. 
 As an undergraduate student at the American University in Bulgaria, she worked as a teaching 
assistant in both Economics and Mathematics. She received an Award for Best Research Publication 
in the Journal of International Finance and Economics, as well as an Award for Outstanding 
Achievements in Economics in 2015. One of her research papers was placed among the top 15 papers 
in Economics in the New Economics Talent 2015 Competition, organized by CERGE – EI, Prague, 
Czech Republic. 
In 2016, Stefani obtained her Master's Degree in Economics from the University of South 
Florida with a CGPA of 4.00. She used to be a teaching assistant and an instructor of Economics in 
the same institution. 
Stefani is currently a Visiting Instructor of Economics at the University of Tampa. The article 
in Chapter 1 of the current dissertation has been submitted to the Labour Economics, and Chapter 3 
has received a "revise and resubmit" from the Journal of Family and Economic Issues. 
